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Prologue 
 
Religion has neither gone away nor remained irrelevant in our world today. There is no day 
that we do not hear news about religion in the media. The news we hear about religion and 
violence, however, appears to dominate the headlines. Although the history of religions and 
violence is not a new one, since September 11, 2001 there has been a growing concern about 
religious extremism and terrorism. At the same time, there is a corresponding interest in the 
subject of religion and violence among many disciplines. In the course GEO-83 “Political 
Geography of Religious Radicalism”, we offered students an excursion into the ambivalent 
world of religion and conflict through an exploration of different theoretical perspectives and 
approaches, case studies, seminal and class discussions and extensive literature review. The 
unique angle of interrogation that political geography offers in terms of the spatial dimensions 
and the power relations between different actors as well as the discursive aspects of inter-
religious conflicts and extremism has proved very valuable in generating insights on this 
subject matter.  
This volume is an attempt by students of the M.A. “Human Geography – Global Studies” 
programme of the University of Tübingen to demonstrate acquaintance with the approach of 
political geography to the study of religious violence and extremism. The students took on 
some of the most challenging conflicts and religious insurgencies confronting the world and 
offered insights using diverse theoretical and analytical frameworks. The analysis contained 
in each chapter was based on secondary data. Thus, limitations are set based on the 
availability of and access to data. Given the contested nature of religious conflicts and 
extremism, the reader is invited to consider all the articles in this volume as primarily an 
academic exercise with no intention to promote a certain narrative or to take sides. 
Knowledge is always incremental. Therefore, what is presented here is intended to increase 
our understanding of the phenomenon and to stimulate further research and efforts at finding 
solutions to the various conflicts. 
No doubt, this exercise has exposed the students to the rigour of scientific writing. This 
experience will remain invaluable to them in their continuing academic pursuit as well as in 
their future endeavours. The lecturers also found this experience to be highly rewarding. The 
process was quite daunting, but the commitment and the dedication of the students paid off. 
Congratulations to all the authors for their hard work and special thanks to the student 
assistants Birgit Hoinle and Katherina Mayser for layouting and proof-reading the text!  
Tübingen, October 2013 
Rainer Rothfuß & Yakubu Joseph 
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Global Restrictions on Religion: Religious Freedom as a Human 
Right in Global Perspective 
Marc Seemann  
 
Abstract 
The right to religious freedom is a fundamental human right which is, at least legally, acknowledged 
by almost all countries around the world. But nearly unrestricted freedom of religion is extremely 
rare. Globally, restrictions on the exercise of religion increased in recent years. There is always in 
some way a form of favouritism for a particular religion, even in the most liberal countries of the 
world, be it in political or legal terms. Religious freedom is a commonly accepted, desirable goal in 
today’s globalised and liberal Western philosophy. But is total religious freedom feasible at all and is 
it an aim which governments should pursue? How far should a society or a government go with the 
demands on religious freedom for each individual religious system? What is a "religion" and what are 
religious beliefs and practices for the purpose of protecting the freedom of religion and who has to 
decide these questions? What role should religion play in society? Should societies not have the right 
to self-determination concerning these issues? This chapter attempts to give answers to those 
questions concerning the normative goal of absolute religious freedom, while taking other critical 
factors into consideration such as the historical and cultural heritage of a society. 
 
1. Introduction: Religious freedom in the global context 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18  
 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948, clearly 
sets out that it is the right of every person to exercise his or her religion freely and without any 
restrictions. But this central human right is not generally accepted in the modern era. Already 
2.500 years ago, Cyrus the Great of Persia, had established a broad regime of religious 
tolerance (Hertzke 2011: 109). But until now mankind has not been able to enforce this 
freedom right globally. This right has in fact been established in most national law systems 
and exists at least formally in most countries of the world. But legal practice often is different. 
More and more people worldwide live with tough restrictions on their religious freedom and 
often contradicting legal provisions; political practices and social values prevail. The 
increasing global restrictions on religious freedom are illustrated by figure 1. Restrictions 
concerning religious freedom are rising almost worldwide; so does the percentage of the 
global population living in countries where the level of restrictions is high, respectively very 
high (Pew Forum 2013: 10).  
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Source: Pew Forum 2013: 10 
Fig. 1 Global Restrictions on Religion  
As already indicated, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constantly faces debates 
concerning its claim for “universality”. Lundquist (2011: 75) points out that widely differing 
cultural and religious traditions and beliefs have inhibited a commonly accepted agreement on 
the definition of human rights and how they should be upheld. Whatever the reason might be, 
it is quite clear that among adherents of different religious systems it is apparently not 
possible to reach an agreement on such fundamental issues. In this context an interesting 
question is: if religions already fail on this fundamental level, how could they coexist in 
complete freedom? The above mentioned fact illustrates how difficult the way to a genuine 
religious freedom is. All in all, and in reference to the topic of this chapter, the core research 
question is: Considering the cultural and historical background, as well as the self-
determination of a community, how far should the demands for religious freedom go? This 
chapter is devoted to this question, among other relevant aspects. For this reason it is divided 
into two parts. The first part deals with the role religion plays in a society and in policy. 
Unconditional freedom of religion or a genuine religious pluralisation is correspondingly rare. 
Rather, it can be seen that nearly in every society the hegemony of a particular religion is 
ostensibly desired by the majority of the population. So, is it not more desirable to grant any 
population this right of self-determination rather than strive for a goal that the majority 
usually does not seem to support? The chapter also takes another look at the role of the 
historical and cultural background of various religious systems. 
The second part will throw a critical view on religious freedom. It deals with the fact that it is 
extremely difficult to implement genuine religious freedom because there are a large numbers 
of religious movements and splinter religions, besides the five world religions, of which all 
would interfere themselves by unrestricted exercise and which claim to be foundational, and 
thus encompassing and universal. How far should the demand for religious freedom go when 
a belief prevents the other from free exercise? To what extent is religious radicalism to be 
regarded as free exercise of religion, or at what point should it be restricted? Finally, 
everything leads to the question: Is a genuine religious freedom possible at all? 
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2. The role of religion in society and politics 
In reference to the topic of this chapter, it is important to investigate what role religion plays 
in a society and what impact faith has on an adherent. How great is the influence of religion 
on his attitudes and decisions? From this view angle, it is interesting to scrutinize if and how a 
certain religious background may affect the decision makers of a country in terms of political 
and legal decisions. But first of all it is interesting to analyse the percentage of world 
population that is religious at all to clarify the role of religion in today's society. In figure 2 it 
can be seen that there was a dramatic change that has taken place over 100 years. In 1910 
nearly the entire world was religious. By 2010 religious adherence had declined in many parts 
of the world (Johnson and Ross 2010: 6).  
 
Source: Johnson and Ross 2010: 6 
Fig. 2 Percentage of the world that is religious 
Especially in the western society a move away from religious values is recognized, 
particularly concerning partnership affairs (divorce, homosexual couples, sex before marriage, 
etc.). Despite this decline, religion is still very important for a community. It represents an 
important source of identity for many individuals in the world, especially when they live in a 
pluralistic society. In such a society a religious system can be strengthened when a sense of 
religious identity is shared by a certain number of adherents but it has social effects as well. 
An individual feels some sort of affiliation to a specific group of like-minded individuals 
(Stump 2008: 15). And naturally an individual will tend to take over the views of the own 
faith group and integrate them into everyday life. This automatism becomes crucial if an 
individual holds a leading role in politics or in society. There is a hypothesis that legal 
systems tend to reinforce the hegemony of a certain religious system, using this certain 
religious system as an implicit model of what constitutes a religion, and thereby maintaining 
the marginalisation and restricting the freedom of other religions. Issues of religious freedom 
therefore frequently end up being the subject of legal judgement and political disputes (Beyer 
2003: 333). Any politicians, judges and other public servants within the legal system will, of 
course, be always influenced to some extent by their religious background and related 
normative values. If so, is liberal politics possible at all? According to Vallier (2012: 149) it is 
a commonplace that liberalism and religious belief be in conflict. A politician, a judge or 
another incumbent on a political or legal level is supposed to suppress his faith to the exercise 
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of his profession, but is this genuine liberal politics? This question is very philosophical and 
complex, therefore a general answer cannot be given. What can be said is that the most 
important political commonality in an enlightened society, the legal basis, founds in joint 
liabilities, including civil rights and liberties, including freedom of religion as a condition of 
mutual recognition (Höffe 2011: 57). 
In this context Hittinger (2011: 45 f.) says that the “care of the right of religious liberty 
belongs to the whole citizenry, social groups, the Church and other religious communities in 
the manner appropriate to each. Beyond the immediate issues of law and public order the 
‘usages of society’ are presumed to be uses of freedom in their full range” and “society does 
not ‘belong’ to either the state or a religious system.” In summary it can be said that on the 
one hand religious freedom is crucial to societies and peace (Hertzke 2011: 108), but on the 
other hand some religious values are outdated and do not fit the image of a modern 
enlightened society and a secular and liberal state. 
2.1 Religion in a cultural and historical setting 
This chapter illustrates at the one hand that different regions with a different historical and 
cultural background tend to favour a particular religion. This is mainly due to the specific 
cultural and historical development that a region or a society underwent. Therefore, it is quite 
normal that a particular religion is preferred. The spatial distributions of a religious system 
and their development through diverse processes and over hundreds of years have fostered a 
specific religious environment in specific world regions. Which religious system has 
developed in which region mainly depended on the cultural development from which these 
processes were taking place. Thus, as an expression of culture, a religion’s worldview is 
socially produced and maintained. The fundamental aspects of every religion affect various 
aspects of cultural life in various forms (Stump 2008: 8 ff). Stump (2008: 11) shows that 
cultural variations within a community of believers can lead to conflict as specific individuals 
or groups contest the meanings of specific elements of their religious system or if they 
challenge the meanings of specific elements, respectively the whole believe of another group. 
According to Stump (2008: 11) such conflicts grow, the more a community becomes diverse. 
So, referring to Stump, it can be concluded that from a historical and cultural point of view a 
single religious system will provoke less conflicts within a community than a variety of 
religious systems.   
On the other hand, although the most religious systems claim to be encompassing and 
universal, foundational of all human existence, including “nonreligious” social structures, the 
parallel claims of other religions and the greater power of other social modalities qualify those 
claims both in principle and in practice. In such a context it can be seen from a historical point 
of view that neither the hegemony of one single religious system nor a variety of religious 
systems is an advantage (Beyer 2003: 337). A good example for that point is India. In 2012 
the population was 1.259 billion people (Stiftung Weltbevölkerung 2012: 12), there were five 
main faiths, namely Hinduism (which includes Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists), Islam, 
Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Judaism, besides there are several sects and sub-sects living 
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in rather peaceful co-existence (Pal 2011: 233). This wide religious diversity is grounded in 
the history of the country, so is the traditional right of every religion to exercise their faith 
freely. The Indian state is expressly prohibited to discriminate any citizens on the grounds of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth (ibid: 236). Yet, in stark contrast to this observation, 
there were and there are still today violent conflicts between several religious groups. Figure 3 
shows that India appears to be one of the countries worldwide with the strongest “social 
hostilities” between different religious groups. 
 
Source: Pew Forum 2013: 39 
Fig. 3 Restrictions on Religion among the 25 Most Populous Countries 
Nevertheless, India is a rather positive example concerning religious freedom as the 
government at least seems to contend a new wave of anti-conversion laws which favour the 
traditionally dominant religions and discriminate those individuals wanting to change their 
religion. The world in general, not just India, is becoming more and more pluralistic, so 
sooner or later people in general will be forced to live in more or less pluralistic societies. 
This shall not conceal the fact that some countries in recent years have increasingly tried to 
encounter those trends by rigidly persecuting and expelling specific religious minorities, 
trying to establish national, container like territories with a homogeneous religious 
composition of the citizenship.  
At the global level, no religion has a majority position. In the past it could be said that 
ethnicity and religion are often linked. But today this correlation is becoming less and less 
relevant. Many minority religions in today’s world are not ethnically based (Durham Jr. 2011: 
363). To come back to the question asked at the beginning of this chapter, if a plurality of 
many religious groups living in freedom next to each other is possible, the answer is yes, in 
the future they have to. How long the process may take until a society is “ready” to accept the 
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diversity of religions is hard to say and not even the trend towards increasing tolerance can be 
considered as natural and global. 
 
3. Critical view on religious freedom 
To summarize the first part of this chapter it can be said that genuine religious freedom is 
difficult to implement in political and social life and considering the history of the world, a 
genuine religious freedom had never been there. This raises the question of the feasibility of a 
absolute religious freedom, which is to be answered at this point.  
The right of religious freedom can be considered from two perspectives. On the one hand, 
there are groups that are limited to some extent in the exercise of their faith. On the other 
hand, there are minorities or certain faith groups and extreme currents of a particular religion 
which are responsible for such restrictions by exercising their faith in a radical way, using 
religion as an excuse for violence. From this observation, a kind of paradox can be derived 
and it shows the main problem statement of this work. If there is a restriction for some radical 
movements of a certain faith then it can be stated that there is no genuine religious freedom in 
the respective country. But if there were no restrictions at all, the radical groups would 
impede other religious movements to exercise their faith freely. Thus a certain point must be 
found, a balance between religious freedom and restriction of religious freedom, if it becomes 
necessary to avoid greater conflicts. Finding and constantly adjusting the right balance is the 
main challenge here. The question whether genuine religious freedom is possible is to be 
answered with no, considering the above statement. It is not possible to admit all religious 
systems the same liberties without hindering any of them in their free exercise.  
So what is the solution for this paradox? Looking at the world today and according to Beyer 
(2003: 333) the maintenance of some kind of religious hegemony is the rule all across global 
society. Furthermore, Beyer (2003: 333) says that “(...) limitations, frequently expressed in 
legal judgments and political decisions, are more or less to be expected because they flow 
from the peculiar way that religion has been constructed in the modern and global era as both 
a privileged and privatized, as both an encompassing and marginalized social domain.” In 
general, it seems that some nations of this world tend to overtly control and restrict religious  
freedom, reinforcing the local hegemony of one religion or an atheistic or other national 
ideology (Beyer 2003: 333). In fact there are very strong contrasts between different nations 
and their way to handle religious freedom.  
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Source: Pew Forum 2013: 35 
Fig. 4 Government restrictions around the world 
Referring to Figure 4 and the Pew Forum (2013: 13, 39), 40 % of the world’s countries have 
high or even very high levels of restriction. Furthermore it can be observed that most of the 
nations where the restrictions of the freedom of religion are high or very high are 
predominantly Muslim-dominated, whereas Christian countries are in average much more 
liberal. In order to implement genuine religious freedom it is necessary to answer the 
following questions: To what extent does a belief system behave as a spiritual religion and 
where is the limit where the secular state and other faith group’s freedom rights are being 
hampered? To answer this question it is important to clarify how "religion" is defined. This is 
quite complex. There is an extensive scholarly and theological debate about that subject. 
Stringer (2008: 1) emphasizes that “there are almost as many different definitions of religion 
as there are people who try to define it.” Stump (2008: 7), however, defines a religion “(...) as 
a cultural system, an integrated complex of meanings, symbols, and behaviours articulated by 
a community of adherents.” So it is very hard to say what counts as religious system and what 
not. According to the definition of Stump nearly every little community of members with a 
certain faith has to be considered as a religious system. The next question which arises is 
whose adherents can effectively claim to exercise their religion freely and which not and who 
decides that? To decide this it would be necessary to have clearly distinguishable patterns or 
specifications to assess what does and does not belong to a religion or what does and does not 
constitute religion (Beyer 2003: 334). Since it is difficult, as shown above, to define at all 
what can be considered as a religion and what cannot, these two questions are hard to answer. 
It is impossible to give an ultimate and all-encompassing answer to these two questions 
because they are very ethical and philosophical. The following chapter will attempt to give 
some kind of a response to these two questions. 
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3.1 Religious freedom in context of respect, tolerance and moral 
If, as described in the previous paragraph, no absolute religious freedom is feasible or 
reasonable, how can a peaceful co-existence between adherents of different religious systems 
be accomplished? Unfortunately, there is no ultimate global standard for the handling of a 
state or a society with a diversity of different religions. This question is more about individual 
respect, tolerance and morality. Hittinger (2011: 39) reiterates this point by saying that 
“religious freedom is seen first and foremost from an anthropological and moral perspective”. 
Hertzke (2011: 111) emphasizes this fact by saying that “variations of the golden rule – to 
treat others as we would wish to be treated – are found in virtually every major religion and 
many philosophical traditions (such as Confucianism). This trait of common humanity – 
potentially recognizable by people of all faiths or no faith – can provide a justification for 
religious liberty understood as the freedom to live in accord with one’s conscience or belief.” 
Or to say it with the words of Mahatma Gandhi: “I have come to the conclusion that, if it is 
proper and necessary to discover an underlying unity among all religions, a master key is 
needed. The master key is that of truth and non-violence” (Pal 2011: 245). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The questions if religious hegemony is per se worse and if the freedom of religion is an aim 
that should have a high priority are in fact quite complex to answer when regarded in a global 
context. The fact that religious freedom must prevail in a modern secular state is undeniable. 
Furthermore, it can ultimately be noted that absolute religious freedom is not met in any 
country in the world but that in each state a particular religion, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, is preferred to some extent. In this sense full religious freedom is apparently 
not feasible and not desirable as it would neglect the cultural rootedness of societies. The 
“freedom of religion(s)” always will be subject to a certain degree of limitation. Therefore in 
my opinion it would be logical, realistic and more important, instead of striving for the 
seemingly unattainable goal of absolute religious freedom, to pursue the goal of a 
comprehensive "religious tolerance". By that I mean that there may well be a prevailing 
religious system supported by the majority of the society but beyond that other religions are 
fully tolerated by the whole society. The toleration of the diversity of religions or creeds is a 
must in a modern society. To answer the question from the beginning of this chapter, whether 
a genuine religious freedom seems really desirable or possible and how far should the 
demands for religious freedom go: In my opinion an absolute religious freedom is not 
possible, since certain belief systems and religious groups are too radical and must be limited 
in their rights, in order not to endanger the free secular state as well as other values and 
human rights, as set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN. Every 
religion, religious community or movement should have the right to exercise their faith freely 
at any time and at any place on earth within the given UN statutory framework. Additional 
fittings for a peaceful co-existence of different systems of belief ought to be possible. For me, 
this is ultimately a question of social and cultural development. Tolerance towards difference 
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and plurality must be the aim. Hence, at the core stands no longer the sole question of the 
degree of limitation of freedom of religion but the question of the degree of tolerance. 
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Religious Extremism and Slavery in the Sahel: Historical and 
Present Structures 
Sabine Stefanie Bösl 
 
Abstract 
Slavery has existed for centuries and is still an integral part of many societies in several forms all over 
the world. The following paper tries to uncover the structures of historical and contemporary slavery 
in the Sahel and to explain in detail this condition of inhumanity, which "denies a human being worth, 
dignity and freedom" (Turaki 2010: 76). Furthermore, a connection to religious extremism is evealed 
to help understand the emergence of the current structures in this region. By using Sudan as a case 
study, a more detailed explanation will be given on how suppression can be justified by one religion 
over another, and what impact this can have both on the oppressed religion and on the entire social 
fabric. The Sudanese example shows how the ancient structures of slavery are still anchored in the 
Sudanese society today and how they could expand again in the past decades, especially during the 
second civil war between the largely Muslim North and the non-Muslim South. 
 
1. Introduction 
Slavery is mostly considered as the transatlantic slave trade, which emerged approximately in 
1450 and had reached its zenith in the first half of the 19th century, as Europeans sold Africans 
to North America (Flaig 2011: 160f). But what role has slavery played before the transatlantic 
slave trade in Africa, what role has the sale of slaves to other countries played and what role 
does it play today even within societies? Slavery has not been effectively abolished till today; 
it is an explosive and very present topic, which sometimes also relates to religious extremism. 
The following paper will deal with slavery and religious extremism in the Sahel in past and 
present. The Sahel is defined as the belt south of the Sahara, which reaches from the Atlantic 
to the Red Sea. The countries belonging to the Sahel zone, are Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia (Haack 2008: 
168).  
This working paper is based on the slavery definition of Paul Lovejoy: "Slavery was one form 
of exploitation. Its special characteristics included the idea that slaves were property; that they 
were outsiders who were alien by origin or who had been denied their heritage through 
judicial or other sanction; that coercion could be used at will; that their labour power was at 
the complete disposal of a master; that they did not have the right to their own sexuality and, 
by extension, to their own reproductive capacities; and that the slave status was inherited [...]" 
(Lovejoy 1983: 1).  
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2. The connection between religious radicalism and slavery 
There is a very important link between slavery and religious radicalism when people of 
different religious background are involved in the exploitation relationships. Religion is a 
factor that underlies many conflicts, wars, devaluation and discrimination.  
Slavery is also linked to these factors and can be employed as an instrument to suppress 
people from another religion. Inter-religious enslavement is strongly associated with the 
superiority thinking of one religion over another which serves as justification of the 
exploitation of the ‘other’. Slavery is a form of sanction which has been performed by almost 
all human societies and religious groups at some point of time during the historical past. 
Religion is often baseline for the justification of slavery and oppression. (Turaki 2010: 76)  
Religious extremism is a phenomenon which is elusive and difficult to define, since it is 
constituted on the basis of a "normal behaviour". The deviation of religious extremism of this 
"normal behaviour" is difficult to measure. Thus, this deviation, which is characterised by 
institutionalised expectations, is interpreted differently depending on the culture. Extremism 
is embedded between terrorism, as the most extreme form, and radicalism. Extremists belief 
in a homogenous community, targeting society as a whole, with the consequence of coercion 
and suppression of minorities (Bötticher/Mareŝ 2012: 51f). Religious extremism is committed 
to faith-based values which cannot be brought into line with human rights standards. It is 
characterised by intolerance against other faith groups and atheists as well as stigmatisation 
and devaluation. Religious extremists try to enforce their religion in society at large and in 
public space. Violence is a typical but an obligatory feature of religious extremism. Main 
forms of violence are religious wars, religious terrorism and repression against members of 
marginalised religious communities (Bötticher/Mareŝ 2012: 275ff). 
The Jihad, an expression of Islamic extremism, played an important role during the 
enslavement of Africa. Jihad is understood as a religious duty of all Muslim believers and has 
been employed by conquerors as a strategic instrument of warfare to pursue geopolitical 
goals. This religious duty comprised fighting a war that leads to the subjugation of non-
Muslim peoples. It is often referred to as a ‘holy war’, which is prescribed, legitimized and is 
performed for and also rewarded by God (Flaig 2011: 83; Bötticher/Mareŝ 2012: 255). Turaki 
(2010: 50) defines the worldwide spatial dichotomy in the Islamic worldview as follows: 
"Islam divides the world into two spheres, Dar al-Islam (house of Islam) and Dar al-Harb 
(house of war, or areas belonging to unbelievers). Through jihad the Dar al-Harb becomes the 
Dar al-Islam." Slavery and the enslavement are justified by the fact that the Islamic warriors 
solely act in the sense of their God and serve him. In this case the religion acts very radical to 
force other people to convert to Islam or, alternatively, live in total subjugation as stipulated 
in Sharia laws. No other religion besides Islam is tolerated; this is why the enslavement of 
other Muslims is forbidden (Flaig 2001: 112; Fisher/Fisher 1970: 17). In general, any 
‘unbeliever’ who got captured during a Jihad had the chance to be enslaved or had to die. 
Jihads have been the common instrument to enslave people and to meet the increasing 
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demand for new slaves. Those Jihads, almost without exception, had to be regarded as regular 
wars with the purpose of conquest. In the conquered areas many tribes had already been 
converted to Islam but against the very logic of Jihad still were considered as slave reservoirs 
(Flaig 2011: 121f). According to Flaig (2011: 145) the purpose of Jihad had changed over 
time: Originally serving to force unbelievers to convert to Islam, Jihad has been increasingly 
used to constantly obtain new slaves for all kinds of domestic, administrative, productive and 
military tasks. Slavery in the trans-Saharan context apparently has had a strong relationship 
with religious oppression and suppression. 
Jihads did not lead only to the enslavement of Africans but also involved genocides. 
Genocides are characterised by the special purpose to destroy, in whole or in part, directly or 
indirectly, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Genocides are referred to as 
“crime of crimes”. There were literal hunts on African slaves during which genocides in the 
strictest sense could occur as many of the affected tribes have been completely obliterated. All 
prisoners, which could be used as slaves, were forced to go with the hunters. Usually, all of 
the others, such as old or ill people, children etc., were killed (Flaig 2011: 145). Genocide can 
be seen as the worst expression of violent religious extremism. In general, the measure of 
enslavement does not pursue the goal to completely exterminate tribes but rather to aggregate 
labour force or to increase military power. Nevertheless, the subjugation of people and their 
deliberate devaluation is a warning signal and can get visible in many different forms, like 
enslavement, genocides, racism, among others (Barth 2006: 183f). 
 
3. Historical structures of slavery 
3.1 The beginning and origin of slavery and the link to religious radicalism 
There is a difficulty marking the exact beginning of slavery. But a clear fact is that slavery 
was pervasive in all the ancient societies, like in the Orient, Egypt, Greece and Rome. The 
oldest evidences that slavery existed were found in the Orient and are dated to the early 3rd 
millennium before Christ. In Pharaonic Egypt, there have been already several types of slaves 
and forced labour, so that there was a differentiation for example between a purchased slave 
or a state slave (Flaig 2011: 33f). Already during the Jewish slave-history a strict distinction 
between Jewish bondages or slaves and slaves of foreign origin was made (Flaig 2011: 34).  
Slavery in the Sahel reached its highest level in the first half of the 19th century, as the export 
of rubber became an important economic factor. The demand of commodities such as rubber, 
ivory, ostrich feathers, salt, livestock, grain etc. in Europe and also in the savannah increased. 
The production in the Sahel was heavily dependent on the labour of slaves. Therefore, the 
number of slaves rose considerably in those years, especially from the 1830ies to the 1850ies 
and donated this area prosperity. The slaves were used for all kinds of labour but especially 
for heavy physical work. They collected manure for fires, minded and watered the herds, 
loaded and unloaded camels for the trade, did constructing, prepared food and did a lot of 
other work for their masters, so that slavery itself was an essential building block within the 
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whole economic and social system (Lovejoy 1983: 210ff). But not only export trade was an 
important factor in increasing the number of slaves, the other factor was the expansion of the 
regional economies (ibid: 184). 
The procurement of the increasing demand of slaves took place through the transformation 
process in this area. Since 1804 series of jihads took place in the whole region and religiously 
transformed large parts from Senegambia in the west to the Red Sea in the east. The 
transformation ended with the enslavement of millions of people (Lovejoy 1983: 184). The 
example of Sudan shows to which extent slavery has been adopted in some parts of the Sahel: 
in the end of the 19th century, the quote of slaves at the total population reached from 30 to 
50 per cent and also up to 80 per cent in some commercial and production centres (ibid: 184f). 
Enslavement in the Sahel in the 19th century is characterised by two main phases: the first 
phase occurred due to far-reaching restructuring of the old systems, such as political 
economy, which led to an expansion of the plantation system. Most of the slaves concentrated 
in Senegambia, Niger and Sudan. The second phase lasted from 1850 to 1900 when the slave 
concentration mostly rose in the southern parts of the Sahel (Lovejoy 1983: 188). 
Slavery is a phenomenon which historically often occurred when one religion tried to 
suppress another. This "superiority" of one religion over another which is symbolically 
reflected in the form of slavery has often occurred between different religions. In the case of 
the transatlantic slave trade the European Christians have been enslavers over the Africans. 
The Portuguese gave the impetus with regard to the transatlantic slave trade. They started with 
large-scale oceanic exploration in the 15th century and subsequently began with the import of 
slaves from Senegambia (Flaig 2011: 161). In the same century the transatlantic slave trade 
began and many of the European countries were involved. In this case the Africans have been 
the sellers of humans, the Europeans the purchasers, who resold the slaves to the transatlantic 
colonies (ibid: 171ff). The largest export regions were Gabon, Congo and Angola. (ibid: 172) 
The transatlantic slave trade existed from about 1450 until 1900. During this period nearly 
11,700,000 Africans were deported (Lovejoy 1983: 19).  
 
3.2 Forms of slavery  
There are five main differentiations within the African slavery: chattel slavery, household 
slavery, service-provider slavery, permanent indenture and child slavery. The chattel slavery 
rose after the collapse of the transatlantic slave trade. It benefitted from the conditions given 
in the Sahel because of several factors such as good conditions for large-scale crop cultivation 
due to abundance of water, governments which did not oppose slavery through anti-slavery 
legislation. Another type of slavery is the household slavery. This type is characterised by the 
fact that most of the slaves remain in the same household for lifetime and their children are 
supposed to do the same work. Often, these slaves are closely linked to the master’s family, 
because of the long-term durability of the exploitation relationship and were often found in 
the rural parts of the Sahel. The service provider slavery has its roots in building up a military 
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system with slaves serving as soldiers; in many cases slaves took over administrative 
functions. The slaves received some power within the exploitation system and in return they 
secured their total loyalty towards their masters. The indentured slavery has a strong 
correlation with the Sahelian Quran schools and is a kind of contractual relationship between 
children and their masters, the Quran teachers. The children have the duty to beg for coins in 
cities. This form of slavery expanded after World War I as a reaction to the attempt of the 
colonial powers to abolish all other forms of slavery. Child slavery is the last category which 
is generally related to child labour as a form of economic exploitation. This type of slavery 
has gained more importance until today than the other forms of slavery in the Sahel (Brynn 
2008). 
 
3.3 The Arabian impact on slavery and religious radicalism 
Arab Muslims began to occupy the north of Africa in the late seventh century after Christ. 
Soon afterwards the trans-Saharan slave trade began whereby the Arabs acted as buyers and 
merchants. For people who were captured in wars against Muslims the justification for 
becoming enslaved was the status of ‘unbeliever’ and not the racial criterion (Hunwick 2006: 
75f). The Prophet Muhammad is quoted like: "White has no preference over black, nor black 
over white except through devoutness" (ibid: 76). "Devoutness" again shows the religious 
aspect in the issue of slavery. As long as you are devout, you are permitted to suppress other 
people independently of their skin colour. The prevailing attitudes are not caused primarily by 
preachers and traditional aspects, but also by warriors and slave owners who have shaped this 
attitude in Islamic society and built several stereotypes about slaves as a "lazy, stupid, evil-
smelling and lecherous slave" (ibid: 77). In general, Arabs saw all black Africans as "weak-
minded savages" and as "inferior human beings whom they could claim as slaves" (ibid: 89). 
The fact that the Arabs saw black Africans as "inferior human beings" shows the attitude of 
superiority-thinking which served as justification to force other people into the worst form of 
oppression: slavery. The first Africans who had been enslaved by the Arabs were Ethiopians. 
Later the Arabs expanded "their territory" and enslaved black Africans who became their 
main slave reservoir until the 20th century (ibid: 89). 
 
4. Present structures of slavery 
4.1 Status quo 
Although the religiously motivated terror attacks declined in worldwide average to the lowest 
level of a five-year observation period in 2011, the violent occurrences in parts of Africa and 
also in Latin America have risen to the highest level (Nicoll 2012: 1f). As Nicoll (2012: 1) 
states, "in Mali, Mauretania, Niger and Nigeria, Islamist militants have filled power vacuums 
created by ineffectual national governments, and tapped into religious and socio-economic 
grievances". Furthermore, these activities show a so called spill-over effect influencing other 
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countries of the Sahel as well, becoming more and more destabilised by militant insurgencies. 
Also the AQIM, the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, is currently operating in the Sahel with 
support from Islamist radicals and from outside the region. Their conservative aim is the 
return of the rule of ‘original’ Islam in this area (Nicoll 2012: 1f). 
Considering the distribution of religions in the Sahel, Islam today is increasingly dominating 
the picture. The whole North part of Africa is dominated by Islam with a decreasing religious 
diversity over the past century. (Johnson 2009) This development is partly the result of the 
discriminatory effects of religious extremism, of historical Jihads and slavery. The only areas 
that are still significantly influenced by other religions are Nigeria and Ethiopia with a share 
of Christians as well as Sudan and Chad with a proportion of animists (Haack 2008: 170). 
Africa as a whole is separated in two parts: nearly the whole North is dominated by Muslims, 
the South mainly by Christians. This is a development which has occurred in the last century. 
In 1910 the majority religion in Africa was Ethnoreligion with about 58%, followed by the 
Islam with 32% and only 9% of the whole African population were Christians. In 2010 the 
percentage was completely different: the majority religion in Africa was Christianity with 
48% almost exclusively in the South of the continent, followed by the Islam with 40% of the 
whole African population (Johnson 2009).  
Religious extremism today is nearly back on the highest level in history and even slavery did 
not fully disappear in the last century. It has survived and returned in renewed strength. Under 
colonial influence, slavery was pushed back and was considered abolished (Lobban 2001). 
There are several factors which have sustained or even strengthened slavery until today. One 
reason is the embryonic development stage and sometimes even collapse of secular state-
funded education systems, especially in the rural parts of the Sahel, allowing child slavery to 
flourish in this area. Another factor is the reinforcement of religious extremism and 
fundamentalism in the region. The increasing poverty particularly in rural parts of the Sahel as 
well as the weaker presence of central governments in marginal areas contributes to this 
development (Brynn 2008). 
 
4.2 Current forms of slavery 
Since a few years several parts of the developing world witness the globalization of child 
slavery. Four factors influence and give rise to this new type: one factor is the critical poverty 
level in most parts of the Sahel which forces parents to give their children away to a master, to 
ensure food provision for the family. Another reason are the recently emerging new plantation 
systems where children are used for harvesting cocoa, bananas, cotton, etc. Another aspect is 
the enhanced transportation system, allowing children to work at distant locations (Brynn 
2008). But also governments have an impact on the expansion of children slavery because the 
"effective governance by central authorities in certain West African states" declines or is 
simply not given (Brynn 2008). There are several other forms and variations of slavery which 
exist today, such as: bonded labour, forced labour, early and forced marriage, slavery by 
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descent, meaning that the respective individuals were born into slavery, and also human 
trafficking as the commercial core activity of the enslavement process (Anti-Slavery 
International n.d.). 
 
4.3 Case study: Civil war in Sudan  
The civil wars between the southern and northern part of Sudan which started just before 
independence of Sudan from the British in 1956, led to a resurgence of slavery. Especially 
after the beginning of the second civil war in 1983 enslavement became a widespread strategy 
of terroristic warfare when Dinka women and children from southern Sudan were captured, 
abducted and sold. The captured persons were Christian or animist black African Sudanese 
from the south who were enslaved by Arab Muslims from the north. The Sudanese 
government equipped Arab Muslim nomads from the region bordering with the south as 
paramilitaries against the rebels of the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) and to 
commit atrocisties against the civil population. The government indirectly supported and, at 
the same time, denied the existence of slavery, calling it instead "kidnapping" by usual 
criminals. In the course of enslavement through the North up to 300 000 people were forcibly 
abducted and taken out of the South for decades since the beginning of the civil wars. Until 
today there still live and work many slaves from the South in mostly rural areas of the North, 
especially in the households of their Muslim masters. (Rothfuss 2013: 121) 
"Slavery in Sudan is initiated through violent raiding, which reduces the status of an abducted person 
from a condition of freedom and citizenship to one of slavery, cheap labourer, and a liability, when 
physically unﬁt. Most important is that citizenship and entitlement to legal protection are undermined, 
whether through lack of laws or violation of existing laws, leaving the state unable to protect individual 
rights" (Jok 2001: 4).  
There are several factors that influence slavery in Sudan. Of course, the civil war and the 
government play important roles in the enslavement processes, but also the religious norms 
and the long-lasting tradition of slavery in this region is a major aspect: Large parts of the 
population ‘tolerated’ slavery because it had been practised against non-Muslim populations 
for centuries.  
The religion and in the following the religious extremism are important factors in the 
Sudanese civil wars. The Islam arrived in Sudan in the 7th century A.D. (Ousman 2004: 90) 
The North is marked by a mainly Muslim Arab speaking population whereas southern Sudan 
was subject to some extent to Western and Christian influence and shows a stronger 
indigenous African self-identification and awareness: 
"Many northern Sudanese had the notion that there were a bunch of uncivilized tribes in the South, and 
very condescendingly, Northerners regarded themselves as guardians of these, their backward brethren. 
[...] Northern Sudanese politicians and administrators sought to replace the colonial regime in the South 
with their own. Arabic was naturally to replace English and what better religion than Islam could 
replace Christianity" (Obervation of a unknown South Sudanese/ ObDeng 2001).  
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But there was always a strong southern Sudanese resistance against the northern suppression 
and humiliation: "The more the South grows, the more Northerners feel threatened and the 
stronger their attachment to Arab Islamic identity becomes" (ibid).  
Just as the self-identification of the northern Sudanese with Islam gets stronger, also the the 
South Sudanese adhere more strongly to their religion which is increasingly Christianity 
(Rothfuss 2013). For Southerners Christianity is not only a religion, it is also a "political 
weapon against Islamization and Arabization" (Deng 2001). This way it is not only a religious 
belief but also a political statement. In January 2005, the second civil war between the North 
and South Sudan ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This agreement 
foresaw a durable ceasefire and a semi-autonomous government for South Sudan. In addition, 
it regulated the southern Sudan referendum on independence which took place six years later 
in 2011 and led to the splitting up of the conflict-torn country. According to international 
NGOs, the government of South Sudan and other local sources many Southerners still remain 
enslaved under very cruel conditions in Sudan until today (BBC 2013; Rothfuss 2013). 
 
4.4 Conlusion and outlook 
"Human rights have their origin in the fight against slavery. They exist, as long as this worst form of 
personal privation is outlawed, and they fall, when slavery returns. [By the human rights] there could be 
calculated the chances of a political universalism, which is able to unite humanity." (Flaig 2011: 11) 
Unfortunately, slavery is still quite often a part of societies worldwide. This "tainted legacy" 
(Turaki 2010) has often been erased from historical consciousness and narratives. In the last 
decades, slavery has even recovered and regained importance in connection with religious 
radicalisation and global linkages of economic exploitation also involving the West. In the 
case study of Sudan it could be shown that religious extremism can drive slavery. As long as 
certain groups adhere to superiority-thinking, justifying oppression, slavery will remain a part 
of our world. In addition, states must also intervene themselves instead of indirectly using 
slavery as a weapon to weaken specific religious or cultural groups within their societies. 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon underlined in 2012:  
“Today governments, civil society and the private sector must unite to eradicate all contemporary forms 
of slavery. Together, let us do our utmost for the millions of victims throughout the world who are held 
in slavery and deprived of their human rights and dignity" (UN 2012). 
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‘Othering’ in the Postcolonial World: The Reproduction of 
Colonial Structures in African Societies (Malawi) 
Jana Mauthner  
 
Abstract 
Western attitudes towards Middle Eastern and Far Eastern states have often been criticized to be 
imperialistic, led by prejudices and arbitrary conceptions of other cultures and religions. In the 
following the conception of this Orientalist world view has been reflected critically by many scholars 
(Craiutu 2010: 265). Edward Said is one of the most popular authors who promoted this criticism. 
Said states that, in producing differences between the Self and the Other, the Orientalist discourse, 
reinforces the bias and conflicts between the West and the Orient. Orientalism is also closely related 
to colonial policies (Ghazoul 2004: 124). In colonial states the western powers imposed their own 
system of knowledge and values on indigenous people. This ‘Othering’ is often transferred, not at least 
promoted by the Protestant church, to a post-colonial era, how the case of the African state Malawi 
shows (Jones and Manda 2006: 197). Thus, the paper deals with the reproduction of colonial 
structures in postcolonial African states via discourses, like Foucault and Said describe them. The 
argument offered here, is that we need to follow Said’s assumptions to understand, that it is necessary 
to overcome the essentialisation of people in order to reduce the possibility of religious conflicts, and 
the reproduction of constructions of the colonial age. Thus, difference should no longer be seen as a 
threat but a chance. Nonetheless, the perception of Said and other scholars who endorsed the criticism 
on Orientalism should not be overemphasised. 
 
1. Introduction 
Said’s book called ‘Orientalism’ is viewed as remarkably powerful in opening the field for 
postcolonial thinking in literacy (Mellor 2004: 99). Identifying the failures in human 
representations and realities, Said strives to show, that the representation of Eastern and 
Middle Eastern history is clearly led by prejudices, misconceptions and imperial interests of 
colonial powers (Mellor 2004: 99; Craiutu 2010: 265). In Said’s view the Orient is created in 
Western knowledge as irrational, staying in sharp contrast to the rational, mature Occident 
(Mellor 2004: 101). Hence, Orientalism is associated with imperialism, colonialism and 
racism (Gardaz 2003: 93; Go 2013: 29). Furthermore, he emphasizes that the knowledge of 
the Other is used to characterize groups as inferior and to create a negative image of the 
Orient. Thus, the Self is constructed through the knowledge about the Other (Meghana and 
Malone 2009: 255). In this view, Orientalism always has an ideological underpinning tied to 
political and economic interests (Ghazoul 2004: 123-124; Bowman 2003: 500).  
‘Othering’ of the non-Western and the Western world is also closely linked to Huntington’s 
clash of civilizations thesis. In this regard he argues that cultural identities are the main 
sources of conflicts in the post-cold war world. In consequence, the terror acts of September 
11th and the following war on terror are claimed to be the result of cultural and religious 
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conflicts (Meghana and Malone 2009: 253-254). Beck speaks in this context of new global 
risks (Beck 2011: 1346). Orientalist assumptions are reinforced since 9/11. Likewise, 
Foucault sheds critical light on the fact that the construction of identities is related to religious 
beliefs. According to Foucault, all societal groups are culturally represented and classified by 
discourses (Mellor 2004: 107). Said’s considerations are mainly influenced by Foucaults 
description of discourse analysis. Referring to Foucault and Said it can be assumed that 
identities are constructed via discourses (Meghana and Malone 2009: 255-255; King 2001: 
113-115). 
In many African states, as Malawi, it can be observed that authoritarian leaders reproduce 
colonial structures and the differentiation between various ethnic, religious or cultural groups. 
Cultural differences seem to be a source of conflicts in, as well as among states (Posner 2004: 
529). In some of the African states authoritarian leadership is closely linked to religious 
radicalism (Mellor 2004: 99). Religious groups instrumentalise cultural binarizations 
established in colonial times to realise their particular interests in various national states. 
Thus, Religious groups, seen as imagined communities, like Andersons defines them, can 
reinforce violent actions by referring to a violent Other (ib.: 104). In the same way, the 
culturalistic anthropology hinders the development of new identities (Bowman 2003: 500).  
Nevertheless, especially the contemporary discourses about Islamic terrorism shed critical 
light on Said’s arguments. By the same degree, Said sees Islamic fundamentalism as the result 
of Western injustices. But authors like Mellor highlight, in referring to Islam, the possibility 
of an ‘Othering’ in reverse (Mellor 2004: 100). Mellor stresses that “Robbing Muslims of 
agency in this manner also robs them of responsibility for their actions for everything is the 
West’s fault (…)” (Mellor 2004: 107). In this context he emphasizes that Said’s work is full 
of contradictions. Thus, Said’s assumptions have been questioned by many authors who come 
to diametrically opposed conclusions, like Michael Curtis. In arguing that the Orient isn’t only 
the victim of Western imperialism, he strives to show that the harsh conflict between the 
democratic Western and the authoritarian Muslim world does not exist. Moreover, the 
depiction of the latter can be considered, as said by Curtis, as diverse (Craiutu 2010: 265). 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 ‘Othering’ and the Construction of Identities 
Postcolonial theory is clearly linked to the criteria history, agency, representation, identity and 
discourse (Kumar 2000: 82).  
“Postcolonialism was traditionally seen as a period of history initialising the ‘handing over’ of 
colonised states by what were classified as supreme powers to rulers born and bred in the colonies 
themselves” (ib.: 82).  
Postcolonial theory was mainly advocated through the work of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak 
and Homi Bhabha (Go 2013: 25). Said’s analysis of the Orientalist discourse starts in the late 
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18th century striving to describe the European colonial involvement and to reveal the link 
between knowledge and power interests (Haldrup et al. 2006: 175). Postcolonial theorists 
strive to dismantle definitions of power balances and discursive practices discriminating 
particular groups (Kumar 2000: 83). The underlying concept referred to by many scholars, is 
the construction of similarity and alterity, namely ‘Othering’. 
‘Othering’ relies on the construction of dichotomies between categories such as race, colour, 
religion, development and modernity (Jones and Manda 2006: 197). The construction of the 
Other is also interrelated with hierarchy and racism. Said is one of the most popular scholars 
who has engaged in the reflection of ‘Othering’. Said differentiates between the Occident and 
the Orient in his work. In Said’s view, the latter is associated with a certain kind of discourse, 
which he names the Orientalist discourse, transmitting Western knowledge of the Oriental 
world. The knowledge about the Other is, as said by Said, used to characterize certain groups 
as inferior. European thinking, as well as the academic European discourse are seen as 
imperialist and hegemonic in Islamic view. Especially the fear of the Other centred in the 
medieval Christian religion proves to be racist, imperialist and ethnocentric in Said’s 
understanding (Mellor 2004: 100; Gardaz 2003: 94) 
Said shows that Western scholars try to exercise power over the Orient, and identities are 
constructed through narratives and monographs published by those scholars (Meghana and 
Malone 2009: 264; Haldrup et al. 2006: 174). Hence, negative images about the Orient, the 
Islam and the Arab world, are created. Furthermore, Said highlights that Islam is 
misrepresented in an Orientalist view (Mellor 2004: 100). In the spotlight is the collective 
essentialisation of the Middle East in processes of ‘Othering’ (Meghana and Malone 2009: 
253). This goes hand in hand with the construction of cultural and religious stereotypes 
(Haldrup et al. 2006: 176).This means that the heterogeneity of the Oriental culture is not 
acknowledged (Bowman 2003: 500).  
The natural predominance of the Western world is legitimized not only by education, but by 
genetics (ib.: 124). Repeatedly imperial missions, in disseminating disinformation about the 
Islamic world, were justified by ‘Othering’ (ib.: 123). More often, these operations have an 
ideological underpinning and serve the interests of the imperial powers (Meghana and Malone 
2009: 256). Colonial policies are largely influenced by the knowledge of the Other, which 
often has a negative connotation (Ghazoul 2004: 124). The non-Western world is identified as 
a danger for the Western world. This justifies Western imperialism. Accordingly, Orientalism 
can be defined in Said’s understanding as a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and 
having authority over the Orient” (Said 1979: 12). In this process the Other is permanently 
devaluated. Hence, Orientalism is for Said a discursive system of dominance (Haldrup et al. 
2006: 175). 
This understanding is closely linked to what Anderson explains in his book Imagined 
Communities’. Benedict Anderson describes nationalism and patriotism in his study 
‘Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism’, which was 
published first in 1983, as imagined communities that are cultural features, embedded in 
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history and structures. Especially religious groups can be identified as imagined communities 
based on a shared language (Anderson 2006: 3 ff).  
Huntington’s findings are also related to Said’s assumptions. In his 1993 published book 
‘Clash of Civilizations’ Samuel Huntington argues that cultural and religious identities are the 
main sources of conflicts in the post-cold war world. Edward Said picks out the distinction 
between collective identities of the West and the Orient as a central theme (Meghana and 
Malone 2009: 253).  
To sum up, Bhaba, Spivak, Said and other postcolonial theorists plead for the demystification, 
decentralisation and the destigmatisation of the colonial discourses in order to reach to a 
discourse of cultural hybridity (Kumar 2000: 86; Ghazoul 2004: 124). This interpretation is 
displayed in Said’s conception of culture, which he defines as “a matter of (…) 
appropriations, common experiences and interdependencies of all kinds among different 
cultures” (Said 1993: 262-263, cited in Jones and Manda 2006: 198).  
Said speaks of cultural hybridity rather than cultural essentialisation. Referring to the latter 
assumption of Said, Bhabha establishes the concept of a hybrid space of enunciation, in which 
the role of culture can be reorganized and the antagonism between different cultures and 
religions can be overcome (Jones and Manda 2006: 198-199). In this understanding, one can 
differentiate between acculturation and transculturation. While transculturation means that 
different cultures are treated as equal actors, it is significant for acculturation that other 
cultures are subordinated and disempowered by the dominant culture (ib: 199). Nonetheless, it 
is necessary to take into account, that this postcolonial view has been criticised by many 
scholars. As Mellor says: 
“Said can be praised for his illumination of the fact, that many forms of Western scholarship have been 
nowhere nearly so ‘objective’ as they have claimed to be, and for alerting us to the dangers of 
perpetuating images of non-Western cultures that represent them in damaging ways” (Mellor 2004: 
100). 
Even so, one main problem is that Said denies the influence of Islam in the Middle Eastern 
world, while emphasizing the strong impact of Christianity on Western patterns. Thus, he 
relies on the same mistakes made by the Orientalist scholars he aims to criticize (ib.: 100). 
Said condemns that the Orientalist view does not take into account the heterogeneity of 
Middle Eastern society, but simultaneously represents the Western view on Islam himself (ib.: 
104). Mellor emphasizes that Said misunderstood that Islamic developments are not only the 
reaction on Western influences (ib.: 100). In the same manner, Curtis advances the opinion 
that the Islam is not the constant victim of the Western world by stressing that the depiction of 
the Orient by Western scholars was heterogeneous (Craiutu 2010: 265).   
 
2.2 The Discourse-Analysis of Foucault 
The suppositions depicted in the section above are closely linked to the social constructivism 
of Foucault (Mellor 2004: 99). Said relies on the foucauldian assumptions in view of 
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discourse theory (Mellor 2004: 100; King 2001: 115; Go 2013: 30). According to Said, the 
knowledge and understanding of the Orient has the intention to justify power interests via 
discourses. So, differences between societal entities are reinforced discursively (Meghana and 
Malone 2009: 254). 
Foucault states in ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’ that a “discourse is constituted by a 
group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can be 
assigned particular modalities of existence” (Foucault 1972: 107). He emphasizes that 
discourses can influence the reality transmitted via language (Keller et al. 2008: 11). 
These ideas also rely on the sociology of knowledge introduced by Berger and Luckmann in 
their publication ‘The Social Construction of Reality’. They analyse the relationship of 
discourses and the power of knowledge as well as how particular actors influence the 
construction of reality through their resources (Keller 2008: 205; Weber 2013: 43-46, Glasze 
et al. 2005: 42-43). They state that identities are formed discursively (Meghana and Malone 
2009: 275). Dichotomies and differences are transmitted via language daily. Haldrup et al. 
name this banal Orientalism (Haldrup et al. 2006: 175). In the same manner, Foucault 
highlights that the depiction of issues in discourses can influence the social reality (Weber 
2013: 45; Keller 2008: 204-205). 
Hegemonic discourses are a very relevant element of discourse analysis (Nonhoff 2008: 308; 
Weber 2013: 58). According to Gramsci, hegemony is associated with the domination of one 
class by another, and often implies the enforcement of political interests (Mellor 2004: 103). 
Hegemonic discourses structure everyday life (Haldrup et al. 2006: 177). An interesting point, 
which is embraced by Haldrup et al., is the concept of practical Orientalism relying on the 
assumption that geography and history are performed, practised and negotiated continuously 
in everyday life. Thus, history and geography are produced actively (Haldrup et al. 2006: 175-
176; Kumar 2011: 83).  
Durkheim establishes an important sociological approach reflecting the way in which 
representation of other groups influences the organization of the same groups. Durkheim and 
Mauss further refer to the fact that societies are structured by classifications. Thus, societies 
are organized as collective entities: 
 “Collective representations express a unity of knowledge and the emotional dynamics and affinities of 
the group represented through collective concepts, symbols and values” (Mellor 2004: 101).  
Referring to Durkheim, Moscovici developed the idea of ‘social representations’, informing 
the members of a community of habitual actions and duties. In establishing the distinction 
between Orient and Occident Said relies on the previously illustrated understanding of 
classifications. 
Said’s assumptions concerning ‘Othering’ can be related to Foucault’s description of the 
discourse analysis in so far, that Western power politics are interrelated with the 
representation of the Orient. In analogy to the social constructivist theory, Said emphasizes 
that reality is defined through representations (ib.: 101-102). The construction of the Self is 
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necessarily influenced by the knowledge of the Other (Meghana and Malone 2009: 256; Hart 
2001: 351). This means that individuals form themselves by distinguishing their identities and 
characteristics in view of other persons. Hence, identities are constructed in relation to other 
identities in the process of ‘Othering’ (Meghana and Malone 2009: 262). Thus, Said describes 
the construction of the Orient as associated with categories like childishness, irrationality and 
difference and contrasts these with commonly prescribed western attitudes like rationality, 
virtuosity, maturity and normality (Mellor 2004: 101; King 2001: 116).  
Also speaking of Gramsci’s definition of hegemony, Said shows that the domination of one 
class by another is often promoted by intellectual ideology (Mellor 2004: 103). For Foucault 
as well as for Said the discourse about the Orient is not representing the reality, because 
according to Foucault every representation is influenced by the specific knowledge about the 
Other (Mellor 2004: 102; Meghana and Malone 2009: 256). Differences which can promote 
conflicts and power struggles are the results of the practical construction of imagined 
spatalities via discourses (Haldrup et al. 2006: 178). This is congruent with the presumption 
of postcolonial theory where a discourse is understood as a system of domination (Jansen 
2008: 108). 
 
3. Orientalism in the Postcolonial World 
3.1 The Reproduction of Postcolonial Structures in African Societies (Malawi) 
From the mid-fifteenth century on a discourse of civilization on the part of European powers 
was developed envisaging a colonial expansion. In this relation a harsh contrast between 
Christendom and Islam was formed. This contrast was embedded in the perception of Europe 
as the pioneer in rationality and science in contrast to a savage Other, as we have seen in the 
previous chapters (Haldrup et al. 2006: 174). 
The trend of ‘Othering’ is often transferred to a postcolonial era (Jones and Manda 2006: 
197). There’s a reification of cultural cleavages as the result of the experiences made in 
colonial times (Posner 2004: 530). The territorialisation of space and the characterization of 
certain groups and places as superior and inferior in the colonial understanding is closely 
linked to the practices of ‘Othering’ (Jones and Manda 2006: 198). 
Cultural nationalism is likely to reproduce imperialist structures, namely cultural binarizations 
(ib.: 198). Thus, cultural nationalism can be identified as a way to exercise power in the 
postcolonial world. Cultural nationalist societies can be characterized as imagined 
communities in the way Anderson defines them. Hence, the violence exercised in colonialism 
disfigures the postcolonial landscape. 
Following Jones and Manda, postcolonial African states led by a dictator can be characterized 
as accultured. Exclusion is promoted through postcolonial policies, which often involve the 
relocation of ethnic or religious groups within a certain national territory and the colonization 
of culture intending to structure space in the interests of the authoritarian leaders (ib.: 199). 
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Postcolonial violence is fundamentally influenced by the reproduction of colonial patterns. It 
can be seen as the result of the self-alienation experienced in colonial times. Thus, violence in 
the postcolonial age is one of the pathologies deriving from colonial leadership (ib.: 199). 
Ngũgĩ and Sóyinká state that the hatred of the Other reinforced in colonial times is 
transformed into self-hatred and the identification of a violent Other on the same national 
space. An example for this trend is the creation of binarizations in the genocide of Rwanda 
(ib.: 200). Mandani 2000 has this to say about binarization: 
“The political world set into motion by the modern state and modern colonialism generates subaltern 
identities endlessly, in binary pairs. For every sergeant, there is a subaltern, for every cat a rat, and for 
every settler a native (…). To change the world, we need to break out of the worldview of not only the 
cat, but also the rat, not only the settler but also the native. Unless we can break out of the worldview of 
the rat, postcolonialism will remain a purgatory punctuated by non-revolutionary violence.” (Jones and 
Manda 2006: 200).  
The above quotation shows that there are clear analogies between postcolonial states and their 
colonial forebears. This can be seen in the regime of Malawi under the leadership of Banda, 
who used the enacted structures of the colonial British regime to reinforce his power. Jones 
and Manda call that accultured hybridity (Jones and Manda 2000: 200). Malawi was declared 
a British protectorate in 1891 (Moyo 2012: 10). In the following years, British rule was 
established as the cadre of law (Jones and Manda 2006: 201). In this law corpse the alienation 
of the African farmers was promoted. Their land was replaced and occupied by settlers. They 
were also used as cheap labourers. The colonial self interest in the case of Malawi was the 
reinforcement of cultural binaries, which was for example promoted by bad educational 
institutions (ib.: 201-202). The British colonial power strove to ensure the civilisation of the 
Malawian society through the English language (Moyo 2012: 11).  
Malawi has attained its independence on 6. July 1964 (ib.: 10). The process of gaining 
independence from colonial statutes in Malawi was mainly led by Hastings Kamuzu Banda, 
while the vast majority of Malawians was excluded. Even if the nationalist movement, the 
Malawi Congress Party, grew as the response to colonialism, their leader, Banda, rapidly 
transformed the party in his personal system of power. Banda controlled all state systems and 
outlawed the opposition (Cammack and Kelsall 2011: 89). Jones and Manda state that ‘Banda 
combined paradoxical qualities of ardent nationalism and populism on the one hand, with 
being more British than the British on the other’ (Jones and Manda 2006: 203). Thus, there 
was a clear analogy between the implementation of policies by Banda and European ruling 
class. The power in Malawi was also concentrated in the hands of Banda. Consequently, 
postcolonial Malawi became a one-man-state. Through the control of the media the ‘Othering’ 
was supported. Colonial laws and statutes are preserved. The identification of the Self and the 
Other was also used to enact state-led violence against the Malawian people. This was 
executed by paramilitary organisations, namely the Malawi Young Pioneers, attacking 
persons who have links with dissidents (ib.: 204-207). Furthermore, the Censorship and 
Control of Entertainment Act of 1968 regulated the freedom of speech and entertainment to 
reinforce Banda’s power. He also controlled Malawi’s only radio station. Hence, Banda had a 
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large influence on religious, political and economic discourses and could reinforce the 
‘Othering’ of the rural society, as well as reproducing colonial thinking via this channel (ib.: 
204). 
These developments are closely related to the realization of personal interests by Banda’s 
regime through the ‘Othering’ of large parts of Malawian society. In this context he 
instrumentalised colonial modes of governance to ensure his power. He constructed a climate 
of fear, in which the Malawian population was not able to question the governmental actions. 
Thus, the trend of acculturation promoted in colonial times is transmitted to the postcolonial 
society of Malawi (Jones and Manda 2006: 208). Malawi was mainly influenced by Christian 
religion since colonial times. Hence the Muslim population is relatively small. Banda, the first 
president of Malawi was also Christian. He mainly influenced the relation between religion 
and state in implementing particular policies (Forster 1997: 164). Hence, Protestant values 
had the main influence on state policies, like the handling of HIV discourse shows. ‘Othering’ 
was, as it is said by Jones and Manda, one of the constitutive elements of the Banda regime in 
Malawi. British colonial rules were determined in so far by Banda, that Banba saw the elite as 
civilized and other parts of society as barbaric (Jones and Manda 2006: 208).  
With the end of the cold war and the decay of a bipolar world, African one-party regimes 
were forced to be altered. In the following, the culture of silence induced by the Banda regime 
in Malawi was broken. In 1994 the first democratic elections took place in Malawi. As a 
result a multi-party-system was established (Cammack and Kelsall 2011: 91). The Banda 
regime was replaced by the United Democratic Front. Nonetheless, contemporary changes in 
Malawian policies indicate a backslide to violent ‘Othering’ by the following Presidents using 
constitutional rights to strengthen their one-man power (Jones and Manda 2006: 209). Since 
Joyce Banda, who followed the former president Mutharika in 2012, is the president of 
Malawi, the criticism regarding the way of Governance institutionalised in Malawi declined 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2013).  
Nonetheless, there are discourses originating in colonial times, which are transferred to the 
modern Malawian state. For example the institutionalisation of gender inequalities, both 
promoted by the state and religious actors, has a large influence on the Malawian society. This 
is especially true for HIV/AIDS discourses, in which the modern, educated parts of the 
Malawian society are clearly privileged in view of other groups. Thus, the distinction between 
different groups enforced by colonial leaders and postcolonial actors, like Hastings Banda, is 
nowadays still virulent. This can be for example seen in the fact that the rural peasantry is 
‘othered’ in HIV/AIDS discourses (Lwanda 2003: 113). 
This ‘Othering’ is closely linked to the stigmatization of particular societal groups because of 
their race, sexuality or health (Petros et al. 2006: 68). Petros et al. highlight that the process of 
‘Othering’ within the HIV/AIDS discourse has five dimensions, namely race, religion, gender, 
homophobia and xenophobia. This includes the exploitation of cheap labour, poor education 
and the discrimination of the rural population and women (ib.: 71). This recent ‘Othering’ can 
be seen as a result of historical practices in colonial and postcolonial times (ib.: 70-71). 
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Malawi seems to be on the right way to overcome cultural and religious distinctions 
reinforced in colonial times. The transition of Malawi from an autocratic regime led by 
Hastings Banda to a multiparty system, not least promoted by democratic leaders like Joyce 
Banda, can only be realised when the connection between politics, economy and religion is 
critically reflected. In this process the conditions enforced by colonial regimes should be 
overcome.  
 
3.2 The Role of Religion in Postcolonial States in View of ‘Othering’  
The relation between religion and state proves to be very problematic in some African states, 
like Malawi. Religious values are very often instrumentalised to support state ideologies and 
interests of the post-independence leaders. Since the identity between religious and state 
interests vanishes because autocratic leaders lost ground, conflicts between religion and state 
are likely to emerge. Nonetheless, religion is still a major social force influencing main parts 
of the state. Thus, secularization is considered as far away in African states (Forster 1997: 
163). This can be seen in the fact, that there’s a correlation between religious socialization and 
the use of contraceptives, especially in Malawi (Yeatman and Trinitapoli 2008: 1851). 
Religious radicalism is characterized by some authors as one of the pathologies of Islamic 
religion but is clearly non-reflected in Said’s work (Mellor 2004: 99). Nonetheless, the 
criticism of Orientalism raises the question, if religious radicalism can be reinforced through 
Orientalist thinking. Western thinking, especially the Orientalist discourse, is, as said by Said, 
mainly stimulated by Christianity and the emphasis of differences between Islam and 
Christianity (Mellor 2004: 104). “Indeed, it is claimed that Orientalism, as a ‘form of 
paranoia’, arose initially from Christian visions of Mohammed as an impostor seeking to 
usurp the place of Jesus” (Mellor 2004: 104). Said emphasizes that this view is transferred to 
a secular world in associating it with Islamic terrorism against the Christian world (Mellor 
2004: 104). As for Said, Christianity mainly influenced the development and reinforcement of 
Orientalism. Additionally religious beliefs largely influence the social construction of reality 
(Mellor 2004: 105). 
Likewise, Foucault emphasizes that there is a linkage between Western Christianity, power 
and knowledge. The construction of identities is often related to religious beliefs. Thus, 
Foucault states that besides cultural and political categories, religious arrangements have a 
great impact on the construction of identities (King 2001: 113-114). 
This social constructivist view can be related to Anderson’s concept of imagined 
communities. The imagining of religious communities, described by Anderson, has a great 
impact on the construction of space. Radical religious communities can be considered as 
imagined communities. These communities often seek to influence policy outputs in the name 
of a certain religion. Especially in postcolonial states interreligious conflicts are likely to 
emerge. The construction of the Self and the Other leads to the fragmentation in view of 
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religious, cultural and ethnic criteria. Cultural cleavages can be instrumentalised in order to 
gain political support (Posner 2004: 529). 
The idea of an imagined community can be instrumentalised by certain actors, such as groups 
relying on religious radicalism. In constructing the image of an imagined community, they 
seek to realize their interests, striving to neglect multiculturalism and other conceptions of the 
world. Hence Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’ is very suggestive for the issue of 
religious radicalism. Referring to his main findings we can understand, how conflicts between 
different religious groups can emerge and how they are reinforced by the politicization of the 
religious consciousness. Hereafter, Anderson states that “the sacred silent languages were the 
media through which the great global communities of the past were imagined” (Anderson 
2006: 14). 
The Arabic language is, conversely to Anderson’s assumption, that the decline of religious 
communities promoted the rise of nationalism, one of the classical languages which survived 
in history. Religion is still the constituting element of the Arab community. In these 
communities religion mainly influences policies of the government, language and certain 
rituals (Mellor 2004: 105). The Islam has as great signification in these societies. This seems 
to be especially true for the reproduction of colonial structures in postcolonial African states. 
In the case of Malawi it is not the Islamic, but the Christian religion leading to conflicts and 
oppression. It is not mainly religious radicalism, but the influence of religion on all parts of 
society in Malawi’s history which is very important. While 82% of Malawi’s population are 
Christian, only 11% are Muslim and 7% rely on traditional religions (Auswärtiges Amt 2013). 
There are no such tensions between Christians and Muslims in Malawi, but religion still has a 
great impact on Malawian politics and even initialised change under Banda’s regime in the 
1990’s (Forster 1997: 174). In this regard, Forster emphasizes that religion mainly influences 
political issues in Malawi (ib.: 163f).  
The influence of the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches can especially be seen in the 
recent discourse concerning HIV. By claiming for fidelity and abstinence, rather than 
supporting the distribution of contraceptives, especially condoms, the church is mainly 
engaged in the aggravation of HIV-infections on the side of African women (Rankin et al. 
2005: 13). Yeatman and Trinitapoli highlight, that this is especially true for the rural 
population in Malawi (Yeatman and Trinitapoli 2008: 1582). The dominance of Protestant 
church and their discourses in Malawi are closely related to the missions of post-colonial 
leaders to promote Christianity. Furthermore, the differentiation between rural population and 
the privileged Malawians is reproduced within the HIV discourse. The formation of identity 
and in consequence the ‘Othering’ between different societal groups was mainly influenced 
by religious understandings and concepts in the postcolonial era. Even nowadays religious 
discourses support the suppression of women in Malawi. The assumptions depicted above 
show that there’s a clear linkage between colonialism, postcolonial leadership and religion in 
Malawi. Even if, religious radicalism is no threat in the Malawian society, it is clear, that 
religion mainly influences the Malawian society. The Protestant church seen as an imagined 
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community reproduces colonial understandings and distinctions. Thus, inequalities, 
differences and foremost a violent ‘Othering’ via discourses, like the recent studies on the 
HIV discourse show, are reinforced (van Dijk 1998: 155-157). 
 
3. Forecast: Cultural Dialogue: A Way to Overcome Conflicts due to 
‘Othering’ 
“But then, what is philosophy today – philosophical activity, I mean – if it is not the critical work that 
thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to 
what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known?” 
(Foucault 1992: 8-9). 
The view of the world in the process of ‘Othering’ is unilateral. A multilateral portrayal of the 
world, oriented on cultural dialogue, proves, as the quotation of Foucault shows, to be a 
chance to understand the multitude of the constructions of social groups (Meghana, Malone 
2009: 263). 
By identifying the prejudices concerning the Orient it becomes possible to dismantle the 
discriminating discourses on the Other. The demystification of the Orientalist discourse made 
it possible, that scholars of the Arab and Islamic world gained influence. Consequently, the 
way is freed for other discourses of Arab and Islamic scholars (Ghazoul 2004: 125). Colonial 
Exceptionalism and Orientalism are uncovered as a form of oppression mediated through 
knowledge (Mellor 2004: 109). This is also true for the reproduction of colonial patterns in 
postcolonial Africa.  
In this paper, I have indicated that colonial ‘Othering’ is transferred via discourses in a 
postcolonial era. Policies in African states are very often influenced by the inheritance of 
colonial power-relationships. This goes hand in hand with the alienation of the Other in the 
name of colonial rules (Jones and Manda 2006: 211). The symmetries of colonialism are still 
dominant in post-colonial societies. ‘Othering’ can be seen as geopolitical consciousness 
which is pursued by one-sided narratives (Haldrup et al. 2006: 176). Even religious 
discourses, like the reflections on the HIV/AIDS discourse show, are influenced by colonial 
suppositions. In the case of Malawi it becomes clear, that rather than religious radicalism, the 
influence of Protestant religion is one of the main problems. Thus, it is necessary to move 
beyond the one-sided identification of cultures and religions in order to go ahead to the 
concepts of hybridity and multiplicity (Kumar 2000: 82). Following Bhabas point of view we 
need to overcome the dichotomy between nationalist and anti-nationalist understandings. 
Transculturation should be promoted rather than enforced acculturation (Jones and Manda 
2006: 212). This can be ensured through a shift to cross-cultural comparative studies taking 
into account the normative character of the western depiction of the Orient but also letting 
space for indigenous literature studies giving the Arab world a voice (King 2001: 116). 
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Nonetheless, we need to reflect critically the findings of postcolonial theory, which very often 
stick to close to the negative influences of the Orientalist discourse and ignore the ‘Othering’ 
in reverse which is initiated by Islam (Mellor 2004: 107).  
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The Churches and the Rwandan Genocide 
Julia Leiß 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates the role of the Christian churches in the Rwandan Genocide. Christian 
churches have been implicated in the 1994 genocide of ethnic Tutsi in several ways: church buildings 
were a major site of massacres, a number of church leaders participated in the slaughter, and 
religious authorities failed to condemn the genocide. Understanding the involvement of Rwanda’s 
churches in the genocide requires a closer look at the relationship between the churches and the state 
and – even more importantly – the nature of churches as institutions, taking into account the historical 
context of Christian mission in Rwanda. Churches helped establish structures of class division and 
actively practiced ethnic discrimination. They worked together closely with the government and 
played a major role in society in determining the distribution of wealth and opportunities. This article 
will analyse how churches ultimately helped make the Rwandan genocide possible by making ethnic 
violence understandable and acceptable to the population.  
 
1. Introduction 
Rwanda is one of the most Christianised countries on the African continent, with about 90% 
of the population claiming membership in a Catholic, Protestant or Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church, and churches being the largest non-state institutions (Government of Rwanda 1994: 
146). Yet, during the genocide of 1994, church buildings and parishes in the small East 
African state became prime killing fields for brutal ethnic mass slaughter. Faith did not stop 
Christians from killing their fellow parishioners and, in some cases, even their own pastor or 
priest (Longman 2001a: 140) – a clear contradiction to love preached in Christianity. How 
was this possible? 
Rwanda had a population of about seven million people, which was divided into three ethnic 
groups: Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Twa (1%). In the course of the genocide, it is estimated 
that about 800,000 Tutsi lost their lives (United Human Rights Council 2013). But even 
though the genocide in Rwanda was primarily ethnically motivated, Christian churches have 
been accused of complicity in the crime and of collaboration with the executioners. Numerous 
scholars argue that they played a non-deniable role in making genocide possible (Bizimana 
2001; Gushee 2004; Longman 2001a, 2010).  
This article will first explore how religion and violent conflict are interrelated from a 
theoretical perspective, with particular regard to mechanisms that can link religion and 
religious institutions to genocide. Then, the nature of churches as religious and political 
institutions in Rwanda will be analysed, focusing on important factors that contributed to their 
involvement in the genocide, followed by an examination of the behaviour of churches and 
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church leaders before, during and after the genocide itself. The findings will be summed up in 
a final conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Aspects of Religion and Conflict 
The link between religion and violent conflict is highly complex. Quantitative studies have 
shown that whenever religion is involved in political conflicts, they tend to be longer and 
more intense (Fox 2004). Religion is a phenomenon that influences people’s lives in various 
dimensions, such as identity, attitude, and behaviour, and by providing leaders, social 
institutions, and networks (Moix 2006: 595-597; Basedau et al. 2012: 162). Religion provides 
a framework for people to understand and interpret the world they live in, gives meaning to 
facts and actions and a sense of what is right and wrong, good and evil, setting standards for 
behaviour. What sets religion apart from ideologies is the fact that religious ideas and norms 
are believed to be of divine origin and legitimised in a supernatural way, which essentially 
makes them non-negotiable (Basedau et al. 2012: 164). Religion has a number of specific 
characteristics through which it can be related to conflict. 
First, religion can build and demarcate communities. It can promote a sense of community 
and solidarity within a group, uniting people of different social and ethnic status. At the same 
time, this can create boundary lines against outsiders and a potential source for conflict (De 
Juan and Hasenclever 2011: 225). Second, religion can motivate people to engage in certain 
actions and to make sacrifices. By offering the prospect of divine reward or punishment, 
religion can encourage people to cross personal and moral limits, increase their ability to 
overcome fears and push them to make sacrifices for a higher goal (Hasenclever and 
Rittberger 2003: 121). Third, religion can legitimise actions and institutions. This is possible 
not only for religious issues but also for conflicts and actions that are secularly motivated. 
Fourth, religious institutions can have great institutional and mobilisation capacity. They are 
well-equipped to facilitate mass mobilisation because they dispose meeting-places, formal and 
informal networks of people, leaders and activists, access to the media, and often they enjoy 
relative immunity to government repression or interference (Fox 2004: 22). 
All of these characteristics can serve to fight against injustices and discrimination, and 
mobilise for positive change and peace. However, they can equally enable religion to act as an 
accelerator of violence. History provides countless examples for both. What is it thus that 
determines whether religion and religious institutions have a positive or negative impact, 
whether they promote peace and harmony or fuel hostility and aggression?  
The ambivalent effect of religion is still a puzzle for scholars who are challenged to 
adequately explain the phenomenon. Numerous and diverse theories have been developed. 
One argues that different religions claiming absoluteness simply cannot co-exist peacefully 
and that religious borders inevitably bring about conflict (Huntington 1996). A second theory 
suggests that some religions are more conflict-prone than others; Fox (2002) points out that 
Islam in particular is commonly viewed in the Western world as more violent than other 
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religions. However, there is wide consensus among scholars that in fact all religions have 
tendencies towards and justifications for both violence and peace (Rapoport 1991). 
Catholicism for instance has a strong pacific tradition yet brought about the Crusades and the 
Inquisition. A third theory therefore argues that it is not religions themselves but rather the 
dominant interpretation of religious structures and teachings by religious leaders and clergy 
that determines the conflict potential of certain religious groups. Yet another one suggests that 
the course of conflict is essential; in the situation of acute security dilemma people will turn 
towards their religious traditions for moral support (De Juan and Hasenclever 2011).  
So far, all of these theories attempt to explain the conflict potential primarily between groups 
of different religions. In order to understand the role of religion in the case of Rwanda, where 
Christianity is involved as the only religion, the following two explanations are useful to 
comprehend the genocide: 
The first one is the importance of interests, abilities and strategies of influential elites as 
determinants of whether religious interpretations will promote peace or stimulate violence (De 
Juan and Hasenclever 2011: 228). Some scholars argue that the behaviour of religious elites is 
based on utility maximisation and rational thinking, implying that strategic considerations are 
dominant, not religious ones (De Juan and Hasenclever 2011: 239). Thus, just like their 
followers, religious leaders do not “absorb religion as a sponge but adapt it to their own 
needs” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 388), which might include maintaining power, selfishness, 
and greed. 
The second one is the degree of autonomy from the state. Philpott (2007) argues that the level 
of influence of religious actors depends not only on their political theology but also on their 
degree of independence from the state. He finds that where religious actors lack institutional 
autonomy during a time of authoritarianism or civil war or where they are integrated with 
their state, they tend to acquiesce to crimes and injustices and prove incapable to stand up 
against or prevent tyranny and genocide. Religious institutions can often be found supporting 
the status quo, that is, the government, be it in the form of state religions or informal 
relationships. Fox points out that in some cases, this is due to the fact that in order to retain 
their legitimacy and relevance, they “must follow what is popular with their congregation” 
(Fox 2004: 23) in order to avoid becoming marginalised. Thus, religious institutions “will 
support governments as long as they benefit from this support, but when such support 
undermines their support within the community they will oppose the government” (Fox 2004: 
23). 
Thus, if religion is too closely linked to political power and serves nationalist ideologies, and 
if religious leaders abuse their influence to support these or profit from them, then religion 
can be turned into a vicious tool to legitimise discriminatory policies, murder and even 
genocide, while its institutional capacity makes organisation and implementation of large-
scale crimes possible (Vorster 2006: 387; Hayward 2009: 107).  
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Genocide is “by its nature a collective and systematic crime that needs the participation and 
approval of a large group of people” (Vorster 2006: 380). This is only possible if a “genocidal 
mentality” can be created, which is based on legitimation, the healing-killing paradox and 
dehumanisation (Bjornlund et al. 2004). Taking into account the above characteristics of 
religion, it is evident that religion can significantly support, if not enable, the creation of such 
a mentality and thus play a decisive role in the preparation and implementation of genocide. 
 
3. The Nature of Churches as Institutions in Rwanda 
Rwanda is one of the most Christianised countries of the African continent, with the Catholic 
Church being the second most powerful institution after the state. The development and 
nature of Rwandan churches as institutions can be characterised by three decisive factors, 
which contributed to the involvement and complicity of the churches in the 1994 genocide: 
First, the establishment and reinforcement of fixed ethnic categories by early missionaries and 
the subsequent engagement of the churches in ethnic politics; second, the close relationship 
with the government in power; and third, the massive social, economic, and political influence 
of the churches on the population (Gushee 2004: 262; Longman 2001b: 168-170).  
 
3.1 Creation of ethnic categories and active engagement in ethnic politics 
To understand how the Rwandan Churches came to be engaged in ethnic politics, one needs 
to look back to the time when the first missionaries arrived in Rwanda at the end of the 19th 
century. Since then, they have had a large presence and have developed great influence in 
Rwandan society (Gushee 2004: 259). Christian missionaries started massive conversion 
programmes in 1931, and the Catholic Church did not tolerate local religious practices. Their 
strategy was based on converting chiefs and influential local elites first, assuming that their 
subordinates would follow easily (De Lespinay 2001: 163-165). In order to know whom to 
focus their conversion efforts on, missionaries developed their own perception of social 
categories in Rwanda. In pre-colonial times, social categories had been relatively loose and 
flexible with no strictly separated ethnic groups. The Tutsi were tall, light-skinned and 
primarily raising cattle, the Hutus were generally shorter and predominantly farmers, and the 
Twa seemed to make their living by hunting and gathering. All three groups shared a common 
language and religion, and intermarriage between them was relatively common (Longman 
2001a: 145-146). The missionaries hypothesised that Tutsi were not really of African but of 
Middle Eastern decent and thus the superior race: “Tutsi were regarded as the noble rulers and 
the Hutu their subservient farmers” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 380). Consequently, they focused 
their conversion efforts and support on the Tutsi elite. The Belgian colonial administration 
adopted the missionaries’ concept of ethnicity, and over time ethnic groups were transformed 
into clearly defined and fixed categories. Ethnic labels gained significance in practice and 
were assigned on identity cards (Longman 2001a: 145-147). 
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In the 1950s however, the church switched sides and supported the Hutu revolution which 
brought the Hutu into power. Favouritism and dominant loyalty shifted from Tutsi to Hutu, 
but the nature of the ethnic system was not affected by this change (Longman 2001a: 147, 
2001b: 171). From the very beginning, the churches supported the ethnic thinking and 
discrimination by incorporating it in their structures and in their teachings. They thus became 
the “generator and stabiliser of class structures” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 380) which later 
became the driving force of the genocide. 
 
3.2 Close relationship with the government 
Bizimana (2001) claims that the Church openly compromised with the Hutu regime, which 
organised and executed the genocide. Following Rwanda’s independence, Habyarimana, 
president of the Hutu government in power, worked together closely with the Christian 
churches, preserving a system of power structure which benefited the state and the churches 
equally and particularly their elites (Longman 2001a: 157). Van Hoyweghen terms this 
cooperation a “completion of the Church-state symbiosis” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 383) in 
which the churches were in charge of providing education and health care and thereby 
financially supporting the state, while the state made the rules which the Church would obey, 
including discriminatory ethnic quota systems. Many clergy cooperated with officials, 
maintaining mutually beneficial professional and personal relationships, and some were 
members of the president’s single political party (Longman 2001a: 148, 2001b: 179). Being 
an extremely large and unwieldy institution, the church needed a stable, reliable environment 
to work in and therefore had an economic interest in supporting the status quo (Van 
Hoyweghen 1996: 383). 
 
3.3 Omnipresence in society 
The great influence and social power of the missionaries and the churches in Rwanda is 
evident in their great success of converting almost the entire population to Christianity, with 
the Catholic Church becoming the largest non-state organisation (Bizimana 2001). However, 
church strategies to attract converts did not just rely on the power of their holy message, but 
also on material and other incentives (Longman 2001b: 169-170). Particularly in rural areas, 
the population relied on churches not only for spiritual needs, but also for social welfare, 
healthcare, education, and economic assistance. As the country was hardly industrialised, 
churches were frequently the most important non-agricultural employer beside the state. 
Church offices could confer power and high status, and their holders had advantages and 
opportunities for personal enrichment (Longman 2001a: 149). Churches thus served as a 
“channel to power, prestige, and wealth” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 380). As a result, struggles 
for power and influence within the churches were intense. Churches in Rwanda could be 
regarded as politically significant institutions not only in the way that they were closely allied 
with the state but because “they [were] themselves sites of politics, where various individuals 
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and groups struggle to increase their power” (Longman 1998: 69). And from early on, ethnic 
divisions played an important part in it (Longman 2001b: 164). 
Churches thus had enormous social and economic influence and, through their parishes, 
access to the population at all levels. Nevertheless, many people became member of the 
church for the political and economic benefits that came with it (Vorster 2006: 389). The 
churches, in addition, taught obedience to authority and actively engaged in ethnic politics 
(Longman 2001b: 166). As a result, Christian message and values were not internalised by the 
population, creating a superficial Christianity which enabled clergy and church members to 
eventually participate in genocide (Vorster 2006: 389; Bizimana 2001: 137).    
 
4. The Churches and the Genocide 
During the time leading up to the 1994 genocide, the churches faced increasing pressure for 
reform, coming both from the outside and from within the churches. In the wake of an 
emerging democracy movement in Rwanda in the early 1990s, partly supported by church 
activists, power structures within the churches were being put into question. Corruption and 
bribery had provoked public resentment and frustrations, threatening the spiritual legitimacy 
of the churches. In addition, international church partners increasingly urged for 
democratisation, so that serious pressure arose for reform within the churches (Longman 
2001b: 174-179). Longman suggests that it was “the direct challenges to their own authority 
within the churches that made church leaders truly sympathetic to the idea of a ‘Tutsi 
menace’” (Longman 2001b: 179). He argues that where they had obtained their positions by 
the means of ethnic politics, they would interpret threats to their power from an ethnic angle 
as well. In this context, it is evident that “many church leaders were ultimately sympathetic to 
the genocide because it could help bolster their power and preserve their hold on office 
against this movement for reform” (Longman 2001b: 175). It can be argued that due to the 
institutional weaknesses and the fragmentation of religious authorities along ethnic and 
ideological lines, the churches were unable to speak out in a unified voice to counteract the 
genocide (Longman 2010: 8-9). 
During the genocide, places of sanctuary were violated and many church buildings became 
killing sites. According to some estimates, “more Rwandese citizens died in churches and 
parishes than anywhere else” (African Rights 1995: 865). Some priests and clergy participated 
in the slaughter or helped locate and identify Tutsi from their parish and delivered them to the 
deaths squads (Longman 2010: 5). Some turned away Tutsi who were seeking their protection 
and refused to help them, and few church leaders were later found guilty for direct or indirect 
participation in the genocide and convicted (Des Forges 1999: 246). 
However, most critics accuse the churches primarily of their silence and inaction, failing to 
condemn the anti-Tutsi violence publicly. In the years between 1990 and 1993, periodical 
massacres of Tutsi had never generated any noteworthy protest or denouncement by the 
churches, even when church personnel or buildings where the centre of attack. This pattern of 
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silence was supported by continued calls for support of the government and thus was 
“interpreted by the public as an endorsement of the anti-Tutsi message” (Longman 2001b: 
180). By “not issuing a prompt, firm condemnation of the killing campaign, church authorities 
left the way clear for officials, politicians, and propagandists to assert that the slaughter 
actually met with God’s favour” (Des Forges 1999: 246). The fact that people “attended mass 
before going out to kill or that killers paused during the massacres to pray at the altar” 
(Longman 2001b: 167) clearly demonstrates that the slaughter of Tutsi was not seen as a 
contradiction to church teachings. Nevertheless, there have also been clergy who did dare to 
speak out and protect the Tutsi, even at the risk of their own lives (Bizimana 2001: 140). 
When the genocide was over, the churches frequently took refuge in denial, refusing to 
acknowledge the nature of the massacres, and covering priests accused of genocide. Some 
clergy tried to declare the crimes as a result of spontaneous rage of the Hutu population or 
brought up the hypothesis of a “double genocide” presumably of Tutsi by Hutu and of Hutu 
by Tutsi (Bizimana 2001: 49, 63-64). Even today, the possible contribution of the churches to 
peace building and reconciliation is impaired by the “persistent denial within the Catholic 
Church and the continuing politicisation of religion” (Clark 2013: 227). 
The fact that since the genocide, many Rwandans have turned away from Christianity and 
converted to Islam – thus doubling the number of Muslims in the country (Wax 2002) – 
confirms that even though the massacres took place on the basis of ethnicity, the image of 
Christianity and the reputation of the churches suffered from their complicity in the mass 
slaughter. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The Rwandan genocide illustrates the immense potential of churches as religious institutions 
to fuel crime and act as an accelerator of radicalism. It demonstrates how the nature of 
religion in general and of the ecclesiastic hierarchy in Christian churches in particular can 
under certain circumstances facilitate the spread of ideological thinking and racism.  
It was argued that two factors are particularly important to determine whether religion actors 
and institutions will promote peace or stimulate violence: First, the interests, abilities and 
strategies of influential elites, and second, the degree of autonomy from the state. In the case 
of the Rwandan genocide, both factors play together: Churches collaborated closely with the 
state, supporting the Hutu government that planned and executed the genocide; and church 
elites chose to use their power and influence to promote racist ideologies and secure their own 
authority and status, which they felt was under threat.  
The nature of churches as institutions played an important role in the way in which they were 
implicated in the genocide. The responsibility of the churches comprises not only the creation 
of ethnic categories, active engagement in ethnic politics, and the close cooperation with the 
government. The omnipresence of the churches in all spheres of people’s lives and their 
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teaching of obedience to authorities in combination with internal power struggles also lead to 
Christian values of love and charity being disregarded. The churches hence contributed to the 
construction of a genocidal mentality in Rwanda by making ethnic violence acceptable to the 
population.  
Today, Rwandans are still waiting for an official apology of the Catholic Church for its 
silence and for the acts committed by some of its clergy. Yet, acknowledgement of its 
culpability would constitute an important gesture for the survivors, and facilitate true 
reconciliation. There is still a long way to go for Rwanda’s churches which must now take 
seriously the role they can play as social institutions in the process of peace-building, to foster 
caring societies, and refocus on serving the well-being of communities and their entire 
population.  
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Transnational Networks of religiously motivated terrorism 
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Abstract 
This paper tries to demonstrate that there is a gap in scientific analysis between single acts of 
religiously motivated terrorism and transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism. It will 
show that there are possibilities of radicalising yourself by using information which is provided by the 
Internet on homepages from radicals in the cyberspace. As well it will show that there are 
transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism operating on real territories in the 
background and that there is a connection between all those spaces. This connection between those 
spaces can be seen as a new strategy of transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism. It 
will try to demonstrate the connection between transnational networks of religiously motivated 
terrorism and the space they offer on the Internet giving people the chance to radicalise themselves so 
much that they act as a terrorist, without getting in contact with a person responsible for these 
networks. These radicalised people act independently in the background in the name of those 
networks. The Internet has taken the role as an intermediary between two real spaces and functions as 
a third space.  
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper the three space dimensions territorial space, cyberspace and imagined space are 
looked at and their connection to each other. The main premise is that there are connections 
between these three spatial dimensions, even if they are not easily recognizable. We have to 
take cyberspace, as well as an imagined space into consideration if we want to understand the 
phenomenon of transnational religiously motivated terrorism and find the best opportunities 
for counterterrorism measures. 
At first a short definition of transnational terrorism within the structure of networks will be 
given, as far as this is possible. Till today no clear definition of terrorism exists. However, 
terrorism is commonly defined by some main points, such as the existence of a political 
motivation behind the actions and the use or threat of violence. This violence is used to 
produce an environment of scare and it is increasingly practiced against civilians. To show 
what many characteristics go along with the term terrorist, the following definition from 
Richardson is cited:  
“Terrorists are substate actors who violently target noncombatants to communicate a political message 
to a third party. Terrorists are neither crazy nor amoral. They come from all parts of the world. They 
come from many walks of life. They fight for a range of different causes. Some have support from the 
communities from which they come; some do not. They range in size from a handful of Corsican 
nationalists to thousands of armed Tamils. Some are fighting for the same goals that have motivated 
wars for centuries, such as control over national territory. Some are trying to overthrow the state system 
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itself. They come from all religious traditions and from none. One thing they do have in common: they 
are weaker than those they oppose” (Richardson 2007: 20).  
Transnational terrorism in this way can then be characterised by the feature, that the members 
of transnational terrorism groups or networks are located in different countries and that they 
work together beyond borders (Florack 2010: 38-40). Transnational terrorism becomes than 
religiously motivated, when the members are motivated by religious beliefs. These religious 
beliefs with the aim the terrorist want to achieve are called ideology. These ideologies are 
often mixed with political issues. The organisation’s form as a network implies that the 
organisation is structured more horizontally than hierarchically; even though it is possible that 
there are main characters, which can be identified as leaders. It is possible that there is more 
than one leader in different groups of the network or that there is no leader at all, too. This 
brings many advantages; one for example is that it cannot be eliminated through decapitation 
of its leadership (Sageman 2004: 140). Networks are very robust and adaptable to different 
circumstances.  
 
2. Methodology 
The paper’s methodology composes research from publications on the different topics of the 
paper and analysis of them. The references mention a selection of sifted sources, which were 
directly applied in this paper. They mainly describe the general scientific view on terrorism 
and were identified by researching various scientific search engines, general use of search 
engines and the local university libraries. The sources are a mixture of papers, articles, books 
and official reports from governmental departments. As the original plan for this paper was 
not possible to work out, the paper now, tries to give an introduction into the topic with only 
secondary resources.  
At first it was planned to go into a deep online research of primary sources and to analyse 
homepages, which can be identified as radical religious websites with connections to 
transnational networks of religious motivated terrorism. These websites should have been 
analysed for hints, which can link these to an operating network in the background. As a 
second it should have been analysed what opportunities these websites offer for interested 
users. As a last point it should have been analysed if those websites offer structured 
information for users to accompany them on a process of self-radicalisation. One aim would 
have been to find connections between self-starters, which will be mentioned further on and 
transnational networks and to see if they are using a new strategy for recruitment and their 
fight. These plans went wrong because of the very difficult legal position on research in the 
field of terrorism and cyberspace and unclear and different statements from the police 
department, the office for the Protection of the Constitution on federal level and state level, as 
well from the legal department from the university and the department for data handling from 
the university. This made it not possible to do research on primary sources, such as original 
homepages of different groups. A possibility to solve these problems would have been to 
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contact a lawyer who is specialised on such topics as Internet crime. But this was not possible 
through the constriction of financial support. For further research I think there are very good 
possibilities to find connections between these different spaces. Also, it would be appropriate 
governmental departments to make clear statements. This allows researchers a better 
possibility to research in the field of religious motivated terrorism and gives them the chance 
to add something for clarification on this phenomenon as well as offers suggestions for 
solutions.  
 
3. Research 
3.1 The three spatial dimensions 
In this section three spatial dimensions, which have been mentioned above will be described. 
Figure 1 gives a first overview on the topic and shows the frame of this paper. This section 
also provides a short explanation of the function and the actors in these spaces. The figure 
shows, how transnational religiously motivated terrorist networks can jump scales and borders 
without moving themselves and still can exercise terrorism. The main point is, that they have 
to find people in different spots, who are willing to radicalise themselves and act in their name 
or for their purpose. Networks in this way are able to jump scales without crossing borders in 
person and still are able to increase their influence and their membership. This brings a huge 
advantage in being as long as possible inconspicuous and so being undetected by law 
enforcement forces. 
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Figure 1: Space dimensions in transnational networks of religious motivated terrorism.                        
Source: own figure. 
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Traditional transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism 
Traditional networks of terrorism groups “presume […] one or more of the following 
environments:  
• Terrorist groups talk to each other. 
• Terrorist groups support each other. 
• Governments sponsor terrorists. 
• The international terrorist environment is basically conspirational“ (Gus 2010: 285). 
So, one of the main factors, which can describe traditional networks of terrorism, is the 
contact of the actors to each other via a direct communication form (in person, per phone or 
other direct communication forms). This direct communication form also makes it easier for 
the law enforcement to find the connections between certain actors. We need to take into our 
consideration that the function of personal contacts was owed to the fact that communication 
has primarily been developed in the last decades. It is in this way a relatively new 
development, which has not finished yet. New terrorism organizes itself increasingly as a lose 
network.  The network consists of different actors or groups who are linked to each other by a 
hub. This hub can be a person or a group. Through these hubs most of the communication 
between different actors takes place, so this points are vulnerable for counterterrorism 
measures. The connection between two different groups can be a hub of one or more persons. 
Furthermore, the connection can be classified in strong ties and weak ties. Strong ties are 
defined by a deepened connection, whereby a weak tie consists of a loose connection. 
However, weak ties are very important for bringing new aspects into the network (Sageman 
2004; Tucker 2001). This makes the network more flexible, adaptive and resilient and most 
importantly it cannot be destroyed by decapitation (Tucker 2001: 1). Networks, which operate 
close to each other possess the possibility to learn from each other. They can observe and 
learn at first hand from each other. This often leads to copying successful strategies. If there is 
much space between the actors in one or different networks, these possibilities are not given 
(Braithwaite and Li 2007). Hence, other ways for spillover-effects need to be looked at to 
teach other participants for the same purpose. One way to do so is the cyberspace. It can 
function as an alternative platform, to let people far away take part on learning processes or 
just to spread information outside of the network and search for new participants.  
Cyberspace and the function as a recruiter 
Meanwhile, cyberspace has taken a very important role for international networks of 
terrorism. It has the function to spread the cause for what the different groups are fighting for, 
and to give information to the public, but also to recruit new participants for the international 
fight, for the special cause of the groups (Council of Europe 2007: 37-38). It gives the groups 
the possibilities to cross borders with their information. In this way, cyberspace is like an 
arena for theatre or a spectacle, by which people should be influenced. It is a propaganda 
machine by which the intents of terrorists could be spread globally (Minei and Matusitz 2012; 
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Steinberg 2012). Furthermore, it is a very good space to produce spillover-effects in shape of, 
for instance, ideas, training techniques, manuals or for example to get in contact with new-
recruits. As different studies reveal, nearly every active terrorist group has its own presence 
on the Internet (Kennedy and Weimann 2011: 203). Also it gives traditional networks the 
possibility to connect with other persons or networks in terms of weak ties. Weak ties, which 
were introduced by Granovetter, gave networks a very good input on new ideas, tactics, 
strategies or other innovations which can be used for the purpose of terrorist networks 
(Kennedy and Weimann 2011).  
The target to reach a broader audience via cyberspace has in this way more than just one 
advantage for the traditional networks. They can recruit new members for their fight, and also 
if those recruits don’t want to engage directly in active fighting, they can still give new ideas, 
tactics, strategies or other useful information or just spread the ideas of the different groups. 
Cyberspace fulfils its role as a recruiter even more, if there are more and more websites, 
forums, social-networks etc. with the content of religious radicalism. This creates the 
opportunity for people to find such content unintentionally and thereby getting influenced by 
such ideas by coincidence. As has been shown in different studies, one possibility to become a 
terrorist can be in the first steps not a conscious step. The first step is often influenced by 
coincidence, especially for home grown terrorism. This means for example, that one can 
encounter the ideas unintentionally and after that choose intentionally to become a terrorist or 
not. The traditional way is to get in contact with a person from a terrorist group. In this way 
cyberspace can be seen as an omnipresent person, which enables a very big audience to get in 
contact with the main ideologies behind religious motivated terrorism. Mullins calls such 
people “self-starter” (Mullins 2009); they start their behaviour by their own. But also these 
“self-starters” in some way need a link to a larger group or network above. This connection 
can come from a different distant link in the circle of friends, also from a distant point in a 
social media network. Terrorists can aim two recruiting strategies, either top-down or bottom-
up, pursued by transnational networks of religious motivated terrorism or other transnational 
terrorist networks (Hasenclever and Sändig 2011: 209).  
Cyberspace fulfils the function as an information platform to spread their propaganda, find 
new recruits, give training advices, as a communication platform for individual 
communication and mass communication as well as a space for discussion and planning, 
finding financial support etc. (Council of Europe 2007:33-46). As it has been shown, 
cyberspace is able to fulfil a lot of different roles and the development still goes on. It is very 
important to recognise developments early to find the best countermeasures. Cyberspace 
(online) can connect different groups on real territories (offline), without getting in personal 
contact. Cyberspace creates the opportunity to meet different groups or networks from real 
territories in one (cyber-) space. Cyberspace is in this way an important space; it connects 
different offline networks and groups with one online space. So online (cyberspace) connects 
different offline groups to each other (Holtmann 2012b: 122). This is a new chance for 
transnational networks of religious motivated terrorism to “build” a real-time terrorist, who is 
influenced and then moves on to act. A motto of cyber jihadist, which says “qaul wa’amal”, 
which means “saying and then deed”, shows this assumption (Holtmann 2012b: 122). If 
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religiously motivated terrorists find a way to improve their possibilities, which is offered by 
cyberspace and make them more efficient, a very powerful weapon can be created. This 
weapon consists of people who are influenced by the content on those homepages, forums, 
videos and other communication forms. These people can appear anywhere, where a 
connection to the Internet exists. This will make it very hard for the law enforcement forces to 
find out, where the next terroristic attack may occur. In the following paragraph this new 
phenomenon will be described and as there is no special term for this phenomenon, I will call 
it scale jumper, concerning to the ability of crossing different scales without getting noticed.   
The scale jumpers  
In literature the term “home grown terrorist” has gained acceptance to describe local people, 
who have been recruited from a terrorist group in a foreign country, to act in their specific 
region (Hasenclever and Sändig 2011: 204). The act of terrorism is achieved in the same state 
as the terrorist has been born or raised (Precht 2007: 15; Bhatt and Silber 2007). Home grown 
terrorist usually describes a person, who has gotten in direct contact with another person from 
a terrorist network or group. Till now, just a few home grown terrorists have acted on their 
own, without any contact to another person. An example for this case is Arid Uka, who has 
performed the attack on American soldiers at the airport in Frankfurt in March 2011. These 
people are very difficult to find and can appear everywhere. As the development of 
cyberspace still goes on and many resources can be used there, a possibility exists, that there 
will be more and more people who will appear as self-starter terrorists. They will act alone, 
without getting in direct contact with a group or a network.  
In this paper, I will call them “scale jumpers”, because they appear somewhere, without 
giving some good hints before they appear, just as to make a distinction between a home 
grown terrorist and the scale jumper. Scale jumper refers to the ability that such terrorists 
move from cyberspace onto real territorial space. They jump from cyberspace as a space with 
a scale that is not measurable to a scale on real territories which is touchable, but it is very 
difficult to find out were the point on the map emerge were cyberspace is directly connected 
to territorial space. At this point the terrorist jumped from cyberspace to territorial space 
where the terrorist can perform an act on territorial space. Also if the three terms “home 
grown terrorist”, “self-starter” and “scale jumper” are very close to each other, there are some 
fine differences. Home grown terrorists become terrorists by getting in contact with persons 
or ideas from terrorist groups or networks personally or via a medium. See the above given 
description, too. Home grown terrorists can also summarize people who were directly chosen 
by terrorist groups or networks. The term self-starter terrorist summarizes people, who start 
on their own, but then are looking for contact to established terror networks or groups or 
create a new one. Also in the way of self-starter terrorist there is the possibility of getting 
influenced by different personal contacts. Now, the term scale jumper describes just such 
terrorists who get their information on their own through cyberspace and went through a way 
of radicalisation on their own. The contact to established terror groups or networks exists just 
in this way, that the scale jumper performs his act in the name of an ideology of such a group 
or network. The connection can be established firstly afterwards. The scale jumper is a 
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person, who has been inflicted by the ideas of a terrorist group, without having any personal 
contact with those groups or networks. This person is now a new dot in the map, and it is not 
possible to say, where these dots emerge. The only condition is the ability to connect with 
cyberspace and they usually share the same purpose, also if it will be first after the process of 
radicalization. These people do not get any support from the traditional networks; they do not 
receive training or get logistical support or any other form of sponsorship in a traditional way. 
The only way they get information is via Internet or persons from their surroundings.  Internet 
has then the function to give them the information they need to perform a terroristic act. This 
information could be training manuals to build an explosive device or using the Internet 
without being caught etc. (Tucker 2001: 2). They are also amateurs who have not been 
involved in similar activities. This makes it difficult to spot them, too. They sometimes just 
act in one action and then disappear from the surface (Tucker 2001: 10-11).  
The link to transnational networks arises, if it does anyway, after the terroristic act just then, 
when the terrorist comments his or her act or if another group or networks claims the act for 
their own use. Scale jumpers or self-starters start their activities by their own, and after they 
did so, they maybe look for a connection to the network (Sageman 2004: 142). As the use of 
cyberspace can be developed, this could be seen as a new strategy of transnational terror 
networks. They just provide the right information for the right people at the right time to get 
new members for their fight. Then, they just have to find persons or environments where 
possible recruits can be found. The Internet is then a virtual guide, which gives a person any 
help they need for support. This guide is appropriated by the networks and groups which are 
acting in the background on real space (Holtmann 2012a: 9). This shows the strong 
connection between internet activism, the independently operating people and the 
transnational networks and groups in the background. The whole construction shows how the 
different spaces are connected to each other, and that it is important to take all into 
consideration to understand the phenomenon in context and find ways to prevent people from 
getting a terrorist by surfing in the internet.  
In sum it can be said, that these three different spaces show different starting points, where 
networks can find new recruits. It is important to analyse where the starting points are for 
religious motivated terrorism, where growth and development take place and where the place 
for the preparation for action is situated. It is important to analyse the lifespan of individuals, 
to find the connections between “self-starters” and the established transnational networks 
(Mullins 2009: 149). If it is possible to analyse different lifespans of different self-starters, it 
may be possible to find points in life, where people are more susceptible towards ideas of 
radicals. A biography of such persons has to work out. In the next step it will be necessary to 
find out how such points can be inhibited. The analysis of a lifespan will just be possible 
subsequently, soonest from that point when a person was identified by law enforcement forces 
for being a threat. So it will be a very difficult task, but can bring advantages for counter-
measures. 
 
56 
 
3.2 Religion and Terrorism 
This paper has not the aim to explain the connection between religions and terrorism, but it 
will give some words to the topic. It is a very difficult task analysing the connections between 
terrorism and religion. This is shown in the different debates to this topic in the scientific 
community. Religions are different, and as well there is no clear definition of terrorism. Each 
case has its very specifics and need a separate analysis. These differences make it difficult to 
give a frame or a definition. To make it more harder, religious motivations for terrorism can 
be mixed, and they nearly always are, with political matters or other relevant topics. After all, 
religion can give a strong cohesion and an ideology; also it can give security, as it says for 
example there is a life after this life. Religion can also build the opportunity of serving for 
something paranormal, like resurgence in a better world. This can make death more valuable 
than life. However, religious terrorism is often mixed with political issues. For example 
Islamist terrorists see their jihad as self-defence against western intruders into their countries 
and a future for one Muslim community. Grievances can be one of many motivations for 
religious terrorism. Equally, personal based motivations, caused by the circumstances a 
person was born, raised or lived in should also be considered by explaining terrorism and 
which role religion plays (Stern 2004; Juergensmeyer 2003; Sookhdeo 2009 and Gabriel 
2002).  
 
4. Conclusion 
It is important to recognise, that there is a link between transnational networks of religiously 
motivated terrorism on real ground, and the space of information these networks offer online 
as well as individuals who act in their name. It can be a good strategy for terrorist groups or 
networks to just offer enough information on the Internet that someone will get influenced by 
these groups and networks that he or she will perform independently a terroristic act for the 
purpose of these terrorist groups or networks. Groups and networks do not necessarily need to 
risk their own lives in terroristic acts, they just need to find someone via the Internet who will 
do it for them, and it will not be traceable who has “recruited” this new terrorist. 
Counterterrorism measures need to close this gap and show those people who are willing to 
radicalise, that they are misused by the people in the background of the internet. One of the 
best counterterrorism measures was and will be clarification and education. As Hasenclever 
and Sändig propose, a mixture of hard and soft counterterrorism measures is necessary to 
make the best progress (Hasenclever and Sändig 2011). A society which incorporates every 
member of the society and does not produce any marginal groups, will sustain best. As well it 
is important to note, that the Internet will enhance transnational terrorism and make it much 
more harder for the law enforcement to find out, where the next terrorist emerge. Cyberspace 
is an ideal tool to enlarge their networks and make them sounder. 
The paper should have shown that a connection between cyberspace, imagined space and 
territorial space exists. To see these connections is important for analysing and it is important 
to take them into consideration when we describe such a phenomenon as terrorism in the case 
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of home grown terrorism, self-starter terrorism or in the term of scale jumper terrorism. 
Classically the connection between two persons was in one or another way a direct contact. 
Now we should widen our view and see that this is not necessary anymore. It is sufficient to 
provide enough information to find new recruits for the fight of the transnational networks of 
religious motivated terrorism. These new fighters do not need a connection to the network 
personally any more, they do not need to find a contact to which they can talk to or ask what 
to do. The network just has to provide the right information in the right space. This could be a 
new and dangerous strategy by transnational networks of religious motivated terrorists. With 
the term home grown terrorist there already is a description for terrorists, who were recruited 
in the country, where they should exercise a terroristic act. However, I think it is very 
important to make clear differences between home grown terrorists and scale jumpers, 
because scale jumpers do not have and do not need any contact to another person in contrast 
to home grown terrorists. But, we should also notice that, if there is not a direct connection to 
a network, there is a connection that brings these actors together and we should find out, how 
those networks make it possible to recruit fighters, without getting in direct contact with them.  
There are new power relations and power effects between these different scales and spaces. 
Networks generate new spatial power distributions and with cyberspace a new space is 
created, which is influencing other spaces and has the power to change scales. Cyberspace is a 
very mighty space with many spaces in it and connections to each other, also with 
connections to the real space. Cyberspace for example gives people the chance to identify 
themselves with a space that is far away. Identity goes along with space, and cyberspace can 
build new bridges between different spaces and in this way religion can play a very important 
role (Reuber 2012: 44). To understand these phenomenons completely we have to look at it 
from the bottom and the top and we should start as early as possible, before there is too much 
(cyber-) space to look at. Hence, I think there are very important fields for further research, 
bringing political geography in contact with transnational networks of religiously motivated 
terrorism. 
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The Sacral Geography of Islamic Jihad 
Tim Hawemann 
 
Abstract 
The world, including various religions and based upon complex patterns of conflicts cannot be 
described using simplistic spatial constructs. Psychological aspects in analysing conflicts are quite 
important and have to be considered when taking into consideration single individuals as actors in 
conflicts but also in the construction of spaces and communities. The following paper will give an 
introduction and thought-provoking impulse on the ‘sacral geography’ of Islamic Jihad. Questions 
about the psychological and social constructions of space will be clarified and the spaces of Islamic 
Jihad will be depicted more closely. What is the fundament the sacral geography is built on, how do 
Jihadists feel linked to each other through this construct of a sacral space. Finally, an explanation on 
how Jihadists legitimise their action with arguments and goals rooted in their constructs of sacral 
geography will be given. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade since 9/11 the topics of Islamic Jihad and terrorism have been increasingly 
covered by international media and debated within politics. The challenge of terrorism has 
been debated by various authors from different social science disciplines, trying to figure out 
the beliefs, motives and reasons behind the actions. One approach of research investigates the 
psychological aspects and illustrates the “creation of space through Islamic Jihad”. Sacral 
geography, which describes religiously created space, is the main focus of this paper.  
The subject of religious space construction is embedded within the research field of political 
geography and geopolitics. Rothfuß (2011: 37) states that geopolitics is defined as striving for 
influence in spaces beyond the ‘own’ territory. According to this definition geopolitics can be 
described as a spatially expansive, goal-focussed action. Geopolitics is not merely a matter of 
nation states with military and economic objectives. Geopolitical goals can also be developed 
by other organisations like important religious groups and movements. They can as well 
establish and pursue geopolitical goals that may strongly influence the international order in 
the world. The movement of Islamic Jihad, supported by numerous radical Islamist groups 
throughout the world is one example for such a global geopolitical ‘organisation’ beyond the 
nation state. In order to analyse Islamic Jihad as a geopolitical force in the world, further 
information is necessary. Nations or territories are defined by administrative borders but the 
sacral space that evolves in the minds of many individuals is quite more difficult to be 
revealed. Psychological and religious analyses are in this case necessary. In the following 
paper this space, the sacral geography of Islamic Jihad, will be intensively analysed to get a 
deeper understanding of the motives of acting and why Jihadists all over the world are linked 
to each other through common norms and beliefs. Heidenreich (2010: 7) underlines that in 
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analysing spaces of Islamic terrorists, it is important to address the relation in their acting, 
thinking and feeling. 
 
2. Definitional basics 
In this chapter the terminology of Islamic Jihad and sacral geography will be defined. 
Whereas a sacral geography can be generally understood as a spatial construct that has been 
produced by believers in the context of a specific religion, the diverse definitions of Jihad are 
more complex and contradictory. 
2.1 Sacral geography 
The concept of ‘sacral geography’ has been most notably described by the sociologist 
Heidenreich (2010). In summary, it is a kind of mentally constructed geography. Furthermore, 
it is a cosmogenesis, a world explanation, a second creation and a hegemonic power (ibid: 
129). The sacral centre of constructs of sacral geography is based on the location where 
epiphany in a certain religion took place. Around this centre the sacral space is constituted 
and it is the point where the cosmic spheres heaven, earth and netherworld are linked through 
the vertical axis of the world. Moreover, in horizontal direction, the sacral space is 
constructed and extends in all cardinal directions. Consequently there is a space with one holy 
centre of the world where the linkage to God and the netherworld is manifested (ibid: 129). 
Because of this assumption, the permanent linkage between the three cosmic levels in the 
centre, the constructed space extending from is considered a holy or sacral one (ibid: 130). 
Sacral geography determines both the material and the mental base of holy war, moreover, it 
delimitates territories of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ and the ways and devices of this war (ibid: 
13). It is essential that sacral geography is never congruent with the territory of a modern 
nation state. It is a mentally, individually as well as collectively, constructed space that is 
based upon religious norms and beliefs shared by a certain faith group. Heidenreich (2010: 
130) presents the example of Italy for Christianity and of Saudi Arabia for Islam. Holy sites of 
these religions are within Italy or Saudi Arabia but the respective sacral geographies are not 
limited to these territories, rather they have a global reach. As religions and sacral 
geographies are global phenomena which are not limited to national territories delimitated by 
borders they can compete and get into conflict with established secular state orders, should 
their norms and goals be in stark contrast. Sacral geography draws a map which is embedded 
in ‘real world’ topography but it is mainly based on cultural, economic, social and religious 
meanings in space (Heidenreich 2010: 12). 
2.2 Islamic Jihad 
The second important term for this paper is Islamic Jihad. In the following, some information 
on the concepts and roots of Jihad will be given as well as a definition of this phenomenon.  
The Arabian word ‘Jihad’ is translated into English as ‘struggle’ or ‘effort’. Musharbash 
(2006: 41) supposes that many Muslims only interpret Jihad as a spiritual ‘effort’ and do not 
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connote with it a violent ‘holy war’. In Islam the concept of Jihad is distinguished into two 
kinds, the ‘greater Jihad’ and the ‘lesser Jihad’ (Cook 2005: 35; Heidenreich 2010: 15). In 
brief definition, the greater Jihad is the fight against oneself and the lesser Jihad is the 
religious war (Heidenreich 2010: 15), what means "the physical holy war" (Heit 2005: 1). The 
greater Jihad is the inner struggle which exists in three different types:  
"Jihad of the Heart (the struggle for moral reformation and faith), Jihad of the Tongue (the struggle to 
proclaim God’s word abroad; right speech) [and] Jihad of the Hand (doing good works in accord with 
the will of God)." (ibid: 1)  
The lesser Jihad is briefly defined as a way to defend Islam against disbelievers (Kepel 2002: 
176; Musharbash 2006: 34). The lesser Jihad is legitimised in some parts of the Quran in a 
defensive way and it is the highest obligation of every Muslim, as underlined also within the 
Sharia. They are allowed to react to attacks against the Islam or the Islamic community and 
world but do not attack without a reason of assault. Lüders (2001: 71) has published an 
interview with Fazlur Rahman Khalil, a leader of a Jihad organisation in Pakistan and a friend 
of Osama bin Laden, about the Islamic Jihad. The main statement may be cited with the 
words: “Jihad – holy war is only an answer, an answer against the actions of oppressors of 
Islam”. But when you have a closer look to the Quran it can be seen that all disbelievers are 
potentially "oppressors of Islam" and all violently holy war could legitimised in the eyes of 
Jihadists through the Quran, e.g. Sura 4:76:  
"Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve fight in the cause of Taghut. 
So fight against the allies of Satan. Indeed, the plot of Satan has ever been weak."1 
So violence against all Non-Muslims Jihadists legitimise with verses of the Quran like the one 
before. Moreover, verses who promote violent directly can be found in the Quran, e.g. in 
47:4: "So when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then smite the necks until [...] you 
have overcome them" (ibid). A lot of further violent promoting verses can be found in the 
Quran, the base of Jihadists acting. Moreover, one additional fact of Islamic Jihad is the view 
of the world as a battlefield where believers fight against disbelievers (Musharbash 2006: 25). 
Musharbash also notes that abolition of disbelief and implementation of the Islam all over the 
world is one main target. The supporters of Islamic Jihad want to have one world with only 
one religion – Islam. About a violently way, if necessary! 
 
3. Islamic Jihad and the construction of a sacral geography 
The fundament of today’s sacral geography of global Jihad was laid in the middle ages. Sacral 
geography defines the holy centres and regions that have to be defended or regained and the 
“spaces of suffering” of Muslims that have to be integrated in a future global Muslim 
community (Heidenreich 2010: 13, 131). Analysing the Islamic Jihad as psychosocial 
phenomenon in linkage to sacral geography is quite important (Lüders 2001: 43). The space 
                                                 
1 Sahih International translation: http://quran.com/4 (accessed: 12.08.2013). 
63 
 
of Islamic Jihad is a psychological, social and in some cases also a political construction. The 
construction of sacral space needs a nucleus as a centre of development, Heidenreich (2010: 
130) claims. The holy centre that links all cosmic levels and represents the centre of sacral 
space is mostly symbolised as an elevated point such as a mountain. It is a place where the 
superiority is implemented by itself because of the exposition and the proximity to heaven 
(ibid: 131). The ‘highest’ point on earth in the Islamic tradition is the so called "ka'aba". 
Around this centre of the world the sacral space of Islam is constituted. The ka'aba in the 
mosque of Mecca is the centre of the Islamic cosmos. The obvious function as centre of Islam 
can be shown in the fact that every Muslim adjusts his prayer position towards Mecca, the 
centre of the Islamic cosmos (ibid: 131). In the sacral geography of Islamic Jihad the ka'aba is 
the centre, too. This construction of sacral geography of Islamic Jihad occurs by taking into 
account geopolitical military and cultural power relations in the world (ibid). The sacral 
geography of Islamic Jihad is not even manifested; it adapts in case of contemporaneous 
events but is based on the central points of classic sacral geography of Islam. Nonetheless it is 
to remark that some points of Jihadist’s geopolitics remain equal; the imagination of a divine 
order to create a global Muslim community in one territory (Caliphate) where the sole basis 
for state laws is the Sharia (Heidenreich 2010: 14; Hellmich 2012: 87).  
It is important to mention when analysing the sacral space of Islamic Jihad that it has a global 
character. This is an important difference of the global Jihadist Islam in comparison with 
traditional Islamism. In some countries there are or were special Islamism movements, for 
example in Afghanistan the Taliban or Hamas in Palestine but Islamic Jihad is a global acting 
movement that crosses borders and cannot be captured in nations or physical territories. There 
is an ideological and psychological space where Jihadists are linked and act and are not 
confined to national boundaries (Lüders 2001: 59). Regarding the definition of sacral 
geography and the fact of a global phenomenon, the following aspect is important. The Jihad 
as a national movement like the fight of the Taliban in Afghanistan is still limited to a national 
territory. The sacral geography of Islamic Jihad demands a global outreach and action. This 
will only been given once the Jihad has crossed boarders and develops into a global 
movement (Heidenreich 2010: 130).  
Another important point is the imagination of ‘paradise’ within the concept of sacral 
geography because all Islamic Jihadists follow the way to paradise as the ultimate sense of 
life. For Muslims the paradise is the holiest space of sacral geography of Islamic Jihad 
(Heidenreich 2010: 147). As a mentally constructed and imagined space it cannot be 
perceived with regular senses. Jihadists who die as ‘martyrs’ believe in entering this 
‘promised land’ in the beyond without having to go through the ‘final judgement’. Therefore, 
dying as martyr is supposed to be the safest way to paradise.  
The last point of this chapter is dealing with the acting of Islamic Jihadists and how they 
legitimise it. It follows from the abovementioned question of consequences of sacral 
geography of Islamic Jihad. In the following, the consequences of sacral geography of Islamic 
Jihad will be demonstrated. Especially the actions of Jihadists are explainable with the 
approach of sacral geography and a psychological constructed space. One reason of acting as 
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Islamic Jihadist is desecrating of holy territory (Heidenreich 2010: 132). The fight against 
disbelievers and enemies of the Islam that attacks only a small point in the Islamic world can 
be described with the sacral geography. In sacral geography there is a holy territory. 
Interventions in one area in this holy territory justify attacks against the ‘enemies’. There is a 
construct of global holy territory and only a simple attack to this territory, wherever it is in 
topographical definition, legitimises fighting them. Heidenreich (2010: 132) adds the example 
of a hot-dog stand in the backmost area of a cathedral that would desecrate the total cathedral. 
In comparison to this example, an attack against one spot of holy Islamic space that is 
constructed in sacral geography, desecrates the whole Islamic space. It is obligatory for every 
Muslim to fight against this occurrence. Jihadists call fighting against enemies of Islam as an 
obligation like directing one’s prayers towards Mecca (Heidenreich 2010: 133). Referring to 
the point of lesser Jihad in the definitional chapter these actions are explainable. Defending 
the Muslim territory is an obligation for every Muslim – attacks in the sacral space are against 
Muslim territory and have to be parried. At first it is an obligation for the inhabitants of an 
attacked area and subsequently also of the global Muslim community to support the 
‘defensive’ fight (Heidenreich 2010: 132). Secular and democratic institutions that are 
commonly seen as the best way of political organisation are not acceptable for Islamic 
Jihadists. That is another reason that supports Islamic Jihadists fighting, especially, against the 
Western world. The system of government with democracy and freedom of opinion is not 
accepted by Islamic Jihadists based on the fact that people could criticise Islam (Musharbash 
2006: 26).  
 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be said that the field of analysing sacral geography of Islamic Jihad is a 
complex task. This sacral construct of the world is the basis for all global Jihadists and the 
ways and reasons they are acting in. In principle, all members of this community feel linked 
to each other within this space, independent of all profane restrictions. Based on this affinity 
and solidarity linkage within a global sacral space problems arise when it comes to finding 
and fighting Jihadist terrorists by means of modern military. Because of the global network 
architecture of Jihadists within a shared idea of sacral space, containment of such religiously 
motivated terrorism is nearly impossible. Spiritual beliefs and religious convictions can hardly 
be destroyed by weapons. By analysing the sacral geography of Islamic Jihad the global 
geopolitical influence and agenda can be better understood. This paper may only be seen as an 
introductory overview about this complex topic, trying to give some basic insights into the 
approach of analysing Islamic Jihad and its fundamental norms.  
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Religious radicalism and territoriality in the Nigerian conflict: Is 
federalism the answer? 
Daniel Shekerletov 
 
Abstract 
Being the most populous country in Africa and home to huge amounts of natural resources, Nigeria 
has the potential of becoming an important player in the globalized world. But this potential 
contradicts to significant inner tensions, especially between the equally distributed religions of Islam 
and Christianity. The religious issues are repeatedly a reason for violence. In their attempts to hold 
the state together, Nigerian politicians have developed a model of decentralized federalism, which 
even allows the co-existence of different jurisprudential systems, including the Shari'a. Meanwhile, the 
country suffers from exceptionally high rates of poverty and corruption. This paper tries to analyze the 
effectiveness of the system and its capability of limiting and solving the enormous inner conflicts of 
Nigeria and poses the question if federalism isn’t more of a dividing factor in the absence of badly 
needed structural reforms.  
 
1. Introduction 
Since its independence from British rule in 1960, Nigeria has gone through a series of 
political crises, ranging from civil war to military coup d'etats and religious extremism. This 
is not surprising, because the post-colonial Nigerian society comprises strong ethnic, cultural 
and religious differences, which make the country one of the most complex states on Earth. In 
addition, the Nigeria's demographic explosion, the poor educational system, as well as the 
high levels of poverty and corruption produce significant social tensions. All the above-
mentioned factors create an atmosphere of political instability, which easily escalates into 
extremism and violence. The religiously and politically motivated violence has reached 
alarming levels in the last years; it has evolved into a problem, the successful approach to 
which is one of the greatest challenges ahead of the political class of Nigeria. The most 
important question is what means exactly should the country choose and what strategy it 
should implement in order to accomplish those tasks; which actions can bring long-lasting 
stability. If Nigeria manages to overcome those challenges, its vast natural resources and 
essential position in Africa could help the country to become one of the key players in the 
globalized world of the near future. 
Today's Nigeria is a federalist state; it is without doubt, that in order of holding this territory 
together, which is the home of so many different ethno-cultural groups, a form of federalism 
as part of the state's structure is needed. It seems, though, that the Nigerian federalism is 
suffering from severe weaknesses, leading to a contra-productive effect for society and 
nation-building. The Nigerian model of federalisation is characterised by territorial 
fragmentation, capsulation and division between the single groups and serving regional group 
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interests, instead of creating conditions for national cohesion. This is rounded up by an 
inefficient approach of resource control and lack of rule of law. While some important issues 
of self-government are neglected or blocked on purpose, issues, which are directly damaging 
the legitimacy of the state such as the co-existence of multiple jurisprudential systems are 
tolerated. Such drastic contradictions damage the already weakened authority of the state and 
emasculate informal leaders and structures, that rely on religion as the instrument of enlarging 
their influence. The thus arising question, though, is not as much if, but how federalism should 
be implemented in the Nigerian political system.    
The following study tries to observe this problem and to give some insights of how Nigeria 
could reform its federal system and what structural reforms it has to enforce in order to 
provide the "answer" to religious radicalism and territoriality, as set in the title. The author 
has used a broad variety of literature about Nigeria, concerning federalism, religion, 
secularism, identity, resource distribution, good governance etc. and by comparing the variety 
of expressed views will try to come out with a general conclusion on the challenges the 
country has to face and their possible solutions.  
Therefore, the main text is divided into four parts. The first highlights the current structure of 
the Nigerian state and the interconnections between politics and ethnic and religious 
identities. It provides the historical and cultural backgrounds of the developments in Nigeria, 
observes the religious violence and the efforts of the political elite to prevent them through the 
creation of a demonstrative culture of religious tolerance. It also elucidates factors beyond the 
formal political system, which nevertheless prove to be very important for securing and 
legitimizing the power of the political class, such as traditional non-formal forms of political 
authority. The second part explores how aspects of the Nigerian federalism influence the 
stability of the country and the life of its citizens. Therefore, it is based on two case studies: 
the implementation of the sharia law in Northern Nigeria and the concept of resource control, 
two issues, that provide essential insights on how the system works in reality. The third part 
focuses on the importance of implementing structural reforms and schematises a concept of 
good governance for the development of Nigeria, which lies beyond the mechanisms of 
federalism. The main text closes with a chapter that compares Nigeria to two other federalist 
states- Germany and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to clarify two different approaches to 
federalism and underline that the specific concept of federalism in a country assumes different 
processes emerging from it. Finally, the conclusion systemises the displayed information and 
summarises the author's point of view towards the challenges and opportunities in front of the 
Nigerian state. 
 
2. The federalist system of Nigeria and the role of religion and ethnicity 
To understand the current developments in Nigeria, a brief overview on the country and its 
history is necessary. Nigeria can basically be divided into three regions: the Muslim North, 
the religiously mixed so-called Middle belt and the Christian South. This composition is 
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determined by the country's pre-colonial and colonial past. Islam widely entered the North of 
Nigeria in the 19th century with the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1808 under 
Usman dan Fodio (Adekunle 2009a: 5-6). The Sokoto Caliphate was a theocratic Islamic 
state, whose southern borders roughly resemble today's Islamic-dominated states in Nigeria 
(Paden 2008: 7). Since the middle of the 19th century, the British started to expand their 
colonial empire over Nigeria, beginning with the Atlantic coast and eventually conquering 
Northern Nigeria and dissolving the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903 (Afolayan 2009: 38-39). The 
British established a Northern and Southern Protectorate, which they amalgamated in 1914 
due to administrative and economical reasons, shaping the future borders of independent 
Nigeria (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 119). Although in the South colonialism and the spread of 
Christianity went hand in hand, the British prevented the Christianisation of the North in order 
to secure their model of Indirect rule. This created the territorial dichotomy in Nigeria, which 
persists till today, with the South being mostly Christian, with Western education and better 
development, and an Islam-dominated, underdeveloped North (Adekunle 2007a: 6; 
Nwaiogaidu 2012: 223). 
After Nigeria's independence in 1960 and the absence of the stabilizing factor of British rule, 
the different loosely inter-connected territorial entities quickly drifted apart, which led to the 
country experiencing a long-lasting period of political turmoil- a devastating civil war from 
1967 to 1970 and military dictatorship in the periods 1966-1979 and 1983-1988 (Nwaiogaidu 
2012: 121), which tried to stabilize the country by undemocratic and often violent means. In 
1999, the military resigned from power, which led to the instalment of the current Fourth 
Republic.  
The history of Nigerian independence is accompanied by events that lead to a strong 
antagonism and mistrust between the Muslim and the Christian population. Two of the most 
symbolic are when the country joined the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1986 
and when 12 northern states introduced the Islamic law sharia in the criminal domain of their 
judiciary systems in 1999 (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 139; Paden 2008: 58). These events deepened 
the conflict potential in Nigerian society and periodically lead to violent outbreaks on ethno-
religious basis. Just in the period 1999-2006, the first years after the reintroduction of 
democracy, 14 000 people were killed and 3 million displaced due to such outbreaks (Paden 
2008: 82). It is assumed, that 40% of the cases of violence in Nigeria are politically, 
religiously or ethnically motivated (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 281). In recent years, a certain Islamist 
anti-modern insurgency group, called Boko Haram (which means as much as "Western 
education is a sin") evolved into a threat to national security and is being held responsible for 
a multitude of killings and bombings all over Northern and Central Nigeria (Leiß 2012: 13). 
Today, Nigeria is considered to be one of the most complex countries on Earth. With a total 
population of 170 million people it is the most populous country in Africa; given its high 
fertility rate of 5.38 children per woman its population is expected to grow to 400 million 
people until 2050, thus making Nigeria the fourth most populous nation on Earth (Index 
Mundi 2013). It is also home to over 250 different ethnic groups and is the largest country on 
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Earth with an approximate balance of Christian and Muslim population, with the two groups 
forming roughly 50% of the population each (Paden 2008: 3). The three biggest ethnic groups 
(Fig. 1) are the Hausa/Fulani in the north (29% of the population Muslim), the Yoruba in the 
southwest (21%, 50/50 Muslim/Christian) and the Igbo in the southeast (18%, Christian). 
Despite of English being the official language, the languages of those three ethnic groups are 
accepted in their regions for certain administrative purposes. Another big ethnic group are the 
Christian Ijaw from the south with about 10% of the country's population (Paden 2008: 10).  
The country experienced an oil boom in the 1970's and 1980's, which made it an important 
factor in the global economy and determined its economical development in the next decades. 
Today, Nigeria is the 7th largest oil producer in the world (Paden 2008:3). On the 
international level, Nigeria holds leading positions in ECOWAS and the African Union and is 
committed to various peace-keeping and crisis management missions in other African 
countries, such as Sudan (Paden 2008: 24-25). 
Despite of its international significance and its human and economical potential, the dramatic 
inner tensions Nigeria has to struggle with threaten to disintegrate the country. Trying to 
overcome the traumatising heritage of civil war and dictatorship and hold the country 
together, Nigeria has adopted a model of loose federalism that splits the territory more and 
more over time with the argument to ensure maximal autonomy of the different communities. 
After the end of the civil war, Nigeria had 12 states; today they are 36 (Fig. 2), not including 
the federal region of the capital Abuja (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 104). Currently, Nigeria is a 
presidential republic with a bicameral parliament (Paden 2008: 14). The dominant parties are 
the People's Democratic Party (holds most of the states, elected all of the three last presidents) 
and the All Progressives Congress, formed in 2013 by the fusion of the four main opposition 
parties (Paden 2008: 15; Nigerian Tribune 2013).  
The Nigerian political system shows certain specific features that need to be highlighted. At 
least on the level of the political elite, a strong consensus has been reached, that Nigeria has to 
remain one state. Thus, Nigeria's model of overcoming differences is based on a stable party 
center, a constitutional ban of religious and ethnic parties and a demonstrative tolerance, 
applied by the heads of state. A cornerstone of this approach is the already mentioned 
federalist system: besides the 36 states, the military administration in the 1990's divided the 
country in six semi-official geographical regions to overcome ethnic and religious identities 
and moved the capital from Lagos to Abuja in the geographical centre of Nigeria. Also, each 
of the 774 local government authorities have a representative function on state level. There 
also is a general consensus that the president has to be elected on a rotating basis from the 
Muslim North and the Christian South, which system has established itself in reality (Paden 
2008: 19-21). Umbrella organizations such as NIREC (Nigerian Interreligious Council), 
consisting of an equal number of Muslim and Christian leaders, promote a cross-religious 
dialogue (Paden 2008: 23).  
Despite of those initiatives to prevent ethno-religious violence, the Nigerian political model 
has severe flaws, which compromise all the above-mentioned efforts. First of all: theory and 
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practice of the federal structure diverge sharply from each other; below the surface of policies 
for promoting tolerance, Nigerian political life has another face, which includes heavy 
corruption, abuse of power and the construction of clientelistic power networks, based on 
regional origin, on all levels of government. Taking a closer look on the creation of much of 
the current Nigerian states, one can observe that many of them are established to represent the 
interest of a certain ethnic group and to mobilise it, instead for national cooperation as 
intended; thus, often the federal model doesn't prevent ethno-regionalism, but simply 
restructures it. While some ethnic groups have got states for themselves, some are a minority 
in a state ruled by a different group and define their status through alienation; this creates 
political turmoil and competition for splitting up states, which is detrimental for the 
interethnic relations (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 104-105). This competition between the individual 
ethno-regional groups hinders national integration and prevents the conduct of politics of 
"real" issues by determining political process in the orbit of political elites strengthening their 
own networks of clientelism and patrimonialism. Unfortunately, for the Nigerian political 
elites it is easier to protect such a status quo than to support structural reforms, because it 
gives them a secured place in Nigerian politics and an opportunity to increase their influence 
and wealth (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 107). The policy of establishing certain geo-cultural zones  
paradoxically institutionalises ethnic and religious division in an attempt to reduce them. 
Besides that, it further complicates the system and in-tunes the crisis of political rotation 
among ethnic regions, which are neither clearly explained nor sanctioned by the electorates 
(Nwaiogaidu 2012: 128). This particularisation leads to the undermining of the federal 
institutions and their claim of independency and democracy, which compromises the whole 
idea of a Nigerian nation, because it fails to create a loyalty of the citizen to the country that is 
stronger than his ethno-regional identity.  
Another disturbing aspect of Nigerian federalism is the influence of traditional informal 
structures and titles, such as the Sultan of Sokoto. Despite of having no formal prerogatives, 
appointed by the constitution, or any kind of democratic sanction, the holders of such titles 
have a significant authority amongst the population and are often more effective in conflict 
resolution than the official governmental institutions (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 134). The formal 
political class is deeply involved with them in order to legitimize their power; they also play a 
very important role in electioneering, because the ruler has the potential of influencing his 
followers to vote for a certain candidate. The prospect of connections and wealth makes the 
holding of such a title very desired and in many cases they are being sold and traded 
(Nwaiogaidu 2012: 137). Also, due to the era of colonialism, many of the ethnic groups in 
Nigeria are represented in the neighbouring countries, which creates further informal 
interdependencies (Paden 2008: 39-43). 
The role of such traditional informal institutions in the conciliation of social and ethno-
religious conflicts may sound as a positive aspect on the first look, but in the long-term it is a 
disservice to democracy. By being dependent on their services in the election process and for 
increasing their own authority, the Nigerian politicians are creating intermediaries between 
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themselves and the citizens, which is the basis for disinterest in politics, corruption and 
opacity. The result is the emerging of a "informal" federalism, which evades the democratic 
institutions. Thus, in order to strengthen democracy, the Nigerian state has to try to gradually 
deconstruct the sources of the political influence of the informal rulers.  
The provided overview on the Nigerian political model in this chapter shows that it suffers 
under a lot of flaws. Part 3 will try to provide insights on how deep do the flaws affect the 
stability of the country and what role the implemented model of Nigerian federalism plays in 
this process. 
 
3. Issues of federalism: the sharia and resource control 
The following section will explore the backgrounds of two specific examples of how Nigerian 
federalism works. The author has chosen aspects, which are symbolic for the functioning of 
the system as a whole and are shaping the life of Nigerians in many different aspects. 
However, instead of preventing violence and enhancing social cohesion, they are achieving 
the opposite. The first example is the implementation of the sharia in the criminal domain in 
twelve northern states in 2000; being a religious issue, it has a direct effect on interreligious 
relations. The second example, the Nigerian system of resource control provides the 
economical basis of coexistence of the country's regions and determines the general path of 
development of Nigeria.   
 
3.1. Sharia 
In order to be objective, sharia has a past long before the year 2000. First, it was recognised 
by the British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria; after the country's independence it 
was substituted by a national system of secular laws in the criminal and corporate domains. 
Nevertheless, in the Northern states it remained applicable in the civil domain (family issues, 
marriage, divorce etc.) through a system of parallel lower courts, a peculiarity, which was 
confirmed by the constitution of 1999 (Paden 2008: 58). 
The escalation of the sharia issue occurred in 2000, when the state of Zamfara introduced the 
law in the criminal domain. Soon, eleven more Northern states followed its example, thus 
approximately drawing the borders of the old Islamic theocratic state of Sokoto in the 
northern part of the country (Fig. 3). After initial backlashes from the central government and 
outbreaks of violence, the system was widely accepted by Nigerian authorities and no further 
actions were taken to preserve secularism. The implementation of sharia brought with itself 
the practicing of the harsh punishments it foresees; for example, Nigeria is one of the six 
countries worldwide, where stoning as a penalty in capital crimes is allowed (Paden 2008: 
62). 
Although with the establishment of multiple jurisprudential systems on the territory of the 
affected states it was formally guaranteed, that sharia would be applied to Muslims only and 
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the Christian population would be treated according to national laws, sharia quickly became a 
symbol of religious discrimination and oppression of the minority. Since Islam rejects 
separation of political from religious authority and promotes a unified theocratic system of 
governance, the Christian minority in the North (counting several million people) feared, that 
the implementation of sharia is just a step towards assimilation (Nwaogaidu 2012: 282). The 
advocates of sharia argue that it is a cultural necessity for the Muslims to have sharia law and 
that it is not something applied to Christians in those regions. This argument does not pass a 
careful examination, though, because the sharia is not just perceived as a juridical instrument, 
but also a way of life. Thus, in the sharia-affected states there is a ban on alcohol, cinemas and 
integration of the sexes, which is affecting everyone, including the Christian population 
(Adekunle 2009b: 185). Another critical argument is that despite being perceived by the 
Muslim as a demarcation line of good and evil, the sharia is vulnerable to the vices of the 
Nigerian political system, too, and has become corrupt and politicised over time. Adekunle 
(2009b: 183) argues that the law has affected mostly the poor ("talakawa") and represses 
women. He also states that the implementation of the sharia was used as a political statement 
to express disenchantment with the government of the Christian Obasanjo and prevent a re-
election in 2003 (Adekunle 2009b: 186). Obviously, Islamic law is not capable of dealing 
with the problems of Nigerian society; corruption and embezzlement of office is not regarded 
as theft and is subjugated under light punishments, if at all (Paden 2008: 60). Also, there are 
signs that the sharia is being used by the governing class of the northern states to pursue 
political opponents and does not conform to the principle of equal treatment. In some states, 
the creation of neighbourhood squads for the enforcement of Islamic law, the so-called 
"hisbah", has caused additional controversy and damaged further the rule of law and the 
capability of the state to ensure the security of its citizens (Paden 2008: 61). 
The sharia issue is clearly a problem that has formally been created by the mechanisms of 
federalism. Today, 13 years after the introduction of the Islamic religious law in the criminal 
domain, it still represents the mistrust between the two main religions in Nigeria and holds 
enormous conflict potential. To some researchers it is even the controversy that "polarized the 
country along religious divides more than had any other issue in Nigeria's history" (Omotola 
2009: 88). The introduction of sharia and its aftermath caused deterioration of the 
interreligious relations, which were already tattered by events in the past, such as the 
membership in the OIC of 1986, and caused multiple outbreaks of violence, the bloodiest of 
which took place in Kaduna; over 2000 people lost their lives then (Omotola 2009: 90). There 
were even proposals to split the mixed state in two; in the Christian part of the country, Cross 
River State threatened to call itself officially a "Christian State", which would have served as 
an excuse of others to do the same (Adekunle 2009b: 187).  
The implementation of the traditional Islamic law in the North has damaged the idea of the 
rule of law, which is essential for the functioning of a democratic system. Thus, it has to be 
seen as an anti-systematic initiative, which provides a simple solution for swift and direct 
social justice, which is not compromised by the perceived as corrupt institutional mechanisms 
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of the state. Although after the implementation in 1999 and the subsequent riots in 2000, the 
state has withdrawn from imposing secular laws in those regions in order not to create any 
additional turmoil, in the long-run this is the basis for more violence and capsulation. To 
some, sharia might seem as a good chance for Nigerian Muslims to live their culture, but a 
system of multiple jurisprudential systems is damaging the core principle of democracy, that 
the law should apply to everyone, disregarding religion, personal views or social position. 
Parallel laws also mean parallel societies and this is definitely not helping in the process of 
national unity, but is leading to alienation of the individual from the state. In addition, the 
failure of sharia to provide this justice due to its own corruption and inadequacy towards the 
challenges of the present might lead to further disillusionment and seeking of even more 
radical means.  
 
3.2. Resource control 
The programmed weaknesses of the Nigerian system of federalism manifest itself in the issue 
of resource control and the federal redistribution of funds. During colonial times it was a 
common cliché, that the rich South has to subsidise the poor North; this was one of the main 
arguments for the amalgamation of both regions during British rule (Azaiki 2008: 325). 
Since the oil-boom in the 1970's, Nigeria grew attached to the quick oil revenues, which today 
have risen to more than 90% of the country's exports (Nwaogaidu 2012: 164). Until then, the 
revenues from oil production had been split evenly between the producing region and the 
central government, but over time and especially during the military regimes, the central 
government processed laws, which redirected most of the revenues in its hands and over-
centralised the branch (Fig. 4). The first and most important law as such was the Petroleum 
Decree 51 of 1969, which gave the exclusive ownership to oil resources to the federal 
government. It was the time of the civil war and the law was justified by the goal to weaken 
the separatist region of Biafra. Nevertheless, the law hasn't been revoked until today, decades 
after the end of the war (Azaiki 2008: 318). Today, around 87% of the revenue money is 
flowing directly from the oil-producing states in the Niger Delta to the central government, 
from where it is being evenly redistributed to the regions with a slight preponderance of the 
oil-producing regions (Table 1., Nwaiogaidu 2012: 224). This means, that the oil-producing 
regions in the south only get a fraction of the money they make, while the North, not having 
any significant economy, is heavily subsidised by the political elites. With the abolishment of 
fiscal federalism and implementing a policy of monopolising the oil revenues and 
redistributing them, the oil economy not only has become the most important branch of 
Nigerian economy, it is also the key to political power. Since the parliament comprises 182 
representatives from the North and only 154 from the South, this status quo is determined by 
legislative barriers. For example, a proposed bill from a southern representative to revoke the 
Petroleum Act and re-introduce fiscal federalism in 2001 was clearly blocked by a secure 
Northern majority (Sagay 2008: 370).  
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The dependency on oil has had detrimental effects on the other branches of Nigerian 
economy, especially the agrarian sector. The budgetary expenditures are mainly determined 
by the price of crude oil on the international market; this makes the Nigerian economy very 
vulnerable to outer influences.  With the greater dependency on oil, the socio-economic 
development worsened significantly (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 164-165). Thus, the state has become 
the major employer in the country in the minds of Nigerians (Paden 2008: 66). The oil 
industry has become an easy way to distribute money to secure the survival of a certain 
region. The Nigerian political class and is using this factor for securing and expanding their 
political power over their own regions and are stirring up the fear of conflict between the 
South and the North, which adds to the atmosphere of antagonism between the regions and 
religions in Nigeria. Thus, ethnic and religious mobilisation has become strategic means of a 
struggle for oil-produced financial resources (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 129). Therefore, the political 
class takes into account a line of confrontation between ethnic and religious groups, violence, 
the creation of vast corruption and clientelistic networks just in order to sustain their power. 
The distribution of socio-political or economic resources through employment, administrative 
positions or political powers based on ethnic identity struggle disregards merit or qualification 
and affects people by their origin; the aftermath of this process is competence failure, loss of 
productivity and morale declination (Nwaiogaidu 266-267), which is again mostly affecting 
the "simple" Nigerians, creating thus a vicious circle of poverty and conflict. While the fear of 
poverty is causing extremism on both sides, the political class is using it as a distraction for 
exploiting the huge opportunities for corruption, for example through misdirection of large 
amounts of raw oil for offshore sale directly by politicians and military personnel (Paden 
2008: 68). 
Despite of being caused by over-centralisation, the problems of the model of fiscal 
redistribution are exercised through a dysfunctional federalism. In order to overcome this 
vicious circle, Nigeria has to turn towards diversification of its economy and a reform of its 
model of federalism through fiscal federalism. The "curse of oil" over the country has to be 
stopped; the North has to become more independent from the oil revenues. Although the 
Nigerian economy was largely driven by oil in the last decades, the country has much more 
valuable resources in all of its regions, which it could exploit in order to achieve 
diversification. Before oil, for example, there was a period, when the North was economically 
important due to its tin production (Azaiki 2008: 322). 
A great help in promoting diversification can be fiscal federalism. If a reasonable part of the 
revenues from a state economy would stay in the state, then this would cultivate a state of 
responsibility and control in the political class and in the people in general towards their 
budget. The focus of the local government will shift from redirecting wealth to creating 
wealth by using its own potential and resources. Fiscal federalism would also limit the 
networks of corruption and clienteles, which have entangled Nigerian society. It will also 
limit some of the negative aspects of the federalist model, such as the legislative barriers and 
the never-ending corruption-driven balance of powers in the parliament and in the relations 
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between central and local governments. This would open the gates towards a more successful 
form of nation-building and prevention of ethno-religious conflicts.  
 
Those two examples of important aspects of Nigerian politics uncover the wrong design of the 
Nigerian federalist model: in reality, federalism not only fails to create a unified nation, which 
is capable of overcoming political and social challenges, it actually prevents such a process. 
The Nigerian state retreats from spheres which are amongst its most important prerogatives 
such as the rule of law and allows the existence of parallel laws in the criminal and civil 
domain, which are applied only to a certain group of its citizens. This is undermining the very 
basic aspects of democracy. At the same time, the Nigerian state over-centralises the main 
source of its profit and redistributes it on mainly political criteria, damaging the economical 
development of the country, creating corruption and strengthening the existing mistrust 
between the ethno-religious groups. So, as a summary, the author can point out, that wherever 
the Nigerian central government has to defend its authority towards the local governments and 
prove its capacity to defend democracy, it is restrained; wherever the regions need more 
freedom to develop their strengths and create an effect of synergy for the whole state, the 
central government prevents those chances by over-regulating and over-centralising. This is a 
pattern Nigeria has to overcome and the means towards it are structural reforms and good 
governance.  
 
4. The Urge for Good Governance 
Section 3 made clear that federalism is not a solution on its own, when it comes to solving 
complex problems. Also, federalism does not guarantee good governance according to 
democratic principles. The latter is something Nigeria has a dramatic deficit of. The basic 
requirements for good governance are an efficient public service, an independent judicial 
system, an accountable administration of public funds, respect for the law and human rights 
on all levels of government, a pluralistic institutional structure as well as a free press 
(Nwaiogaidu 2012: 306) Certainly, this is a gigantic challenge for Nigeria; the country will 
need a definite, long-term commitment to those principles, if it wants to implement them. But 
it is worth it in order to realise the enormous potential the country has. Good governance in 
Nigeria can be applied in many different aspects, but all of them are connected to the 
changing political culture and mentality towards a general policy in favour of national interest 
and unity. 
First, important structural reforms have to be implemented in order to secure democratic 
principles, the rule of law, equal treatment, economical prosperity, human rights, as well as to 
break through corruption and informal clientelistic structures, based on identity. The two case 
studies in Part 3, sharia and resource control, are good examples of what is going wrong in 
those spheres and what has to change. Diversifying the economy and introducing a more 
efficient model of resource redistribution based on fiscal federalism is an important structural 
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reform and a way of creating employment and reducing the drastic poverty in Nigeria. 
Actually, the results of the opposing economical policy in the past are easy to see: with the 
domination of oil in the Nigerian economy and the demographic explosion, the GDP per 
capita has fallen dramatically from $849.87 in 1980 to $220.22 in 1994. Only since the 
beginning of the 21th century a significant economical recovery has taken place, with the 
GDP per capita rising from $371.77 from 2000 to $1,501.72 in 2011 (Index Mundi). 
Nevertheless, Nigeria doesn't manage to quickly improve its Human Development Index 
(HDI) of the United Nations- it is currently ranked at place 153 out of 186 countries 
(Channels TV 2013). In the period 1980-2000, the percentage of the population living in 
poverty rose from 28% to 70%, 68% of Nigerians are stated to live with less than $1.25 daily 
in 2013 (Jega 2000: 198; Channels TV 2013). Poverty is not just a question of the standard of 
living and consumption of goods for the Nigerian people, as important this aspect may be; 
poverty is also a threat to national security, because it makes people easy to manipulate on 
basis of their ethnic and religious identity by the clientelistic networks of the political class 
and mobilising them in the conflicts for resource control. Thus, applying structural reforms in 
order to fight poverty must be a high priority for the Nigerian state. The quicker this happens, 
the better.  
To achieve this shift in politics, a new political class must emerge in Nigeria that has the will 
to implement it. Unfortunately, this usually is a long lasting process and could take many 
years, until it shows results. The creation of such a political elite, which is committed to 
unifying the nation, depends on a broader commitment of the Nigerian citizens to the ideals of 
the constitution and the principles of democracy. A very important factor in this process is 
civic education (Jega 2007: 159). Civic education could play an important role in forming a 
class of responsible and self-conscious citizens that have overcome the old structures of 
power and dependency of ethno-religious communities. Especially for a society like the 
Nigerian, where the decades of military dictatorship and political instability have significantly 
weakened the civil society, the presence of such a class, which seeks political representations 
not based on religious or ethnic identities, but on policy of issues, is essential. Also, education 
in general is the only way of dealing with the challenges, which emerge from the 
demographical explosion; a permanently growing mass of poor and uneducated youngsters 
will certainly lead to more instability. A large and well-funded campaign for improvement of 
education can turn the demographical situation into a positive aspect by quickly creating a 
critical mass of educated people, who are motivated to work for the national interest. 
Despite the many advantages of implementing a concept of good governance, its realisation 
could prove quite problematic. The clientelistic networks of the political class don't have an 
interest of that, because it would shatter the basis for their power. It is highly likely, that it 
would try to sabotage such initiatives or substitute them by simulating reforms, which in fact 
preserve the status quo. Thus, a real shift in the mentality of policy-making in Nigeria in a 
foreseeable time remains uncertain.  
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5. Other examples of federalism: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Germany 
Finally, wishing to point out more arguments on why federalism can have positive as well as 
negative effects on a state, depending on its philosophy and implementation, the author has 
decided to present two specific countries as examples of both cases. The first case is that of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shows that circumstances strongly resembling the Nigerian 
can be found in a country in the middle of Europe. After the end of the war in 1995, the 
Dayton treaty outlined the further coexistence of the ethnic communities as one state. 
However, the only way the participants saw as a possibility to hold the country together was 
to establish a stiff federalist model with clearly defined ethnic quotas in governmental sectors. 
This led to a political process based on further mutual capsulation of the cultural groups and 
the anchoring of ethnical statism in Bosnia's political culture, which leads to a reproduction of 
the state of crisis from the war and is preventing the stabilisation of the country through a 
process of a gradual unification even until today (Dzihic 2009: 401-405).  
On the other hand, the author tried to refer to a more positive example of federalism, which 
could serve as an inspiration or even role model for Nigeria in order to promote reforms in its 
own federal structure. Germany is such a functioning federalist state. The philosophy of the 
modern German federalism is the so-called "Verbundsmodell" ("unitary model"), in which the 
single states ("Länder") have the autonomy to determine certain fields of their home policy, 
but when it comes to the government of the country as a whole, they strongly rely on each 
other. This system is also called "cooperative federalism", because it is a complex and 
extensive collective enterprise, which stimulates the cohesion of the state and prevents 
significant discrepancies between the single entities (Funk 2010: 30-31). In the German case, 
what helps implementing this model in reality, is on one hand the strong rule of law and on 
the other hand that, despite the single regions having some cultural or religious differences, 
there is a strong national identity that is protecting the country from issues of origin.  
Although surely it has to be noted, that Germany and Nigeria have a totally different social 
background, the German model of federalism might serve as an inspiration for implementing 
certain reforms in order to strengthen the unity of the Nigerian state and reduce the 
importance of group interests. On the other hand, the parallels between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Nigeria show that the weaknesses of the Nigerian system of federalism are 
structural and implemented elsewhere will have a negative effect, too.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Again, at the end of this paper, the question from the beginning arises: Is federalism the 
solution for Nigeria? The possible answer, based on the information presented above, is: 
partially. Federalism can provide a reasonable autonomy in internal, administrative and 
communal issues to the individual ethno-religious communities, which, given the diversity in 
the country, is easy to understand; but most important of all, it can help to enforce the 
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economical development of the regions by giving more instruments of economical initiative 
in the hands of the local governments. Economical decentralization can have a positive spill-
over effect for fighting corruption and clientelistic networks. One crucial aspect of achieving 
this is through fiscal federalism.  
Nevertheless, federalism can just be part of solution, not the solution itself. Unfortunately, the 
model of Nigerian federalism seems to be hardly more than a substitute for urgently needed 
structural reforms and an efficient political class and administration, committed to the 
principle of democracy. In the case of Nigeria, a federalist system has to help in nation-
building, but in reality it just demonstrates the state's lack of interest in unifying the country 
and building up democratic civil structures. The demonstrative religious tolerance of the 
political elites is not a negative aspect, but the author perceives it as the easiest way applied to 
try to hold latent conflicts between the religious communities. In an environment, dominated 
by instability, it is essential to fight the non-religious causes of extremism, which are poverty, 
lack of education and perspectives, as well as corruption. If taken further, the misconceptions 
in the Nigerian federalist model will continue to produce capsulation of the different regions 
into ethno-religiosity and reproduction of mistrust and discrimination. The implementation of 
the sharia as a jurisprudential system and a lifestyle in the North serves as a good example of 
how decisions on the federal level are marginalising millions of Christians in those regions 
and are showing the helplessness of the Nigerian state on establishing secular laws. That is 
why the central government has to set turning towards spheres, from which it has retreated, as 
a priority. The rule of law for all citizens is not only essential; it is defining a democratic 
system. In this sense, theoretically, Nigeria shouldn't tolerate multiple jurisprudential courts, 
especially when they are dividing people on religious criteria. This is a sphere, where 
federalism cannot work for the good of the people and where the central government should 
have the courage to show more authority.  
The similarities between Nigeria and Bosnia and Herzegovina show that no matter what the 
background of a federalist system is, constructing political representation solely on identity 
leads always to negative effects. Nigeria has to turn to politics of issues and commit to a 
concept of good governance, otherwise extremism and violent outbreaks will be inevitable in 
the future. Thus, the struggle against patrimonialism, corruption and clienteles has to evolve 
to one of the top priorities of Nigeria. Ensuring the rule of law and creating effective 
institutions of security and prosecution is one aspect that has to be enforced. On the level of 
the political system Nigeria has to move away from the vast traditional networks of informal 
sources of influence, formulated in the text as "informal federalism". These are a source of 
opacity and corruption. Surely, they are strongly connected to the Nigerian identity and 
provide legitimacy to the government, but on the long-term a democracy has to be less 
dependent on ethno-religious group-interests and informal structures. 
A final factor worth mentioning is education. There is a saying, that a democracy needs a 
critical mass of democrats to survive. If Nigeria invests in civic education in schools and 
universities, it can turn the vast numbers of young people into active citizens with democratic 
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views and intolerance to the vices of the state. This will lay the basis for strengthening 
democracy in the mid-term future.  
The aspects of federalism covered in this paper probably are just a fraction of all; covering all 
would have surpassed its goal. Nevertheless, the author tried to pick out and explore those 
aspects, which have the greatest value for the topic. Summarising their content, one comes to 
the certainty, that Nigeria still has a long way to go in order to develop a true democracy. The 
author can only express his hope that it will manage to overcome all the challenges and 
emerge as one of the strong countries in the 21st century. Unfortunately, despite of some of 
the crucial steps in this process being quite obvious, it is uncertain if there is enough political 
will to implement them in the foreseeable future. The power and influence of the present 
elites, who have interest of that model to continue existing, is too great. The implementation 
of the structural reforms is expected to create some social discontent in the beginning, as well.  
Therefore, it is highly likely that reforms will progress only very slowly and that Nigeria's 
inner tensions will continue to be a source of instability, despite the relative growth of the 
country's significance on the national parquet.  
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Fig. 1: Major ethnic groups in Nigeria 
 
Source: Nwaiogaidu 2012 
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Fig. 2: The Nigerian states 
 
Source: www.mapsof.net 
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Fig. 3: The sharia-states in Nigeria (in dark) 
 
Source: Adekunle 2009a 
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Fig. 4: Federal and state shares of petroleum proceeds 1960-1999 
YEARS PRODUCING STATE (%) DISTRIBUTABLE POOL AMOUNT 
OR FEDERATION 
ACCOUNT(%) 
1960-67 50 50 
1967-69 50 50 
1969-71 45 55 
1971-75 45 minus offshore proceeds 55 plus offshore proceeds 
1975-79 20 minus offshore proceeds 80 plus offshore proceeds  
1979-81 - 100  
1982-92 1.5 98.5 
1992-99 3 97 
1999 - 13 87 
Source: Nwaiogaidu 2012 
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Arabellion: Geopolitical Proxy Wars and New Constellations of 
East and West in Syria 
Beate Ulmer 
 
Abstract 
From the beginning of the protests in March 2011 Syria’s primarily peaceful civil uprising became a 
violent opposition and escalated into a large scale civil war. An increasing militarisation spurred by 
external sponsors could be observed and was accompanied by a growing confessionalisation. The 
conflict has taken on the character of a proxy war where many powers – international, regional and 
subnational – are acting their own interests. All these issues have led to a highly volatile stalemate. 
On account of military and political risks and a variety of outcomes, military intervention on the 
principle of “Responsibility to Protect” is still discussed internationally despite the desperate 
situation of the country’s population. 
 
1. Introduction 
From Uprising to Civil War 
The initial protests in Syria in mid-March 2011 were triggered in Deraa when a group of local 
teenagers were arrested by the police and allegedly tortured for “defacing” walls with the 
motto of the Arab Spring: “Al-sha’b yurid isqat al-nizam”graffiti – “the people want the 
downfall of the regime” (De Juan and Bank 2013: 9). The first anti-government 
demonstrations broke out in Latakia when protestors hurled projectiles at the bronze statue of 
Hafiz al-Assad, the former President of Syria (Goldsmith 2012: 15). Subsequently, thousands 
of Syrians took to the streets across the country demanding the regime of President Bashar 
Assad. What began as a peaceful protest degenerated into a full blown war between the 
regime’s loyal army and a fragmented opposition with thousands killed on both sides. Since 
July 2012 the increasing militarization and also the increasing confessionalisation – Sunni 
Muslims versus Alawites – led to a desperate situation for the civil population. However there 
are also people in Syria and abroad who wanted Assad’s regime to stay for the sake of 
(religious) stability. The sectarian character and the geopolitical networking are quite 
complex. For example, the influence of Iran, the domestic security of Israel, the interest of 
Russia and China, and the various positions of USA and Europe led from a civil war to a 
proxy war where the struggle between East and West is about the dominance in the Near East. 
 
2. A state of politics of sectarian insecurity 
The protest movements in Syria – like in the rest of the Arab world – have been motivated 
almost entirely by domestic issues. The major concerns have been unemployment, poverty, 
and corruption (Terrill 2011). The successful overthrow of the governments in Tunisia and 
Egypt was a central trigger for the Syrian uprising. However in contrast to these countries, 
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Bashar al-Assad still remains in power. In 2000, when Bashar al-Assad assumed power in 
Syria he inherited an authoritarian state from the former President Hafiz al-Assad – his father. 
Bashar al Assad’s regime is dominated by the minority group of Alawites, who appears loyal 
to the government although most of Syrian Alawites remain socially and economically less 
privileged. Syria’s Alawites are part of a broader Arab Alawite community of some four 
million people (Goldsmith 2012: 6). They are concentrated in north-western Syria, with major 
populations in Latakia and Tartous. Some Alawites are also living in Damascus and on the 
peripheries of Homs and Hama, but the majority remain resident in many small villages in 
and around the coastal mountains of Jabal Sahiliyah (Goldsmith 2012: 7). 
 
For centuries the Alawites were one of the most oppressed religious minorities in Western 
Asia.2 They belong to Shi’a Islam containing elements of Christianity. Alawites were often 
considered as an extremist break-away group, as quasi-heretics who are considered to be 
marginal and enigmatic for shunning most mainstream beliefs and practices. (Goldsmith 
2012: 8-9, Noueihed and Warren 2012: 217). Since the beginning of the eleventh century the 
Alawites underwent political and religious marginalisation which excluded them from urban 
areas. They were divided between peasants of the coastal and inland plains and the mountain 
dwellers of the Jabal Sahliyah and also deeply divided by strong loyalties into localised tribal 
groups. Hence, the community had been fragmented, but the social structure was egalitarian 
and the sect was overwhelmingly rural and poor. Owing to these aspects their ideological 
penchant was towards secularism and socialism (Goldsmith 2012: 10). 
The Ba’athist revolution of 1963 happened in a country that was created by western powers 
fragmented on sub- and supra-state identities – a Sunni Arab majority and the mosaic of Arab 
minorities – ethnic and religious ones that included Alawites, Kurds, Druze, Christians, 
Turkomen and Ismailis, another branch of Shi’a Islam. The Ba’ath party was formed in 1947 
in Damascus around a secular, socialist Arab nationalism that intended to liberate Arab lands 
from foreign intervention.3 The minority groups were in favour of the secularizing ideas of the 
Ba’ath party, in fear of being oppressed by the Sunni Muslims (Hinnebusch 2012: 96, 
Noueihed and Warren 2012: 216). 
Syria’s population was also divided between the dominant landed and commercial oligarchy, 
a rising middle class, and an aggrieved peasantry. Under the Ba’ath regime land reform broke 
the economic hold of the oligarchy and the party won the support of the peasants. The regime 
started a revolution from above by creating a public sector through nationalisations where the 
major segments of the middle and working classes were employed. Investment in rural 
electrification, public health, and education led to an increase in life expectancy that 
continued into the 1990s (Hinnebusch 2012: 96). 
                                                 
2 For a detailed overview of the history of Alawites and several names of this community see Goldsmith 2012. 
3 Lewis (2011: 53) considered that “for most of the twentieth century, two ideas dominated political debate in 
the Middle East: nationalism and socialism. […] Both were of European origin; […] 
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In connection with the historical background of the Alawites it seemed a remarkable 
achievement for the Alawite community when Hafiz al-Assad became President of the Syrian 
Arab Republic in 1971. Hafiz al-Assad himself was a member of the Alawite community 
originating from a small village in the mountains. He formed the basis of his power on the 
military-security complex, the Ba’ath party apparatus and a new Alawite elite (Noueihed and 
Warren 2012: 216). 
 
Although the Ba’ath party is the sole leader of state and society in Syria since 1963 the rule of 
Assad’s dynasty is connected closely to the Alawite community forming the bedrock of the 
government. Hafiz al-Assad realized the transformation from an unstable country into a robust 
nation by a “neo-patrimonial” strategy and concentrated power of large military security 
apparatus where Alawites lieutenants playing an important part in building the patrimonial 
core. The support of the society underlies the bureaucratic and party-corporatist institutions 
that cut across sectarian and urban-rural divides, unifying a constituency that bridged the 
middle class and the peasantry (Hinnebusch 2012: 96-97). 
Despite Alawite urbanisation during the 1970s most maintained a dual existence between the 
metropolises and their home villages. From the 1990s and after the inauguration of Bashar al-
Assad many of Alawite children had a privileged status, grew up in a privileged urban 
environment or were educated abroad, like Bashar al-Assad himself. He started liberal 
economic reforms which enlarged the social division within the Alawite community 
(Goldsmith 2012: 11). Bashar al-Assad forced the overconcentration of power and patronage 
in the ruling clan. His power rests on an authoritarian, dynastic regime created by a minority 
Alawite core. In his doctoral thesis Leon T. Goldsmith (2012) demonstrated that sectarian 
insecurity is the key element of Assad’s dynasty to maintain Alawite’s support for the regime. 
The causes of insecurity within the Alawite sect are deeply rooted in its history and its long 
period of social, economic and religious marginalisation isolated in their mountain refuge for 
centuries. Goldsmith saw in the Assad regime’s struggle with the Sunni Islamist Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1976-1982 the main cause for the tenacity of Alawite insecurity. The Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood, part of the wider Sunni Islamist organization, founded in Egypt in 1928, 
launched its “all-out struggle” against the Assad regime in 1976 which finally ended in the 
tragic battle of Hama in 1982. A massive three-week long bombardment led to the death of 
around twenty thousand people and almost completely annihilated the city. The origins of 
violent opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood against the regime can be found in economic 
dissatisfaction among Sunni merchants, and involvement of the Syrian regime in Lebanon. 
The political dominant role of the Alawite elite provoked a general resentment among the 
majority Sunni population. And the Alawites themself fought for the survival of the Assad 
regime in the belief that it was the best chance for security and equality in Syrian society 
(Goldsmith 2012: 169ff.). Although Bashar al-Assad’s economic policies for ordinary 
Alawites were more unpopular, he calculated the support to the regime in perpetuation of 
insecurity. As the regime came under pressure from the international community, Bashar al-
Assad promoted external relations with Iran and Hezbollah. Sectarian chaos in Iraq and 
Lebanon fuelled Alawite sectarian paranoia. Politics of Sectarian insecurity embraces causes 
and effects of insecurity between religious communities (Goldsmith 2012: 333). The 
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continued support of the Assad regime even in its second generation is grounded in the 
Alawite “group feeling” which depends on collective memories of persecution, 
discrimination, fears, and prejudices (Goldsmith 2012: 4). 
 
3. Religion and (International) Conflict 
Religion and Civil War 
There is an increasing realisation that religion plays an important role in many conflicts all 
over the world (e.g. De Juan and Hasenclever 2010, Toft 2006, Thomas 2000). As a 
proportion of all civil wars there are also an increasing number of religion civil wars. But why 
is it that religion has a central issue in some civil wars whereas but not in all of them (Toft 
2006: 2)? 
Scientific research offers some explanatory models to answer this question. 
One model emphasizes the nature of religion itself. Within the abundance of religions 
worldwide, each presents a value system or set of beliefs and practices of a society or a 
country which distinguishes them from other systems such as political and economic activity. 
This makes religion a complex and convoluted concept (Toft 2006: 5). Dissimilarities in 
religious ideas may hold the potential for conflict or making existing conflicts more 
persistent. Religion tends to be uncompromising, often defining what is good or bad, creating 
an absolute and universal truth (Thomas 2000: 1-2). 
A different model accentuates the politicisation of religion due to globalisation. Globalisation 
creates a global culture grounded in western modernity which includes industrialisation, 
capitalism and urbanisation. These transformed religions and fragmented historic religious 
communities in the west, and now, through globalisation, are also transforming the 
Developing World. Scott Thomas (2000: 5) details that  
“From this perspective, it is argued that global resurgence of religion is more about increasing the 
political power of marginalized communities rather than bringing ‘religion’ into politics”  
A further model emphasizes the role of influential elites. They have high-ranking positions 
and thereby influence existing politics and bolstering their survival (De Juan and Hasenclever 
2010: 238, Toft 2006: 19). 
 
Islam and Civil War 
In addition, in religious civil wars Islam plays a disproportionate role. More than eighty per 
cent of religious civil wars have their origins in Islam (Toft 2006: 4). Monica Toft’s 
explanations of this issue are centred on the subsequent development of an industrial system 
and the timing to the advent of “state” (Toft 2006: 21ff). Islam has never gained courage to 
separate faith from government. The western “state system” is the result of the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 after thirty years of religious war and the beginning of the era of an 
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increasingly secularised system of a government. However, Islam does not know the principle 
of state or state sovereignty, the system of the caliphate of the Islamic Umma is the only one it 
recognises.  
“Denn der Islam kennt weder die Idee der Nation noch den ihr zugrunde liegenden Nationalstaat. Beide 
sind Ergebnisse der zunächst in Europa stattgefundenen neuzeitlichen Entwicklung seit der großen 
französischen Revolution. Die Staatsform, die der Islam in seiner Geschichte kennt und anerkennt, ist 
das Kalifat der islamischen Umma (Gemeinschaft), die ja universell ist und die gesamte Menschheit in 
der angestrebten Vereinigung umfassen soll.“ (Bassam Tibi, quoted in Abou-Taam et al. 2011: 51).  
The Western industrialisation and colonialism had exported the concept of nationalism and 
state legitimacy. The establishing of a Jewish state in the territory predominantly populated by 
Arabs and Muslims led to the West becoming an unintended force for unifying Islam (Toft 
2006: 23). In addition, Islam’s holy sites are located in a region with the largest petroleum 
reserves and the importance of petroleum for the industrialised economies moved the Middle 
East into the focus of many contests. Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism received 
intensification after the foundation of Israel in 1948 and are linked to the increasing 
antipathies between Jews, Arabs and Iranians after World War II. Conflicts in this region 
would be more likely, because of Islam’s disproportionately high role (Toft 2006: 24). 
 
Apart from historical and geographical reasons to explain Islam’s disproportionate 
contribution to high role in religious based conflicts is the form of how religion is defining 
social values and goals and in determining foreign linkages. Religion, Islam in particular, 
offers the basis to support leaders in Islamic states and at the same time the basis for 
opposition movements (e.g. Toft 2006: 24; Thomas 2000: 15). Thomas considered the 
important role of religion in postcolonial societies. Colonial states were created with artificial 
borders and at independence most of them had no meaningful national identity (Thomas 2000: 
14). Thus religion is a source of conflict because it “promotes a transnational ideology that 
challenges allegiance to the state as the basic political unit of international society” (Thomas 
2000: 14).  
 
An important aspect of Islamic conflicts is the mythic imagination of supranational ideal of 
pan-Islamic unity. However, in fact Islamic community is divided into several movements, for 
example Shi’a and Sunni Islam (Thomas 2000: 15ff.). The main Sunni Islamic movements are 
the Muslim Brotherhood based in Egypt, cooperating with the governments in Kuwait and 
Jordan and part of the armed opposition in Syria. The Gulf Arab states promote a Sunni 
version of fundamentalist Islam. On the other hand, Iran pushes the Shi’a Islam. The Iranian 
revolution intensified the split between these Islamic movements. Another aspect is the 
foundations of organisations such as the Islamic Conference and the World Muslim League 
(1962) both by Saudi Arabia, the Bureau of Islamic Propaganda by Iran and the Arab-Islamic 
People’s Conference by Islamic Sudan (1990). All these organisations are instruments of 
cultural diplomacy of particular states to weaken their rivals. 
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4. External Actors and their Interests 
Syria’s internal fight between regime and opposition forces did not take long for external 
supporters to become involved. Above and beyond the internal struggle the conflict assumed 
the character of a proxy war in which regional, subnational and international conflicts are 
fought out. All external powers whether pro or contra Assad’s Regime have their own 
interests in Syria’s civil war. Mainly Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are struggling for influence 
in the region. A confessional mobilisation – Sunnis versus Shiites – is at work. 
Russia and China support the government with trade and protection. China’s interests in Syria 
are primarily economical ones. Chinese products are popular because of their reasonable 
prices and China’s engagement in the mineral oil business is based on its reliance of the 
Iranian oil for its own energy requirements. Furthermore China and Syria agree in some 
political questions such as the return of the Golan Heights and the US hegemonial power 
politics, for example the long-standing Iraq occupation (Helberg 2012: 174). 
Russia supports the Assad Regime with arms deliveries. The alliance between Russia and 
Syria has its roots in the Cold War when the socialistic government of Syria had been the last 
strategic partner in Western Asia. Therefore, it looks like Russia’s real interest in the on-going 
conflict is its naval base in Syria’s Mediterranean harbour Tartous (Helberg 2012: 171). 
Another aspect of Russia’s support for Syria could be the fear of Sunni extremism. Moscow 
faults Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia – America’s allies – for supporting Sunni radicalism in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, and recently in the Middle East (Nasr 2013). 
In particular, Iran and its regional role is a promoter in Syria’s civil war. It strengthens 
Assad’s regime with military advisers, financial transfers and energy supplies. Bashar al-
Assad’s government is the only ally of Iran in the Arab world, albeit is not even an Arab 
country. However, some political-strategic aspects are reasons for this alliance. To counteract 
the loss of the Golan Heights Syria wanted to concentrate all forces against Israel. In addition, 
Iran itself escaped from the US-Israel influence after the downfall of the Shah-Regime and 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Revolution. Iran attempts regional domination and Syria is an 
important link to the pro-Iranian Hezbollah (Helberg 2012: 175 and Gorzewski 2013). 
For the Sunni monarchies Saudi Arabia and Qatar the civil war in Syria is a power struggle 
against Tehran’s considerable growth in influence (Asseburg and Wimmen 2012: 3). While 
Qatar backs Syrians opposition with light weapons and money, Saudi Arabia also wants to 
send heavy weapons and high-tech equipment. The fall of Bashar al-Assad would be a blow 
to Iran and thereby Saudi Arabia and Qatar could increase their regional domination 
(Gorzewski 2013). However, Saudi Arabia’s interests in Syria’s civil war will not lead to 
democratisation of Syria. This had been demonstrated during the revolt in Bahrain when 
Saudi Arabia sent troop support to the ruling Sunni minority against the struggle with the 
Shiite majority (e.g., Gorzewski 2013; Der neue Fischer Weltalmanach 2012). 
The strategic alliance between Iran and Hamas was undermined by the Syrian civil war and 
the move of Hamas’ headquarters from Damascus to Doha, the capital of Qatar. Hamas was 
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founded in 1987 as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Syria’s relationship with 
Hamas is based on a long tradition. In 1948 Syria took in Palestinian refugees displaced 
during the foundation of the state of Israel and in 1967 during the six-day war. Syria also 
supported Hamas as well as Hezbollah to add pressure on Israel over the unsolved situation of 
the Golan Heights. Although Sunni Hamas and Shiite Hezbollah have no common ground, in 
2006 they agreed on a common front against the Zionist-American aggression (Helberg 2012: 
189). 
Syria and Lebanon are connected closely in some aspects of history and society. The 
Lebanese state specifically was created by officials of the former French colony and Syria did 
not recognise the sovereignty of Lebanon. For Damascus the Lebanese capital Beirut remains 
the window to the world for official and unofficial business in the international financial 
sector (Helberg 2012: 193). The Syrian conflict is splitting the Lebanon society. While 
Lebanese Hezbollah supports the Syrian government, Alawites in the North of Lebanon are 
placing their destiny in the hands of the Assad regime with, Sunni politicians and tribes 
standing by the side of the Syrian opposition. In case of a regime change in Syria, Lebanese 
Hezbollah would be weakened, since Syria represents its most important transfer route for 
arms deliveries (Helberg 2012: 198; Asseburg and Wimmen 2012: 4). The confessional 
mobilisation also let the Syrian struggle spill over into the neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq. In 
October 2012, the high-ranking Sunni intelligence officer Wissam al-Hassan was killed in a 
car bombing, with some Sunni groups even operating for the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In 
mid-November 2012 in the southern Lebanese port city of Sidon Sunni Salafist groups and 
Hezbollah were fighting and in early December violence between Alawites and Sunni 
quarters reignited when a dozen youths died in northern Tripoli on route to join the opposition 
forces inside Syria. Iraq, too, supports Assad’s regime with combatants and the number of 
bombings in the unstable state has increased in recent months (Asseburg and Wimmen 2012: 
4). 
Turkey is involved in the conflict from an early stage and in diverse manner. Its border to 
Syria is the last resort for many Sunni refugees and rebels, and Turkey has been directly 
affected by fighting along this border. NATO, too, benefits from the border to Syria when it 
approved the Turkish request to install Patriot antimissile systems on Turkish territory. In 
addition, there is the Turkey’s fear of another autonomous Kurdish region. The Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat, PYD) and members of the FSA control 
individual crossings along the Turkish-Syrian border. The PYD emerged from the Kurdish 
Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in 2003 and is systematically working to 
establish local structures of self-administration and law and order. In 2003 PYD and Assad’s 
Regime informed a strategic alliance to keep the Kurdish resistance in check. In return, the 
PYD was allowed to found language schools and cultural centres. The PYD gained more and 
more control of Kurdish territories. At present, the PYD rejects armed struggle against Syria’s 
government, at the same time it builds an area of retreat and recruitment for PKK fighters 
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which is seen as a provocation for Ankara (Helberg 2012: 205; Asseburg and Wimmen 2012: 
1; 4). 
Apart from the Gulf States and Turkey, the opposition in Syria also receives political and 
logistical support from Western countries such as the United States and France. United States’ 
support is probably based on the hope that the fall of Assad’s regime would weaken Iran and 
the Lebanese Hezbollah. 
 
5. The Responsibility to Protect 
The situation for the Syrian population in the on-going civil war is becoming increasingly 
desperate. According to the United Nations almost 100,000 Syrians have died.4 More than 1.8 
million of Syrian refugees are registered in the neighbouring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.5 Some 4.25 million people are internally displaced and 6.8 million 
civilians need urgent humanitarian help and protection.6 The use of chemical weapons as 
recently as August 2013 could now serve as the basis for a military intervention on the 
principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
 
A new principle 
At the beginning of the 1990s, with the end of the Cold war, the increasing number of 
intrastate conflicts became a problem. Consequently, discussions on how the international 
community respond to situations of massive human rights violations within states arose. 
The new era of cooperation between previously opposing parties led to the concept of 
protecting the civilian population, but at the same time a fierce debate about this concept 
commenced. The obvious incapacity to act in the case of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the 
mass murder in Srebrenica in 1995, but also the military intervention during the ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo in 1999 without the authority of the Security Council of the international 
community made it clear, that the principle of Humanitarian Intervention was not an adequate 
basis for Interference of the International Community. This issue raised the question of how 
the protection of human rights can be threatened without the authority of the Security Council 
of the international community. Since 1999 especially the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
opposed the negative connotation of the “right for intervention” and the “responsibility to 
protect”. He therefore forced the debate of different understanding of national sovereignty 
                                                 
4 United Nations Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13447&LangID=E (accessed: 
17.10.2013). 
5 UNHCR: Syria Regional Refugee Response. Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. Available at: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (accessed: 17.10.2013). 
6 OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Available at: 
http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/syria-un-humanitarian-chief-urges-security-council-
%E2%80%9Cend-brutal-conflict%E2%80%9D (accessed: 17.10.2013). 
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(Debiel 2012: 9). If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on state 
sovereignty this issue has to be weighed up against individual sovereignty (Evans 2006: 707). 
In response to the United States and NATO intervention with incomplete authority in Kosovo 
in 1999, the Canadian government sponsored International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) and in 2001 presented a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect 
which established this term and also provided a comprehensive concept. This concept details 
a new way of understanding state sovereignty which implies rights not strictly based on the 
Westphalian sense of the term. The redefinition of the term sovereignty implies 
responsibilities as well as rights: Any state has a primary responsibility to protect the 
individuals within it (Evans 2006: 708-709). Another part of the report emphasized that R2P 
is much more than military intervention. It extends also the responsibility to prevent, the 
responsibility to rebuild and the responsibility to react. The latter could also imply armed 
reaction (Brzoska 2012: 5 and Evans 2006: 709). However, the most important aspect of these 
three dimensions was that of prevention (Evans 2006: 709). A major achievement of the 
High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly in September 2005 was the unanimous 
embrace of the R2P principle in the paragraphs 138-139 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document (UN A/RES/60/1).7 The principle rests on three equally weighted pillars: (1) states 
have the responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity; (2) the international community has the responsibility 
to assist a state to fulfil its R2P and (3) should a state manifestly fail to protect its population 
from one or more of the four crimes, the international community has the responsibility to 
take timely and decisive action in accordance with the UN Charter. In this document the 
responsibility to protect strictly concerns cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity with military intervention only authorised by the Security Council 
(Brzoska 2012: 5-6). 
Although the R2P gained recognition as an obvious progress, there is an on-going controversy 
about it. Critics argue the failure of the liability under international law and to whom to 
attribute the responsibility and under what circumstances. Furthermore, it would be an 
incomplete legal obligation for states to interpret their responsibility (Hasenclever 2012: 163). 
Other critics argue that  
“the R2P is a dangerous and imperialist doctrine that threatens to undermine the national sovereignty 
and political autonomy of the weak or, quite the reverse, that it is little more than rhetorical posturing 
that promises little protection to vulnerable populations” (Bellamy 2010: 144). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=398 (accessed: 
17.10.2103). 
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Syria and the Responsibility to Protect 
“The recognition of responsibility to protect as a principle is one thing – its practical implementation, 
quite another” (Evans 2006: 715). 
The desperate situation of Syria’s population, in particular the use of chemical weapons, has 
demands that the international community should exercise its responsibility to protect. In the 
case of Syria the debate is considering a military intervention on the principle of R2P. 
Consequently, the external intervention could only be legitimated with the mandate of the 
Security Council. However, Russia and China blocked a resolution at this committee. Without 
the mandate a humanitarian military intervention is contrary to international law. The 
principle R2P might only increase the pressure for action but there is no legal obligation for it. 
The use of chemical weapons is considered a war crime by the International Criminal Court, 
but only in the case of international conflict (Schaller 2013: 4). 
Although in Libya the military action was authorised by the Security Council, it actually 
remains unlikely that the UN Security Council will ever adopt a resolution for a military 
intervention in Syria. The Arab Spring protests in Libya turned violent very rapidly. Gaddafi 
threatened the world to execute all rebells in their eastern epicentre of Benghazi together with 
the civilian population. In March 2011 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 which 
authorised  
“Member States (…) to take all necessary measures (…) to protect the civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a 
foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (Hasenclever 2012: 165).  
While there was no objection to intervention, the problem was its dimension. The initial goal 
to protect the civilian population was extended to the fall of Gaddafi’s regime. This resulted 
in an unknown number of deaths and injured individuals, more than 600,000 refugees and an 
unstable state with countless militias competing for power (Hasenclever 2012: 166). 
 
6. Conclusions 
The state of Syria, which together with Lebanon was under French Mandate from 1920 to 
1948, is a creation of colonialism. However, for the mosaic of ethnic and religious groups this 
has not been significant for everyday life or for the protest movements. The latter have been 
motivated by unemployment, poverty, and corruption. The religiously based civil war in Syria 
is more related to unstable politics than to specifics of religion or Islam. Thomas (2000) 
considered religiously based conflicts as conflicts between communities defined on the basis 
of religious identity rather than on the debate of ideological-religious ideas. However, these 
conflicts represent challenges for international society and its secular principles (Thomas 
2000: 19). Islamic fundamentalist movements want to create new transnational ties among 
Muslims to weaken the principle of state sovereignty and transnational religion. This is 
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considered to undermine diplomacy, because religion presents values which are not agreeable 
to diplomatic bargaining in religious conflicts. (Thomas 2000: 15; 19).8 
Unfortunately there is no end in sight for the conflict in Syria. Significant military successes 
of one side led evidently to an intensification of support of the other side. All these issues of 
external actors showed that there are deeply polarized relations between Sunnis and Shiites in 
the Arab world. The mobilisation by confessionalisation is a logical consequence in the way 
Monica Toft reflected upon. Embattled leaders can gain from appeals to religion in particular 
when the religion has significant extra state constituencies like Islam (Toft 2006: 48). 
Because of the geopolitical networking and the logic of war by proxy a military intervention 
is highly risky and consequences of a military intervention can hardly be calculated. 
Furthermore, there is currently no legal basis for an external intervention on the principle of 
R2P. Although military intervention is one of the fundamental requirements of the principle, 
an effective protection of the civilian population would not be fulfilled. An additional aspect 
stems from the fragmented opposition groups which also represent – in part – a threat to the 
civilian population. 
So what is the cause of the R2P principle? Firstly, the principle should not be seen as the right 
for a military intervention. Its core should be the responsibility to prevent by forcing warring 
parties to the negotiating table. The second point is the responsibility to rebuild, aiding 
societies destroyed by war to rebuild their state. (Hasenclever 2012: 172; Evans 2006: 709). 
Military interventions in past years have demonstrated their low chances of success. 
Intervention cannot be a way to peace. For this reasons the theory of just(ified) war or its new 
form as the principle of responsibility to protect remains a theory (Hasenclever 2012: 172-
173). 
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Ethno-Religious Nationalism and the Case of the Alevis in Today’s 
Turkey 
Erkan Keser 
 
Abstract 
At least since the latest protests at the Taksim Square Turkey demonstrated its vulnerability towards 
societal conflict. Despite the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, 
governments failed to fully separate state institutions from religious institutions. Finding themselves at 
need of a new “Turkish identity”, nationalist forces began to persecute the non-Turk population with 
intent to achieve a homogenous identity in the first half of the 20th century. Paving the way for the rise 
of the pro-religious Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) to power in 
2002, pro-Islamic politics gradually reshaped the political structure of Turkey, which was officially 
marked by secularism or Kemalism. This paper seeks to address ethno-religious conflicts in Turkey 
considering the Alevis as an ethno-religious group in the 20th and 21st century. The findings of the 
case study will be significantly linked to the aversive attitude and the political opening of the AKP 
towards the Alevis, leading to the result that Sunni Islam is still prevalent and dominant in Turkey, 
and that ethno-religious conflicts have its origins in the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
1. Introduction 
Turkey has a distinctive position in the Muslim community since it is known as the only 
secular democratic state inside Muslim majority countries. The first trends of a secular 
movement appeared in the mid-nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire strived to 
modernise. Ever since, the existence of heterogenic ethnic and religious groups within 
Turkey’s state borders exposed the governments’ deficiencies in relieving ethno-religious 
tensions. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the roots and consequences of ethno-religious 
nationalism on the one hand and the current government’s political attitude towards this issue. 
However, this paper has its limitations concerning its scope and the availability of information 
in sensitive cases like in the Alevi case. Since numerous studies focalised on non-Muslim 
ethnic groups (e.g. Armenians) or multi-religious ethnic-groups (e.g. Kurds), this paper will 
seek to describe ethno-religious nationalism and its consequences using the example of the 
Alevis, a religious group composed of multiple identities. 
The transition from an empire to a nation-state was a key factor in the identity building 
process that clearly led into a distinct perception of ethnic groups. Thus, this paper will first 
historically analyse the measures taken during the period of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Republic of Turkey. Because Islam, as the prevalent religion then and now, never had been 
absent in society and state politics, the peculiarity of Turkish secularism or Kemalism will be 
described. The emergence of new nationalist ideologies and the role of religion in political 
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agendas will provide the basis to depict the situation of an ethno-religious group, the Alevis, 
who have a history of permanent persecution and suppression within the borders of today’s 
Turkey. Finally, the current government’s positions towards the violent incidents will be 
described briefly, followed by a prospect for Turkey’s future as a state consisting of multiple 
ethnic and religious groups. 
 
Conceptual framework 
With respect to the detailed discussion of ethnicity and religious identity in scientific 
literature, the following definition of ethno-religious conflicts should be adequate to link 
arbitrary identity formation to ethno-religious nationalism in the special context of Turkey: 
“‘Ethno-religious conflicts’ refer to those involving groups where religion is an integral part of social 
and cultural life, and religious institutions are representative, possess moral legitimacy, and mobilisation 
potential. Where conflicting groups define themselves along ethno-religious lines, religious identity can 
create sharp distinctions between parties, and increase group mobilisation. (…) Such conflicts are also 
often intra-state (…)” (Kadayifci-Orellana 2009: 1). 
The definition or construction of identity, whether it is national, ethnic or religious therefore 
plays a major role in societal conflicts. 
Considering the applied policies of governments ruling within state borders, it might be 
contingent to define them as “internal geopolitics”.  
There are various definitions of “Geopolitics” in academic literature, which evolved in the 
course of time. The understanding of the term often depends on the scholar’s scientific 
background, varying between geography and politics. Cohen (2003) describes geopolitics 
"(…) as the analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and 
perspectives and, on the other hand, political processes. (...) Both geographical settings and 
political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. 
Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction." (Cohen 2003: 12). Cohen’s 
definition considers the crucial dynamic interaction between power and space. Even though 
“geopolitics” is generally associated with international or external relations – or more exact 
the strategic foreign policy – of a specific government, it can also occur on different scales. 
As Yves Lacoste concludes, geopolitics can be separated into external and internal geopolitics 
(Lacoste 1990: 29). Internal geopolitics involves e.g. the demands of minorities and 
suppressed groups for autonomy or the emergence of regions (Lacoste 1990: 30). Due to 
limitations of this paper, a profound analysis of the internal geopolitics will be absent. Instead, 
in case of Turkey, the paper will show that the current reigning government chose to consider 
the internal situations by actively addressing the ethno-religious issues in Turkey. 
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2. Turkey in Transition 
After dominating extended territories of the Middle East, Eastern Europe and North Africa for 
more than six centuries (1299-1923) with its sovereign prevalence, the Ottoman Empire came 
to an end not due to external or internal contradictions but in consequence of the age of 
modernisation in general, especially with the rise of revolutionary European modernisation. 
The multi-ethnic and heterogeneous empire contained more than 70 different ethnic groups 
and large diverse religious populations of Muslims, Christians and Jews, which also differed 
in language, culture and institutions (Saatci 2002: 552). It based on a Millet-System 
acknowledging these millets (various religious communities) as autonomous units and 
granting them self-administration in specific laws and internal affairs (Özdogan 2007: 144). 
Although, when comparing the Ottoman Empire to today, many claim it was owed to this 
system that peace could be kept within the state borders, the Millet-System “applied […] only 
to non Muslim minorities” (Andrews 2002: 33), whereas “heterodox Muslims, like the Alevi 
and Nusairi [or] heretic Muslims […] had no such liberty, and learned to survive under 
frequent repression” (Andrews 2002: 33). Even if religious and cultural freedom was allowed 
to non-Muslim minorities by the state, their members could only hold government offices by 
converting to Sunni Islam (Özdogan 2007: 144). This amongst others makes clear that Islamic 
law was the basis of political rule in the Ottoman Empire. 
While the developed powers in Europe improved in science, industry and technology, the 
Ottomans lost their supremacy as a military power. The first efforts at Westernisation began 
in the mid-19th century, when the empire underwent large-scale reforms in the Tanzimat 
period beginning in 1839 and ending in 1876. The emphasis was placed on administration, 
taxes, judicature and the educational system, conceding equal rights to all citizens (Özdogan 
2007: 147). Still those reforms could not prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. 
The ultimate fall took place after World War I when European occupation forces divided its 
lands among themselves. This resulted in a civil war between nationalists and Ottoman 
dynasty, leading to the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. 
In the late 19th and early 20th century, three central doctrines affected the realignment debate 
in the Ottoman territory: (Neo-)Ottomanism, Islamism and Pan-Turkism (Özdogan 2007: 
151). These are briefly covered below, since they still play an important role in the today’s 
ruling party’s agenda. Ottomanism describes the conflation of all religious and ethnic 
communities in the Ottoman Empire in order to stop the political and social disintegration 
(Özdogan 2007: 151). Neo-Osmanists disapproved a secular judicial practice by 
instrumentalising Islam in order to gain a religious legal system (Özdogan 2007: 154). This 
leads over to the Islamism doctrine. While 40 percent of the population within the Ottoman 
Empire were Christian in the beginning of the 19th century, the share declined to less than 20 
percent towards the end of the century (Özdogan 2007: 156 f.). Considering these 
circumstances, Islamism, unlike Ottomanism, primary aimed for the confluence of the Muslim 
population in the empire (Saatci 2002: 554). Pan-Turkism (or Turanism) supported the 
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conception of unifying all Turkic peoples to single nation state (Özdogan 2007: 161; Saatci 
2002: 554). Saatci concludes: 
“The political realities of the time, however, permitted neither the pursuit nor the realisation of these 
ideals. Instead, the frontiers were limited to the borders of present-day Turkey” (Saatci 2002: 554). 
 
Secularism and Kemalism 
Turkish modernisation was realised via political, social, educational and cultural reforms 
during the presidency period of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1923-1938). Ataturk’s political 
philosophy, Kemalism, was dedicated to the secularisation and Westernisation of the nation-
state. The first president of Turkey and the so called “state elite” implemented the transition 
from a fallen empire to a modern nation-state through drastic top-down politics under a 
tutelary regime (Waxman 2000: 5). 
Tab.1: Ataturk’s reforms  
1923:  Declaration of the Republic. 
1924:  Abolishment of the Caliphate. 
1925:  Replacement of the fez; Outlawing of religious sects; Introduction of the Western 
 calendar. 
1926:  Adoption of the secular governmental system; Introduction of a new civil code; 
 Outlawing of polygamy; Equal rights for women; schools become coeducational. 
1928: Constitutional provision is added, declaring that Islam is no longer the state religion; 
 Roman alphabet replaces Arabic alphabet; Establishment of the Turkish Language 
 and History Institute; Adoption of the international numeric system. 
1931: Introduction of the metric system. 
1934: Prohibition of religious attire in public; the surname law is passes; Abolishment of 
 nicknames and personal titles 
Source: Saatci 2002: 562. 
Tab. 1 shows the most important reforms of Ataturk in chronological order. It is detectable 
that Ataturk and the state elite perceived Islam or religion by itself as an obstacle in the 
secularisation process of Turkey. The government intended to marge religion to the sphere of 
privacy in order to unify the population through a new kind of national identity (Baran 2010: 
23). 
The state elite operated as the framers of the Turkish national identity, acting arbitrarily and 
ignoring the concerns of the mass of society, who had no other choice but remaining passive 
(Waxman 2000: 6). Therefore most scholars see Turkish national identity as an artificial 
construction (ibid.). Even if the state elite knew they had to consider the specifics of Turkey’s 
population, their constructed Turkish national identity was not meant to accommodate the 
society in its entire diversity (Waxman 2000: 7). In Turkish (and Ottoman) context, Islam 
always portends Sunni Islam ignoring other streams (Karakas 2007: I). 
On closer consideration one realises that Kemalist Nationalism was not free of religious 
components. The creation of the new identity heavily relied on a nationalised Islam. The 
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Article 4 Law of Settlement which preferred Muslims ethnicities to permanently settle in 
Turkey, the foundation of the Department of Religious Affairs, which worked in accordance 
with secularism, the Capital Tax of 1942 which obliged non-Muslims to pay way more taxes 
than Muslims or the deportation of non-Muslim minorities during 1941-1943 are just a few 
examples. (Jung 2008: 122; Waxman 2000: 10 ff.) 
However, by searching for, defining and imposing a new absolute and monolithic identity, the 
heterogenic population in Turkey should be discounted and suppressed. 
 
Re-Islamisation 
With the transition to a multiparty system in 1946, religion was instrumentalised from 
bottom-up and the competition for votes began (Karakas 2007: 13). After two decades of 
leadership, the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) had to adapt its edict of toleration 
for religion due to the electoral pressure of the conservative rural population (Karakas 2007: 
13). Secularism might have been established politically, but the secularisation of the Turkish 
society was absent: the secular reforms approved in the centre did not pervade into the 
periphery (Jung 2008: 123). 
Already 24 parties espoused for a stranger consideration of religion during the campaign in 
1950 (Karakas 2007: 13). The Democratic Party (DP) played a major role in the Re-
Islamisation process in Turkey. Then, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (1950-1960), 
reintroduced the Arabic call for prayer (formerly prohibited by Ataturk) and several new 
mosques and schools for the education of prayer leaders were built under DP rule (Jung 2008: 
123).  
With increasing unemployment and hyperinflation as results of strict modernisation, the 
disagreeability of the Turkish population towards Westernisation grew and entailed the 
migration into cities (Karakas 2007: 14). This era was characterised by Necmettin Erbakan, 
head of a new movement whose ideology was based on Islamism (Karakas 2007: 14). 
Recreating the political discourse regarding moral values of religion in the late 1960s, 
Erbakan challenged the Western-oriented Kemalist policies during his period with the 
National View Movement (Milli Görüs) (Jung 2008: 123). Following Prime Ministers as 
Süleyman Demirel and Turgut Özal also supported religious symbols in their agendas, which 
helped them to gain electoral power of the vast Anatolian periphery (Jung 2008: 123). It 
should be emphasised that “(…) Sunni Islam has been part and parcel of their identity 
politics” (Jung 2009: 123). 
Another important ideology affected society, especially after the third military coup in 1980. 
This ideology is known as the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Secularist military surprisingly 
made use of Islam in order to fight against leftist movements (Ayoob 2008: 106). The search 
for homgenisation and depolitisation of the Turkish society should form an awareness that 
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Turks played an important role for the propagation of (Sunni) Islam and that Turkishness only 
exists combined with (Sunni) Islam (Ayoob 2008: 106; Karakas 2007: 17 f.).  
The Era of Turgut Özal (1983-1989) significantly revaluated Islam as a part of Turkish 
Identity, where Neo-Ottomanism way of thinking and market liberalisation encouraged many 
Islamic lobbies to develop (Karakas 2007: 22). Once again it was Necmettin Erbakan who 
boosted Islamism in Turkey during the 1990s. The leader of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) 
and Prime Minister from 1996-1997 contrived the Islamisation of public space and politicised 
religion, which aggravated the situation of internal politics (Karakas 2007: 28). Having no 
success in developing Turkey neither from an economic viewpoint nor from politic aspects, 
the Welfare Party lost their trust of the electors when becoming exposed to work with militant 
groups (Karakas 2007: 28). It was closed down by the Constitutional Court on account of its 
anti-secular activities. Afterwards the Welfare Party was substituted by the Virtue Party 
(Fazilet Paritisi), which also was shut down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 (Hale and 
Özbudun 2011: 4-5). 
Finally, the proscription of the Virtue Party led to the formation of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). The AKP won the general elections in 2002, 2007 and 2011, all 
with impressive results. The founders, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent 
Arinc all received their political training in Erbakan’s National View Movement and its 
political parties.9 This party stresses its distinction to the former parties, declaring itself as a 
“conservative democratic” party and dismissing associations with its member’s beliefs (Hale 
and Özbudun 2011: 20).  
 
3. Ethnicities and beliefs in Turkey 
According to the study Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey by Peter Alford Andrews 
(1989, 2002), 47 different ethnic groups reside in Turkey. The study contains an argument 
about ethnicity and group identity from both the emic (inside) and etic (outside, distanced) 
point of view. Ethnicity is determined as “(…) the concepts, sentiments and actions which 
characterise ethnic groups. They define these in contradistinction to other, comparable groups 
within a state” (Andrews 1989: 17), while Ethnic groups depict “(...) generally endogamous 
groups, whose criteria (e.g. family, language and religion) for cultural self-definition are 
common traditions selected from the past” (Andrews 1989: 17 f.). 
Although there is no official state religion in Turkey, the Turkish Constitution challenges the 
principles of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Article states that 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
                                                 
9 For a revealing overview of Erdogans political history before founding the AKP: Baran, Z. 2010, 45-46. 
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and observance” (UN 1948). According to the Constitution, mandatory religious education in 
Turkish schools only contains provides the teaching of Sunni Islam (Minority Rights Group 
International 2007: 5). With a view to the ethno-religious variety in Turkey, this regulation 
presents a major factor of persecution between the Sunni Muslim majority and minority 
groups such as Christians, Jews, or Alevis. This particular and exemplary form of denial of 
religious freedom does not assort well with the main ideas of human rights or liberalism and 
can be considered a violation of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Almost ninety-nine percent of the Turkish population is considered to be Muslim, of which 
the majority is Sunni Muslim (United States Department of State 2012: 2). Up to 20 Million 
people within these ninety-nine percent are Alevis (ibid.). The remaining one percent consists 
of “approximately 500,000 Shiite Caferi Muslims; 60,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians; 
22,000 Jews; 20,000 Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians; 10,000 Baha’is; 5,000 Yezidis; 
5,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses; 5,000 members of various other Protestant sects; approximately 
3,000 Iraqi Chaldean Christians; and up to 2,500 Greek Orthodox Christians” (ibid.). 
Although all these religious groups besides Sunni Muslims were victims of societal abuse and 
discrimination (United States Department of State 2012: 1), numbering the cases of religious 
persecution in order to gain a comparative review of religious freedom in Turkey seems 
difficult. However, recent outbursts in the Middle East proved that intra-religious difficulties 
are an important factor for fueling religious conflicts. Today, tensions between Sunnis and 
Alevis are recognized especially due to the Civil War in Syria, but the fact that tensions of 
this type were (and are) prevalent in Turkey did not make its way to the international public’s 
attention.  
The main difference between Sunnis and Alevis is that the latter consider Ali and his 
descendants (the Twelve Imams10) as the legal successors of the Prophet Muhammad.11 At the 
present day, notable differences reside in the religious practices of both groups, all referring to 
the schism after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Alevis speak different languages such 
as Turkish, Zazaki or Kurmanci, they are often referred to as an “ethnic group”, even though 
this exceeds the demarcation of Kurdish, Turkish and Zaza (Vorhoff 1995: 33). It can be 
elaborated that the Alevis constitute an “ethno-religious” community in which Alevi belief 
defines the borderfunctions of their identity (Kehl-Bodrogi 1989: 503; Vorhoff 1995: 31). 
Regardless of whether Alevis have their origins in Islam, neither the Sunni majority nor the 
other Islamic Groups fully treat them as Muslims (Kehl-Bodrogi 1989: 503). 
Further, the Alevis are discriminated by all state institutions, especially the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs (Özdalga 2008: 188). Their main concerns are “obligatory religious 
education in school; difficulties in getting permission and/or funding for the building of 
Cemevis (Alevi houses of Worship); and lack of representation at state level” (Özdalga 2008: 
                                                 
10 The Twelve Imams consist of Ali, Hasan, Husayn and his nine descendants. Except for Husayn, the brother of 
Hasan, each Imam was the son of the previous Imam. 
11 They are not to be confused with Shias, which follow a way more orthodox codex of Islam. 
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189). Summarised, the Alevis’ concerns rest on the non-existence of those rights which are 
favourably granted for the Sunni majority in Turkey. 
Before depicting the Alevi situation after the transformation, a brief look at the situation 
during the reigning period (1512-1520) of Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim should give an 
impression of the Alevis awareness in Anatolia. As the Sunni sovereign, Yavuz Selim 
persecuted Shia and Alevi people in the Empire; those were massively supported by the 
Persian leader of the Safaviyya, Sah Ismail, who is a shining light for the Alevis. Besides the 
battles they had, Yavuz Selim was responsible for countless massacres and humiliations of 
Alevi people (Vorhoff 1995: 152). Further, Yavuz Selim even got religious legal opinions 
made, declaring the killing of Alevis as mandatory and indispensible (Vorhoff 1995: 152). 
This shows that the peaceful coexistence of heterogeneous ethnic groups during the Ottoman 
Empire has to be questioned when regarding the Alevis. The persecution and injustice extends 
over the period of transition to secularism until today. 
Constituting a sensitive and specific case is the Dersim12 Massacre from 1937 to 1938. 
Because this intricate massacre is referred to as an ethnic (Kurdish, Zaza, proper non-
Turkish), a religious (Alevi, proper non-Sunni) or an ethno-religious (Kurdish-Alevi, Zaza-
Alevi) matter, it will not play an important role in this paper. 
The Alevis, however, regarded secularism as a chance to emancipate and made e.g. the 
Kurdish ones assimilate voluntarily to Turkish culture (van Bruinessen 1996: 8; Vorhoff 
1995: 71). The incremental integration of the Alevis into broader society by migration into 
towns after years of social separation introduced them to a close contact with the Sunni 
population (van Bruinessen 1996: 8). Within the abovementioned Re-Islamisation period 
between 1950 and 1980 and the decline of Kemalist secularism, Alevi society passed through 
a period of discrimination. A certain distinction of the population in the towns, where 
immigrants inclined to assort together with people of similar descent led to growing tension 
between Alevis and Sunnis both supported by opposing political formations: the radical left 
considered the Alevis as its allies whereas the extreme right touted for conservative Sunni 
Muslims, fueling their anxiety and aversion of the Alevis (van Bruinessen 1996: 8). This 
collision of the parties led to several Sunni-Alevi conflicts in anti-Alevi persecution in 
Kahramanmaras (1978) and Corum (1980), showing the reluctance of the local police 
concerning the protection of the Alevis (van Bruinessen 1996: 8).  
During the Turkish-Islamic-Synthesis period the distinction between Turkish and Kurdish 
nationalists or Sunnis and Alevis was fostered and the military contributed to the 
marginalisation of the Kurdish and Alevi identity (Karakas 2007: 19). With the strengthening 
of the Directorate for Religious Affairs government policies influenced the Alevis by building 
mosques in their villages, compelling their children to attend Sunni religion classes and the 
intensive allocation of the police with conservative Sunnis (van Bruinessen 1996: 8). 
                                                 
12 Today Tunceli and parts of Bingöl, Elazig, Erzincan, Erzurum, Mus, Malatya and Sivas (Sevgen 1999: 12). 
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The failure of the left movement in Turkey in the late 1980s made many Alevis redefining 
themselves with their religious identity (Shah 2013: 266). This era is also described as an 
“Alevi Revivial”. The revival was driven by the defensive attitude of the Alevis towards the 
rise of Islamism and entailed the establishment of various Alevi associations all over Turkey 
(van Bruinessen 1996: 8). Furthermore these associations enabled the public performance of 
former banned Alevi rituals, the opening of houses of worship and publications of Alevi 
intellectuals addressing questions of identity, history and doctrine of Alevism (van Bruinessen 
1996: 9). As stated, Alevis consisting of multiple origins, started to define Alevism as an 
alternative ethnicity when they noticed that this plurality may cause nationalist tension within 
their community (Shah 2013: 266). Thus especially the Kurdish Alevis stressed the religious 
essentials in public discourse (ibid.). 
The most significant public violent persecution of Alevis was the Pogrom of Sivas in 1993. 
Sivas represents one of the provinces with a high amount of Alevi population in the 
countryside (Kurdish and Turkish); the towns however are inhabited by most Sunni Muslims 
(van Bruinessen 1996: 9). Various Alevi intellectuals and artists came together to celebrate 
the annual “Pir Sultan Abdal Senlikleri”. Among them was the famous writer Aziz Nesin, 
who caused indignation in the conservative Muslim population with several provocative 
statements and announced the publication of the Turkish translation of Salman Rushdie’s 
“Satanic Verses”. A large group of violent demonstrators were obviously minded to attack the 
hotel “Madimak” where the Alevi participants of the festival and Nesin were accommodated. 
During the demonstration the violent group was fueled by the mayor of Sivas (member of the 
right wing of the Muslim Welfare Party) and later they set the hotel on fire (ibid.). In this fire 
thirty-seven people (including two demonstrators and two workers of the hotel) were killed. 
As Bruinessen underlines, “the degree of involvement of the police and local authorities was 
perhaps the most shocking aspect of the Sivas events. The police, although it had advance 
warning of the demonstrations, had taken insufficient measures to protect the festival (which 
had been authorised by the provincial governor) and it did not make any serious attempt to 
disperse the demonstrators or to keep them away from the hotel (apart from a police cordon in 
front of the hotel). (…) Most of the police simply looked on as the hotel caught fire” (ibid.). 
 
4. The AKP and its attitude towards the Alevis today 
The Islamist and centre-right parties which had been introduced above rarely or never strived 
to address the situation of the Alevis in Turkey. This was due to their dependence on the 
Sunni electorate, lasting out the support for politics (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 78); Therefore, 
“(…) their policies towards Alevis varied between benign neglect and efforts of assimilation 
(i.e. Sunnification)” (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 78). After the parliamentary elections of 2007, 
the AKP for the first time engaged in a policy which it described as the “Alevi question” or 
“Alevi Opening” (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 78).  
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The Alevi community was in agreement about the concerns stated in section 3 of this paper 
enhanced with demands e.g. making a museum out of the Madimak Hotel in Sivas or the 
integration of Alevism into the Department of Religious Affairs (Özmen 2011: 86). The 
initiative started with a series of meetings with Alevi clerics, intellectuals, scholars, journalists 
et cetera. A vast majority of Alevi associations had not participated in the conferences, 
reasoning it with an apprehension of assimilation efforts (Hale Özbudun 2011: 78). In those 
meetings little dialogue took place, instead the government representatives were just listening, 
but it seemed like the AKP took the concerns of the Alevis seriously (Hale and Özbudun 
2011: 79). In spite of it all, apart from these meetings, no specific steps followed (Hale and 
Özbudun 2011: 79) and “the Alevis have not been satisfied with the results, and most of the 
Alevi population has found the efforts of the government insincere” (Özmen 2011: 86). 
In order to show that the AKP government’s “Alevi Opening” initiative receded in sincerity, 
few facts will be depicted below. 
In March 2012, an Ankara court dropped Sivas massacre case, ruling that the charges against 
the suspects exceeded, after 19 years, the statue of limitations (Hürriyet 2012a). Apart from 
the dubiousness of the limitation in such a sensitive case, the most noticeable fact in this case 
is that the accused were advocated by counsels consisting of delegates, ministers, mayors, city 
councils and district chairmen, all of them being members of the ruling AKP (ibid.). Prime 
Minister Erdogan commented the drop with the words “Let it be auspicious for our nation” 
(“Milletimiz için, ülkemiz için hayırlı olsun”) (Hürriyet 2012b). 
In a special interview Erdogan asserted: “There are people who try to make me look like an 
Alevi enemy. For me, Alevism represents the love to the Saint Ali. When I look at the ones 
claiming their Alevi identity, I see that I am more Alevi than them. No one of them lives like 
the Saint Ali, I am trying to live like him” (“Beni Alevi düşmanı olarak gösterenler var. Ben 
Aleviliği, Hazreti Ali’yi sevenler olarak biliyorum. Ben bugünkü Aleviyim diyenlere baktığım 
zaman hepsinden daha Aleviyim. Hiçbiri Hazreti Ali gibi yaşamıyor, ben onun gibi yaşamaya 
çalışıyorum”) (Milliyet 2012). Furthermore, he declares that there is only one place of 
worship for Muslims, the mosques (Milliyet 2012). 
The construction of a third bridge spanning the Bosporus in Istanbul caused another stir in the 
Alevi community. On May 29th 2013, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gül took part on 
the groundbreaking ceremony of the bridge, with the latter proclaiming that the bridge’s name 
will be “Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge” (“Yavuz Sultan Selim köprüsü”) (NTVMSNBC 2013). 
Another important topic in the Alevi stances of the AKP is the Syria conflict. Syria is a state 
where the Sunni Muslim population forms the majority and the Alawi population forms the 
minority. The AKP supports the Sunni rebels in their conflict with the Alawis, and this may 
result in a latent spillover of the sectarian conflict from Syria to Turkey. Therefore, it would 
not be surprising if an emotional driven solidarity of the Alevis with the Alawis occurred, 
although both groups are not necessarily equal in their religious practices. They both do share 
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the worship of the Twelve Imams and share a history of persecution by Sunni Muslims 
(Hermann 2013).  
The current protests in Taksim Square, Istanbul, started on May 28th 2013 to contest the 
urban development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park but the motive of the protests 
changed to the expression of disappointments concerning issues like the freedom of the press, 
expression and assembly, and the government's encroachment on Turkey's secularism. Among 
the protestors numerous Alevis are present, stressing the abovementioned issues and their 
discontent with the AKP and Erdogan’s government. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Ethno-religious nationalism in Turkey has its roots in the history of its population before and 
after the proclamation of the Republic. Its territory always was settled by numerous varying 
ethnic and religious groups, but internal tensions increased more apparently during the years 
of secularism. The formation of a new absolute and monolithic identity had many groups 
discriminated in their personal identity awareness. With Sunni Islam as the prevalent religion 
during the Ottoman Empire period and today, despite the secularisation efforts, new 
nationalist ideologies came up. These ideologies were theoretically deployed towards the end 
of the Empire but practically fulfilled in the second half of the 20th century. The main reason 
that parties, who were following these ideologies, had success was the fact that secular 
reforms never pervaded fully into the peripheral regions of Turkey. The AKP's rise to power 
is based on this so called "Re-Islamisation" process. 
The Alevis exemplify how ethno-religious nationalism in Turkey predominated. Never being 
fully accepted as an Islamic group, they were violently persecuted by Sunni groups and 
permanently discriminated by state institutions. Although disengaging from their various 
ethnic backgrounds (Turkish, Kurdish, Zaza) and defining themselves by their religious 
essentials during an Alevi-Revival, the suppressions continued. 
Even today’s ruling party, the AKP, declaring itself as a “conservative democratic” party, 
failed in finding a solution for the ethno-religious tensions between Sunnis and Alevis. On the 
contrary, its pro-Sunni politics fostered the schism between both groups. If the AKP insists on 
its politics towards Alevis, they are preventing the appearance of a unified and uniform ethno-
religious nation-state. 
Granting Religious freedom for the purpose of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights implies an end of the favouring of Sunni Muslim citizens by the Department of 
Religious Affairs and the current ruling AKP. This would mean that either all religious groups 
should benefit from the practices of both these institutions or none of them. Otherwise, 
tensions will rise and persecution will go on.   
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Tunisian Elections after the Arab Spring: A Victory for 
Democracy or Islamism? 
Hannah Kusche 
 
Abstract 
In October 2011, a new interim government and a constitutional assembly were elected in Tunisia. 
The election was preceded by the so-called Arab Spring and the fall of the dictator Ben Ali. Although 
Islamist groups didn’t play influential roles during this process they were the main winners of the 
elections. The paper deals with the reasons for these results and analyses if the victory of the Islamist 
Ennahda party should be interpreted as the wish of significant parts of the Tunisian population to live 
in a theocracy or if the high percentage of votes for the Islamist party can be explained by other 
factors. The paper identifies historical and political developments, such as the persecution of Islamist 
groups during the Ben Ali era and the general political insecurity after the fall of the old regime as 
well as organisational factors, as crucial reasons for the victory of the Islamist Ennahda party, 
usually portrayed as moderate. Different from most other parties the Ennahda has a strong stance in 
the Tunisian population and possesses broad networks as well as abundant human and financial 
resources. The appreciation of religious values may also have been a factor, which has influenced 
Tunisians to vote for Ennahda but should not be interpreted as the crucial element. 
 
1. Introduction 
It’s almost two years ago now that the Tunisian people have elected a constitutional assembly 
and a new interim government. As most observers had expected, the Islamist party Ennahda 
achieved an impressive victory. The party, which was forbidden and strongly suppressed 
under the old regime, won more than 40% of the votes and therefore got 89 out of the 217 
seats in the constitutional assembly. A strong position of Islamist groups in the new 
government and especially in the negotiations about the future Tunisian constitution had been 
feared not only by Western observers but also by significant parts of the Tunisian people. The 
Tunisian society is often considered to be one of the most secular societies in the Arab world. 
Far reaching women’s rights, religious liberty and protection of minorities have been defined 
in the Tunisian law since the 1950s. Any Islamist tendencies were strongly suppressed by the 
authoritarian regime which also supported the secularisation of public life. Though, soon after 
the resignment of Ben Ali, Islamist groups started to reorganise. Many Islamists were released 
from prison, others returned from exile and reassembled their supporters around them. In 
March 2011, Ennahda, a group of ‘moderate’ Islamists, which were founded by Rachid 
Ghannouchi in 1981, was allowed to register as a political party for the first time in history. 
Soon it was recognisable that Ennahda, in spite of the long lasting suppression, would manage 
to win the elections. Fears rose that the party would introduce the Sharia and limit individual 
freedom and democratic rights in favour of an Islamic state. Although Ennahda and above all 
Ennahda’s leader Ghannouchi denied promoting such changes, the fears of many secular 
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forces persisted, and were highly present during the election campaign. Nonetheless, Ennahda 
became the largest single political power in the elections which were considered to be free 
and fair. In view of these results some observers prognosticated a repeating of the 
developments in Iran after the fall of the Shah regime which lead to the installation of the 
present theocracy. This comparison raises the question whether the political victory of 
Islamists has to be understood as the peoples wish to live in a state dominated by religion. 
Although the motivation of voters was probably highly diverse and influenced by individual 
expectations, this chapter will try to analyse the general reasons for the success of the 
Ennahda party. Thereby, I support the thesis that the fact of Ennahda being Islamist wasn’t the 
most relevant for voters to support the party. There were other important reasons which 
played an influential and possibly even more important role. Therefore at first, the chapter 
will give a short overview over the political and economic situation in Tunisia prior to the 
elections. Secondly, the Ennahda position in the Tunisian society and its election programme 
will be analysed. Thirdly, I will derive possible reasons for Ennahda’s victory from the most 
urgent problems and challenges, the Tunisian society is facing. In a conclusion the results will 
be summed up and a short outlook on possible future developments will be given. 
 
2. Tunisia during the elections: Economic and political frame conditions 
Originally the uprisings, which started in December 2010, were mainly economically 
motivated. Many young people who suffered from poverty and a lack of opportunities rose 
against the stagnancy and demanded the improvement of their social situation. One of the 
crucial factors for this development was the high unemployment. While the average official 
unemployment rate was 13% in 2008, at the same time the unemployment among young 
people (15-24 years) exceeded the threshold of 30% (Zeghal 2013). Even higher were the 
unemployment rates among well-educated young people facing the paradoxical situation that 
the higher their education was, the lower their chance to find a job. Furthermore there were 
strong geographical discrepancies. While the unemployment in the capital Tunis and the rest 
of the coastal area was relatively low, many young people in the interior and the south of 
Tunisia saw practically no chance to find a job (Noueihed & Warren 2012). 
The problems at the job market came along with a growing general discontent about the low 
level of development. How Noueihed and Warren underline “Tunisians were increasingly 
unhappy with the state of housing, healthcare and roads, and they complained about 
bureaucracy”; furthermore “perceptions of corruption, inequalities and a lack of opportunity 
had dramatically worsened in the last two or three years before the uprising.” (2012: 66f.). 
The self-immolation of a young street vendor in Sidi Bouzid, one of the small towns in the 
interior of Tunisia was finally the activator for the outburst of demonstrations and riots which 
finally lead to the fall of Ben Ali.  
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The primarily economic demands were soon complemented by political requests. Claims for 
freedom and democracy rose and, while the protests spread from the disadvantaged regions in 
the middle of Tunisia to the capital, political demands gained more and more weight. 
Although the claims for an improvement of the economic situation persisted, the later phases 
of the uprising demands were often overshadowed by the claims for the ending of the regime. 
These claims constituted the focus of foreign media reports and when Ben Ali fled and his 
supporters had to give up, this was generally seen as the fulfilment of the central demands of 
the protests and a victory of the revolution. Nonetheless, the majority of the Tunisian 
population continued to see economic dissatisfaction as the main reason for the uprisings, 
which ended the dictatorship (Alexander 2011). Therefore, many were disappointed of the 
results of the revolution which so far did not improve but rather worsen the economic 
situation. The tourism sector, which has a large economic impact on Tunisia, declined. 
Foreign companies cancelled their operations in Tunisia or decided to invest elsewhere. 
Furthermore, the Tunisian economy in general was affected by a wave of strikes and demands 
for higher wages.  
With regard to political developments many people were disappointed by the outcomes of the 
revolution as well. During the demonstrations, people were unified by the desire to dispossess 
the dictator and the ruling party. Soon after the fall of the government huge differences in the 
imagination of the future organisation of the state became visible (El-Issawi 2012). Especially 
the gap between Islamist and secularist forces became obvious. While Islamists want religion 
to play a more important role in politics, the aim of the secularists is a separation of the two 
realms. The detailed definition of both paths is a matter of broad discussions, internal 
disagreements as well as mutual accusation and suspicion. Neither Islamists nor secularists 
are a homogenous group, of course. Although the general controversy between these two 
blocks plays an important role in politics since the revolution, the respective internal 
differences are large. The Islamist field reaches from radical Salafis to more moderate groups 
like Ennahda wich clearly dominates the political representation of this block. The secularist 
block is much more splintered between various groups and political parties. Despite of their 
shared refusal of an Islamist government, many of them only have very few commonalities 
(Noueihed & Warren 2012). This leads to a situation where the Islamists, at least the ones 
acting in the parliamentarian area, are a relatively homogenous group while the secularist 
parties compete not only with the Islamists but also among themselves, weakening each other 
and indirectly strengthen Ennahda and the Islamist block. 
Despite of all economic problems and demands the political competition between secularists 
and Islamists had clearly dominated the election campaign. While the Islamists accused the 
secularists to be anti-Islamic and wanting to ban religious expressions and signs not only from 
public life but also to constrain the private practice of religion, the secularists blamed the 
Islamists of wanting to establish a theocracy. Especially with regard to Ennahda, secularists 
stressed that the party would only keep up the appearance of being democratic and respectful 
towards individual human rights until they have fully established their power. As soon as they 
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were strong enough they would show their true face and install a new authoritarian, this time 
Islamic, regime (Zeghal 2013).  
 
3. The Ennahda party 
Ennahda has repeatedly rejected the accusation of wanting to limit individual rights in favour 
of an Islamisation of the state. Quite the contrary emphasises Rachid Ghannouchi again and 
again, underlining the democratic orientation of his party. The founder of Ennahda who 
passed many years in exile in Great Britain during the Ben Ali period, until today has a strong 
influence on the political orientation of his party. Over and over he points out that Islamism 
and democracy are compatible and promises that Ennahda is going to protect the rights of all 
groups of society, especially of women and minorities: “Everyone in Ennahda believes that 
democracy is the only way to reach power and to stay in power. There is no one in Ennahda 
that does not believe in equality between men and women, and the rights of women. No one 
in Ennahda believes that jihad is a way to impose Islam on the world.”, cites Marc Lynch 
(2012b: 46) from an Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi. Critics of the party doubt the truth of 
such statements. They accuse Ennahda not to dissociate themselves strongly enough from 
more radical Islamist groups like the Salafi movement or even blame them to secretly support 
their violence (Zeghal 2013). Within the party there are also voices which nourish doubts if 
all representatives of Ennahda support the same liberal position as claimed by Ghannouchi. 
One Ennahda depute claimed that single mothers shouldn’t have the same rights as married 
ones. Although the leadership of the party has expressed its disagreement with this claim 
immediately, such statements nourish the fears of the critics (Zelin 2012: 42 f.). 
Despite of the secularists’ doubts concerning Ennahdas true and long-term political direction, 
the party managed to win strong backing in the Tunisian population. After decades of 
suppression and persecution the party had been completely smashed. During the revolution, 
neither the Ennahda nor religious claims played a major role (Mneimneh 2012).  But after his 
return to Tunisia, Ghannouchi quickly succeeded in uniting the Islamist forces (Lynch 2012a). 
“The long repression“, writes Lynch (2012a: 33), „meant that Ennahda had to start virtually 
from scratch in reconstituting itself, and did not have deep existing relations with Tunisian 
youth. But it also meant that it was absolutely uncompromised by any relationship with the 
hated old regime, and could claim an attractive mantle of principled resistance and clean 
hands.” Thus, the long lasting persecution became one of the reasons which gave the party 
credibility within the population. Contrary to many forces which had been politically active 
under Ben Ali, the Islamists had been persecuted and therefore aren’t suspicious to be 
connected to the old regime and to maintain their structures and networks. Additionally, 
Ennahda succeeded to strength its popularity and to show its presence in the rural areas due to 
a large election campaign and the opening of many regional offices (Lynch 2012a).  
Although Ennahda never denied or hided its Islamist orientation, the election campaign was 
focused on liberty, democracy and self-determination. Again and again the party 
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representatives emphasised that a government dominated by Ennahda will respect and support 
the right of self-determination of all people and will promote the conciliation of all social and 
political groups to create a stable and fair democracy (El-Issawi 2012). This approach ment 
that also radical Islamist forces should be included in the creation of the new state. Some 
critics interpreted this statement as further proof that Ennahda is in reality more open towards 
radical-Islamic positions than publicly admitted. The concept of Ennahda nonetheless was 
perceived positively by large parts of the Tunisian society. In the elections on 23rd of October 
2011, Ennahda received 41% of the votes and became the strongest party of the new interim 
government with 89 out of 217 seats of the constitutional assembly. 
 
4. Reasons for Ennahda’s victory 
What reasons can explain the success of Ennahda? Does the election result express the wish 
of many Tunisians, who lived under a relatively secular dictatorship for decades, now to 
establish a state where politics is dominated by religion? Most observers think that such an 
interpretation is highly doubtful. Even in the month before the elections the political scientist 
Andrew Terrill (2011: 9) had predicted that it’s “highly doubtful that Tunisia’s highly 
secularized population would seek an Islamist system.” Polls among the Tunisian population 
confirmed this impression. These showed that large parts of the Tunisian population don’t 
want the introduction of Islamic law or the dominance of religion over the state (Robbins & 
Tessler 2012). Instead, there is a number of other reasons why Ennahda won the first “free 
and fair” (Robbins & Tessler 2012: 48) elections. Some of these are the ideological distance 
between the Islamists and the Ben Ali regime, the strong connections to the normal 
population, the effective election campaign and the general insecurity concerning the political 
developments. How these factors may have influenced the elections in favour of Ennahda will 
be shown in the following section. 
  
4.1 The distance to the Ben Ali regime and the closeness to the population 
The long period of persecution makes the Tunisian Islamists immune against suspicions to 
have cooperated with the old regime. How Michael J. Willis (2012) shows the Islamist 
movement succeeded due to the strong suppression during the dictatorship to establish itself 
as the only true opposition to the regime. While other groups compromised and arranged with 
the Ben Ali regime, the Islamists were never given that chance. After the revolution this 
turned out to be an advantage for Ennahda. A vote for Ennahda was not only seen as “a vote 
for religious values, but a vote to reject the past and a general expression of new-found 
political freedom” (Noueihed & Warren 2012: 273). Furthermore “[m]any Tunisians said they 
voted for the party not because it was Islamic but because it was untainted by the corruption 
that has sullied politics for so long” (Noueihed & Warren 2012: 93). In addition, the closeness 
of the Islamists to the population played an important role. This is mainly caused by the long 
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lasting and continued grass root work of Islamist groups. At many places Islamists did charity 
and supportive work which gave them, apart from political credibility, also the image of 
social competence (Traub 2012: 16). Thus many people believed in the Islamists to better 
understand the problems and needs of normal people than most other groups which were 
rather associated with the country’s elites (El-Issawi 2012: 19). 
 
4.2 Election campaign, availability of resources and general insecurity 
Due to a large and effective election campaign, the Ennahda even managed to strengthen this 
advantage. The opening of regional offices and the realisation of many hustings enabled 
Ennahda to show its presence also in the rural areas of the country. This way, the Islamists 
managed to mobilise many followers on the local level (Cammett 2012).  The critical question 
where all the money for the costly campaign had come from didn’t prejudice the positive 
effect. Although the opponents of the Islamists accused Ennahda to be financially supported 
by foreign Islamist organisations, this didn’t affect the positive image of Ennahda seriously 
(Lynch 2012a).  
The opposition didn’t succeed in weakening the party with repeated accusations of 
Islamisation of political and public life. In the insecure situation, the party appeared to many 
Tunisians as a stabilising factor. Most of the other more than 100 parties which were founded 
after the revolution were unknown to most people. Also, the aims and political directions of 
most of the more than 80 parties which finally participated in the elections were not clear to 
many voters. Therefore, the groups which had existed before the fall of Ben Ali, legally or 
illegally, were in advantage. People remembered them and their aims rather than those of the 
new parties. Sean Sweeny (2013: 3) states: “In a time of extreme upheaval, it makes sense 
that many people would vote for what they know can work and has worked.” The election 
results confirmed this statement. “Those that performed well were opposition parties that had 
existed, legally or illegally, before the uprising.” (Noueihed & Warren 2012: 93). The high 
profile has to be seen as one of the major reasons for Ennahda’s success. 
 
4.3 Religious reasons and the weakness of the other parties 
The party wasn’t only known to most people from the time before the upheaval but it also 
managed to be associated with Islam (Mneimneh 2012). This way it could benefit from the 
virtues which are commonly ascribed to Islam by the Tunisian population. The secular parties, 
on the contrary, partly failed to make the differences between secularism and the commonly 
rejected atheism clear. They were not only imputed to keep Islam from making a positive 
contribution in politics but even to ban religion from public life completely. Fears appeared 
and were proactively promoted by Islamists that secularists would even restrict the private 
practice of religion. In a society where most people share the general appraisal of Islam and 
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its values this was a factor which considerably influenced the elections in favour of Ennahda 
(Cammett 2012). 
The other parties also had weaknesses in other areas which Ennahda used strategically in its 
campaign. Although secularists are traditionally strong in Tunisia they didn’t succeed in 
becoming the most influential force in the government and the constitutional assembly. 
Indeed the secular groups together got almost 60% of the votes but in contrary to the Islamists 
these votes weren’t concentrated on a single group but were divided between many parties 
(Noueihed & Warren 2012: 80). Additionally, many of the new parties had no or very limited 
political experience and suffered from a lack of networks and financial means. Another 
problem was that the reasons for founding most of these small new parties were no political 
visions or programs but the rather unstructured experiences and claims from the revolution. In 
many cases the political activities and claims of these groups stayed vague and indefinite. 
During the revolution claims like “more jobs”, “better economic conditions”, “dignity” or “no 
corruption” were able to unite large bulks of people but for the elections these slogans were 
too vague and not appropriate to give the people an impression of the political competence 
and suitability of actions a party would take. Thus, this strategy which was followed by many 
of the new parties, was inadequate to mobilise followers and to win the elections (El-Issawi 
2013:19).  
The election campaigns of the other parties were by far not as large and successful as 
Ennahda’s. Many secular parties remained relatively unknown. Furthermore, some of the 
older and better-known parties had been legally active during the Ben Ali era. The fact that 
they had been accepted by the old regime and had arranged with it now weakened their 
position and caused a lot of mistrust among the population. Many of the new parties were 
affected by this mistrust, too, because after the upheaval and the prohibition of the former 
government party RCD, many of its representatives founded new parties or got engaged with 
existing ones.  
Altogether, there are many factors, which gave Ennahda an advantage over the other Tunisian 
parties. At the one hand these stemmed from the political and historical situation, on the other 
hand they were caused by a better availability of recourses such as financial means, social 
networks and political experience. Therefore, beyond the Islamism agenda of Ennahda there 
were many causes for the election victory.  This impression is backed by a poll that was made 
in October 2011. Although many people expressed the opinion that state laws should not 
generally be in breach of religious laws, 78.5% of the respondents agreed with the statement 
“that religion is a private matter that should be separated from social and political life“ 
(Robbins & Tessler 2012: 49).  
Summarising, the conclusion can be drawn that the election victory of the Islamist party 
Ennahda isn’t an expression of the wish of the Tunisian population to live in a state which is 
strongly dominated by religion. The secular and liberal rhetoric of Ennahda clearly shows that 
there is a huge agreement that Tunisian elections could not have been won by radical 
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Islamists. A more radical Islamist rhetoric would have alienated many voters from Ennahda 
and the success in the elections would have been at risk. 
 
5. Conclusion and Preview 
It can be concluded that Ennahda’s victory in the election of the intermediary government and 
the constitutional assembly has been the victory of an Islamist party. This shouldn’t be 
understood, however, as a signal that the people wish to live in a state which is dominated by 
religion. Not Islamism was the main reason why Ennahda won but its independence from the 
previous regime and its intensive election campaign. It’s likely that the reference to religious 
values had a positive influence on some people’s election decision. Nonetheless, financial, 
political and human resources which were extensively available to Ennahda had a very 
important impact on the results. These resources enabled Ennahda to perform a professional 
election campaign, to strengthen its popularity and to gain support and confidence within the 
population. Additionally the historical and political frames conceded an advantage to 
Ennahda. Not only the former persecution strengthened Ennahda’s credibility but the 
unsecure political situation after the revolution also lead to a situation in which many people 
decided to vote for a party which promised to bring continuity and stability to the country.  
The thesis that the election victory of an Islamist party should not be misunderstood as the 
wish of a significant part of the Tunisian population to live in a theocracy or a political system 
which is dominated by religion can therefore be confirmed. 
Nonetheless, the country’s further development is only partially predictable on the basis of 
these results. During the times of these first free elections in Tunisian history the country was 
in a special situation. Only few months after enormous popular upheavals, after the fall of the 
dictator and of significant parts of the political regime, the country was in a phase which was 
defined by political insecurity on the one hand and by experimentation and enterprising spirit 
on the other hand. Most of the numerous new parties which emerged during this time are 
expected to be short-lived. Thus, the party landscape will probably become clearer in the 
years to come. Many observers confirm that Tunisia has the necessary preconditions for a 
successful democratisation process. If this process advances, Ennahda’s comparative 
advantages of the first years after the revolution will decrease and the balance of the parties 
may be newly negotiated.  
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Blurred Future in Egypt after the Fall of Mubarak 
Nadia García Sicard  
 
Abstract  
In the past years, the Islamization process has not just been an ideology project directed to some 
specific social groups; it has also been a structural movement with the main purpose of expanding the 
Islam in the state policy. This article seeks to establish, and by using as an example the Egyptian 
Case, how due to the unsuccessful patronage package, deliberated by the authoring regime of Hosni 
Mubarak with the goal, to establishment their legitimacy and exercise their power over the state, has 
left a generation of young people frustrated and unemployed, a stagnant economy and a corrupt 
political system safeguarded by the elites and the military forces. The discontent with the regime 
generated the growth of support toward the Islamist groups, who leveraging the empty of power in the 
periphery to structured as a political movement until their reach the center of power.  
 
1. Introduction 
Since the end of Abdel Nasser´s presidency in 1954, Egypt has experienced a political history 
under authoritarian regimes, thereby, the president had the power with the support of the 
military forces, controlling all the State blanches without greater participation of the 
institutions, opposition parties and keeping his population excluded from political power.  
President Nasser’s and his supporters’ outcome, also termed as ‘an alternative centre of 
power’ by them, was a type of authoritarian system. This was one in which power was highly 
centralized, pluralism was suspect and where the regime sought to exercise a monopoly over 
all legitimate political activity (Owen 1992: 27) 
Consequently, the authoritarian legacy lasted until Hosni Mubarak’s presidency (1981-2011). 
The stability of an authoritarian regime like Mubarak’s was sustained for thirty years due to 
the coercive control of the state combined with the support of the military forces. 
Furthermore, the authoritarian regimes legitimate their policies with promises of economic 
growth and stabilize their regimes through the distribution of patronage (Lust-Okar 2005: 2).  
During Mubarak’s government, social demands were met under the patronage package, 
offering public goods and services suited to people’s interests and keeping them submissive 
and relegated. Some of these goods and services were the expansion of education by 
promoting it actively, a considerable degree of social participation of oppositional groups and 
the access to new technologies and information highways (Brisson & Lee 2012: 9). 
Ironically, these measures contributed to the detonation of its own Arab spring in Egypt, also 
known as the Tahrir’s revolution and subsequently the collapse of Mubarak’s regime. At the 
same time, as Mubarak’s power decreased, two other powerful actors in Egypt had started to 
perform, showing their strong social and economic influence and the effective role in Egypt’s 
political arena.  
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On one hand the loyalist military forces, which decided to stay “hand in hand” with the 
protestors and following their economic interest. On the other hand the well-structured 
Muslim Brotherhoods could finally show their massive share of followers and supporters. 
They have managed to reach this share, by the distribution of their own patronage package 
offered through their religious-politic mission. 
Concerning these factors, this article deals with the events before and after the demise of 
Mubarak’s regime and explains the concept of political patronage as a tool to renew and reach 
the centre of power by the military forces and the elected president in 2011 Mohamed Morsi, 
within the framework of neo-patrimonialism.  
 
2. Neo-patrimonalism and political patronage in an authoritarian regime  
Authoritarian regimes utilize methods, which allow them to maintain power over long periods 
of time and to count on an apparent acceptation of the people. Normally, the legitimacy of the 
regimes is confirmed through their electoral success, in spite the partial or total prohibition of 
political opponents and opposition groups.  
To approximate the understanding of authoritarian regimes, it consists “of a core elite which 
maintains the exclusive right to control the coercive mechanisms of the state – and uses them 
quite deliberately to influence the majority of the public – but it also creates exclusive 
opportunities of access to the political arena and the participation of social groups. Thus, 
authoritarian regimes are permeable and do respond towards their respective societies; and 
this opens channels for political participation under authoritarianism” (Albrecht 2009: 22). 
Although the political participation and the right of association are restricted, the opposition 
groups tend to congregate and organize themselves in the periphery, where the control of the 
regime does not have its full capacity to permeate it. An example of this was the growth of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo’s rural areas and low-middle-class neighbourhoods during past 
regimes. Regardless of the constant and stricter persecution over the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
account of members has been growing constantly and strongly.  
Meanwhile, in the central political institutions in authoritarian regimes have been established 
with the intention of achieving two core aims that do not at all rule out one another, but rather 
complement each other: to exert control and, at the same time, to govern and accommodate 
social demands. The latter, however is not done in a deliberate manner, and does not 
necessarily trigger a positive outcome for each demand, but nevertheless still works for their 
very aim, thus being not ineffective at all (Albrecht 2009: 17). 
The manner of legitimacy for an authoritarian regime is made through an exchange between 
the distribution of some goods and services to the public and a support and electoral votes for 
the regime’s leader. This exchange between benefits and political support is labelled for some 
scholars as a “social contract”. This term presumes economic distribution, rather than such 
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factors as charismatic leadership or the indoctrination as a basis of a regime’s popularity 
(Wickham 2003: 23).  
In the same context, we can understand the extension of the concept as a Weberian 
interpretation under the term “patrimonalism” and then applied as neo-patrimonalism as basis 
of specific political practices in post-colonial Africa (Erdmann 2006: 17). In the specific 
Egyptian example, Mubarak’s authoritarian regime used three manipulated presidential 
elections to prove their legitimacy and maintain the control of the people giving some 
subventions especially in energy, agricultural and petrol sectors.  
All the attempts to define neo-patrimonialism deal with, and try to tackle one and the same 
intricate problem: the relationship between patrimonial domination on the one hand and legal-
rational bureaucratic domination on the other. Following the basic Weberian concept of 
patrimonialism, Erdman and Engel explain neo-patrimonialism as a mixture of two partly 
interwoven types of domination that co-exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational 
bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power relations between the ruler and the 
ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no 
differentiation between the private and the public realm (Erdmann 2006: 18).  
The difference between patrimonial and neo-patrimonial clientelism is, firstly, that the latter is 
more complex than the former. It is a reiterating patron-client relation, forming a hierarchy of 
dominance relations. In neo-patrimonialism there are brokers to mediate the exchange 
between the “little man” and the “big man”, whereas in patrimonialism there is only a direct 
dyadic exchange relation between the “little and big man”. Secondly, the object of exchange 
is different. The transactions are less about the exchange of private or personal goods and 
services but more about the transfer of public goods and services by the patron (Erdmann 
2006: 20). 
For some scholars, neo-patrimonialism has been applied almost synonymously with other 
terms, such as ‘patronage’, ‘patriarchy’, ‘clientelism’, or ‘corruption’ (Albrecht 2009: 26) but 
more specifically for Eisenstadt, Bratton and van de Walle, who conceptualize clientelism 
together with patronage as an integral part of neo-patrimonialism (Erdmann 2006: 20). In 
consolidated authoritarian regimes, where the policymaking component of elections is highly 
circumscribed, elections are best thought of as competitions over access to state resources, or 
“competitive clientelism” and the candidates and voters likely recognize this (Lust 2009: 
124). 
As an example, we must take into account the basis on which most Egyptian citizens’ vote. 
Egyptians typically voted for the National Democratic Party (NDP) not out of support for its 
platform but as a means to secure access to government resources. As an appendage of the 
state apparatus, the NDP have been an important vehicle for the distribution of patronage 
(Wickham 2003: 89). 
To specify the concept of patronage, it is defined as the politically motivated distribution of 
“favours” not to individuals but essentially to groups. The difference between clientelism and 
125 
 
patronage is essentially the distinction between “individual” and “collective goods”; 
clientelism implies an individual benefit (land, office), patronage collective benefits (e.g. 
roads, schools etc.) (Erdmann 2006: 21). 
In relation to our specific case, authoritarian regimes based on political patronage in the 
Middle East sowed the seeds of their own dissolution, not through failure to deliver, but 
precisely because they succeeded in delivering the patronage package, albeit with diverse 
degrees of success. The achievements embedded in the package (from education to other 
manifestations of modernity) could not be accommodated within a static structure (Elnur 
2013: 133).  
A clear example of this patronage package in Egypt in relation with the education package 
provided since the Nasserist government has been the Lumpen Inteligentsia13 generation as a 
result of the established Social Contract according to which the regime provided goods and 
services to the public in exchange for their political support. The expansion of higher 
education, the free access to a Shahada (pre-graduate studies) and the promise of a 
government job were the most representative benefits provided by the Nasserist social 
contract (Wickham 2003: 24), but at the same time the most unsustainable promise after the 
economic collapse. 
In order to relate the political patronage after the fall of the Mubarak’s regime, two specific 
issues must be linked. First, the patronage packet14 provided by Mubarak’s regime had helped 
to encourage the protestors to demand his fall and a radical change in the political, economic 
and social scenario. Second, if those changes have been seen during the military transition and 
after the presidential elections, given that these two rulers have also their own interest to be on 
power. 
 
3. The fall of Mubarak  
On 25th February, the popular uprisings began in Egypt and in just over three weeks, 
managed to force the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. Consequently, Egypt started a delicate 
political transition, after thirty years of centralized Mubarak’s power. 
During the decades of his reign, the Mubarak’s authoritarian government was accompanied 
and protected by a stable army, which was led by the loyal ally Hussein Tantawi as chief 
commander of the military forces and secretary of defence for almost 20 years. During this 
                                                 
13 Group of educated or cultivated people (al-muta ´allimin or al-muthaqqafin). This group is technically not a 
class but a status group, defined not by occupation, income, or relation to the means of production but by 
possession of a shahada, or formal education degree. (Wickham 2003: 36) 
14 Various forms of distribution of governmental largesse, including salary and pension increases, bonuses, 
relaxation of mandatory crop deliveries required of producers, appointments to public bodies, the discretionary 
granting of licenses and permits, and various other inducements offered by the regime specially on the weeks 
and days prior to elections. (Wickham 2003: 89) 
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extensive period, the military forces (SCAF) worked together with the government having the 
objective to enforce and maintain their power and to extend state control supervision over the 
legal and civil systems, as well as the economy. 
Due to the loyalty of the military forces, Mubarak’s government was able to maintain its 
power even when there was some dissatisfaction among the civil society and under the 
approbation of the international community. Owen exemplifies such aspects and argues that 
authoritarian presidents presided over a state apparatus that consisted, in the first instance, of 
its major component institutions: the military, the party, the security services, the bureaucracy 
and the economic enterprises. All had their own organizational reasons for obtaining 
resources, influencing policy and preserving as much as possible of their autonomy (Owen 
1992: 33). 
In such manner Mubarak, in order to maintain his acceptance, started the patron-state in 1983 
taking responsibility for the economic recession in Egypt after the collapse of world oil prices. 
To address the “twin gaps” between investment and savings and between imports and exports, 
the Mubarak regime increased its borrowing abroad and in addition, accelerated its use of 
deficit financing, contribution to inflation, which was conservatively estimated at 15 to 25 
percent per year. Despite the growing budgetary constraints, the regime continued to channel 
a large share of the available funds into the “social contract” keeping consumer subsidies at a 
high level (roughly 20 percent of GDP if implicit subsidies are included). After the informal 
sector, the state was also the largest source of new domestic employment (Wickham 2003: 
41). 
In addition, promoting economic policies to accelerate the development of Egypt, the regime 
focused on guaranteeing and promoting the access to higher-studies for the low-middle class 
youth. The rapid and massive expansion of Egypt’s educational system resulted in serious 
problems, not only because of the enormous growth of Egypt’s labour force but also in a 
social context regarding the huge amount of young unemployed professionals, waiting in a 
lengthening queue for a governmental job, or looking for wasta15, or simply taking any job 
outside their field of specialization and being forced to keep living with their parents.  
Around the beginning of 1988, the problem related to unemployment, especially 
unemployment among educated people in particular, became subject of an intense public 
debate, used by the Mubarak regime as a discussion for its own purposes, seeking ways to 
extricate itself from populist commitments inherited from the Nasser past (Wickham 2003: 
44). Though some reforms of the higher education policy and together with economic 
development caused by the growth of the liberalized economy in the 90´s, the situation for 
                                                 
15 In countries with little transparency and a weak rule of law, finding a mediator (or wasta) between the citizen 
and the state is key. Individuals wanting to enter university or to obtain a government licenses, public housing, 
employment, or a broad range of other state resources know that they must often find someone to help them to 
accomplish their goals. Navigating such ordinary dealings with the bureaucracy is rarely a simple matter of 
finding the right office, filling out forms, or paying a standardized fee. (Lust 2009). 
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some graduates could be handled and solved with marketable skills with wasta or for those 
who emigrated to some more developed and prosperous country in the Arab Gulf.  
The people’s frustration and the economic grievances were not first and foremost the uprising 
that brought infamy to Mubarak, but rather a political system that was rigged in a way to 
benefit Egypt’s leader and those most close to him. Political change, which became a mantra 
of the ruling National Democratic Party during Mubarak’s last decade, was a ruse (Cook 
2012: 16). 
Approximately since 2005, Mubarak had prepared his retirement, not with the intention to 
hand it over to a more democratic government, but to assign it to his younger son, Gamal 
Mubarak. As in 2011 the emotion of the “Arab Spring” in Egypt appeared, the citizens felt 
older and more tired than an 83 years old man. In that moment the failed democracy, the 
broken economy, a disarrayed educational system, a regrettable health system and the 
people’s frustrations, encouraged the protestors to ask for a real change.  
Mubarak’s regime provided a patronage packed to the Egyptians that he thought would have 
aided in maintaining the status quo, but instead had ironically the exact opposite effect. The 
three areas of policy included the expansion of education, a considerable degree of freedom of 
expression and assembly, and the promotion of an Egyptian information highway” (Al-sayyid, 
2013: 13) were key all aspects of the dissatisfaction of the people, effectively contribution to 
the fall of Mubarak’s regime.  
The patronage packet provided from the regime, within a structure that was not built to 
sustain such a massive increase in these three sectors together with the subsidies, became 
insufficient for a population of 90 million people where 65% are young and most unemployed 
professionals who are part of the low-middle class. Besides, Egypt being part of the 
globalization of information is an inescapable to the influence of the modern world, and it 
may enhance the abilities of protest, social and opposition groups while increasing the 
vulnerability of government.  
In consequence, Mubarak’s patronage package that was offered during 30 years left three 
results: first, a group of young students and professionals without opportunities to enter the 
labour market, second, the social and economic grievances that left a gap between the society 
and the government and third, allow the opportunity for the Islamic groups to convert this 
grievances into a successful way of political advantage.  
 
4. Military transition and presidential elections: more of the same?  
 After 18 days calling, claiming and asking for “Bread, Freedom and Social Justice”, 
Mubarak’s regime fell and the Egyptians accepted that the SCAF took the power and the 
supervision of the transition to democracy. During the protests, two actors started to shape the 
political scenario in Egypt. On the one hand the SCAF and on the other hand the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
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The gains of decades of political patronage in Egypt have a direct relation to these two actors. 
Respectively, “the ascendancy to power, the preservation and the survival of the authoritarian 
regime was based on massive security forces and the entire loyalty and support of the military 
forces. The authoritarian regime together with the SCAF had not just provided the patronage 
packages characterized by an extended access to basic needs, including education and health. 
But the same authority also served to build up and maintain a form of crony capitalism that 
was cultivated carefully through selective interactions with an increasingly globalized world” 
(Elnur 2013: 131). 
The military forces had the control over the industries in Egypt due to globalization of the 
enterprises and the economic liberalization in Egypt16. This is one of the reasons why from 
the moment of Mubarak’s resignation on, it became apparent that the SCAF was no 
disinterested arbiter of the political transition. “The furore over the obscene wealth of 
Mubarak’s private-sector cronies presented the military a golden opportunity to eliminate 
rivals. The SCAF proceeded to shape the electoral field to advantage those politicians who 
would not infringe upon the military’s economic prerogatives” (Marschal 2012). 
These economic interests led the military to oppose against Gamal Mubarak’s presidential 
aspiration, as well as to his neoliberal project including the privatization of some industries 
(Abul-Mag 2012: 6). Contrarily, for the perspective of the military the best candidate to 
support was the Muslim Brotherhood, which does not pay so much attention to the structure 
of wealth accumulation and capital monopoly. 
The day of the “Battle of the Camel” at the Tahrir Square in Cairo “was a microcosm of the 
struggle to reconfigure the Egyptian society complex: the interests of monopoly battled 
against the interests of the competitive capital, devoid of any concerns about social questions 
and consequences, with the military positioned such that it was clear that it would continue to 
accrue benefits regardless of which social force would emerge victorious. Ultimately, 
Mubarak resigned, and the reactionary forces of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military 
emerged as dominant, and the form of the Egyptian state persisted” (McMahon 2013: 159). 
For first time after having elected the National Democratic Party (NDP) five17 times , the 
polls would be free for the new candidates to participate and to finally elect under the 
democratic parameters the replacement of Mubarak’s regime. However, the short timeframe 
to organize a fair and equal campaign to postulate the candidates from the new and 
inexperienced parties gave a benefit to the well-organized and stronger opposition, especially 
                                                 
16 The military’s oldest commercial interests are the factories run by the Ministry of Military Production, the 
Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) and the National Service Projects Organization. But the army also 
oversees numerous subsidiaries of state-owned holding companies and owns shares in public-private ventures. In 
many cases, these smaller operations are embedded in transnational conglomerates that reach into several 
economic sectors, from construction and maritime shipping to weapons manufacturing. (Marschal 2012). 
17 In 1981 as a part of the National Democratic Party´s NDP is for first time elected and reelected consecutively 
in 1987, 1993, 1999 y 2005. In 2005 other parties were allowed to participate for the elections, but Hosni 
Mubarak won with the 88% of the votes. These elections were demanded for International Organizations as not 
transparent and fraudulent. (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs 2013) 
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for the Muslim Brotherhoods now being free of the relenting police presence that followed 
their campaigns during the rule of the NDP.   
However, the Muslim Brotherhood represented by the Freedom and Justice Party, gained the 
power through elections not just because of the military’s interest of monopoly nor because of 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s disinterest in economic reforms, but rather because of the 
exploitation of the frustration of the unemployed and underemployed youth.  
Moreover, since the late 80´s the Muslim Brotherhood has been using selective incentives to 
attract potential recruits and to ease their entry into the movement. This broad movement 
caused significant change in society and posed the most serious challenge to the Egyptian 
regime. The Muslim Brothers´ commitment to socio-religious change through da´wa18 (call of 
God) and associational work wrested much of the urban society from state control. (Bayat 
2007: 137)  
Through material and psychological incentives and initiatives it became attractive to 
participate in the movement even if the new recruits inherited some risks in the context of the 
intimidation, continuous arrest and threat by the regime (Wickham 2003). Examples for a 
material initiative are the construction and creation of clinics, mosques, schools and job 
opportunities. They complemented these initiatives under the da´wa values, concerted through 
youth associations, women’s groups and Islamic activists. Its institutional and social 
activities, contributing to the general spread of religiosity, aimed the Muslim Brotherhood’s to 
turn into a public policy (Bayat 2007: 137). 
The mission of da’wa incorporate to the Muslim Brotherhood by their founder, Hasan Al-
Banna, has seen as an intrinsic part of the political game. In fact, for some, da‘wa has become 
politics itself and has little if at all to do with the missionary activity. For Al-Banna, the 
ultimate mission (da‘wa) of the organization was the establishment of a universal Islamic 
state. The movement has had numerous ideologues, which have elaborated upon the essence 
of da‘wa. Their basic argument winds down to the understanding that da‘wa without political 
underpinning is incomplete and doomed to fail. Moreover, these Muslim activists argue for a 
highly institutionalized form of da‘wa, for only through well-structured organization it is 
possible to achieve the sought goal – establish an Islamic state (Racius 2004: 184). 
The Muslim Brother's strategy of societal transformation was expanded beyond the mosques 
and the Sha´abi (popular) neighbourhoods. They dominated the major national professional 
syndicates and the student unions in the north, ran various NGOs, influenced numerous 
schools, and constituted the most powerful opposition in Parliament. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, in short had captured a sizable space in civil society and was beginning to 
                                                 
18 “[The concept of missionary activity is Islam is subsumed under the Arabic Word “da`wah,” a noun formed 
from a root composed of the radicals dal-ain-waw. In its verbal form this word has as its basic meaning “to call,” 
“to summon,” “to invite.” Da`wah” thus become “a call” or “an invitation,” and, in specialized usage, 
“missionary activity.” In the Qur´an the concept appears in such passages as Sura 16:125: “Call unto the way of 
thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way”…] (Poston 1992: 3). 
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permeate state institutions, including the judiciary, universities, and al-Azhar (Bayat 2007: 
143).   
After that the effectiveness of the deployment of the da‘wa mission with political purposes, 
confirmed the result, when the Muslim Brotherhood captured a record eighty-eight seats in 
the legislative elections of 2005. In addition, for this time, the Muslim Brotherhood changed 
their conservative and set religious-politic language and ideology. Pushed by the rising 
popularity of democratic demands, the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to move away from the 
idea of establishment an Islamic caliphate based on Qur’anic Shura (consultation) toward 
acknowledging the rights of the Coptic minority, behaving like a political party, and speaking 
the language of citizenship and political equality (Bayat 2007, p. 185).  
This strategy was tacked for their political benefits during the Tahrir revolution and the 
transition period. Taking into account the influence of the Brotherhood in Egypt, the results of 
the parliamentary and presidential elections were not really surprising. “The dissolution of the 
Parliament and the issuance of the controversial constitutional annex, along with the long 
delay in releasing the results and the rampaging rumors of the deployment of military forces 
and the warnings of Brotherhood’s intrigues” (Lync 2012: 24), were not an impediment to 
take the victory with the leadership of Mohamed Morsi. To some extent it can be observed 
and argued that the contentions during the electoral periods in Egypt serve as ‘window 
dressing’ partly designed by the authoritarian regime to present a reformist image to the 
outside world (Köhler 2009: 978). 
Many revolutionary political forces already have a bill of complaints against the Islamist 
movement (e.g. supporting the March 2011 constitutional amendments, not joining and 
neglecting several Tahrir protests, trying to dominate the constitutional assembly, having the 
nerve to win parliamentary elections, and so on). Additionally, breaking their very public 
promise not to run a presidential candidate drove a sharp wedge between the Brotherhood and 
other political forces because it seemed to confirm a prevailing narrative about their hunger 
for power and non-credible commitments (Lync 2012: 24). 
The real issue stems from the fact that over five decades of patronage have produced a 
massive bulge of well-educated young people to whom the old “package of patronage” is no 
longer attractive. Under certain conditions injustice and inequality might survive for long 
periods of time and remain relatively immune to exposure. However, to rule well educated 
and well connected elite, a totally different patronage package is required. In such new 
package, those who need to surrender are the former winners, not the emerging social forces 
(Elnur 2013: 137).  
In sum, the election of Mohamed Morsi and the permanent stand of the SCAF led to an 
unsure political scenario in Egypt. But for the moment, these two actors will be able to 
continue the increase of their economic gains, while offering certain goods and services to 
citizens. 
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5. Conclusions  
After the observance of the disturbances in Egypt and the collapse of Mubarak’s regime, the 
incidents are considered as a step forward to the construction of a new more equal and 
participating governmental system, satisfying the needs of representation of the people who 
claimed for “Bread, Freedom and Social Justice” in the streets.  
However, the exaltation of a revolution has brought more of the same. The self-interests of the 
new groups, who are actually representing the power, have been enforced whereas in the 
meanwhile the demands of the people have been ignored. This implies that the elites continue 
being privileged and the reforms that have been offered does not represent in reality a 
reconstruction towards new politics that would help to improve the social, political and 
economic situation in Egypt. 
The present two principal actors, respectively the military forces and the Muslim 
Brotherhoods have become the two principal leaders of a new struggle for the power. The 
people are in the middle of this. At the beginning of the Tahrir’s revolution in 2011 the 
protestors and the people were linked and shared the same hopes. Although after two years in 
a fickle transition for a change -without the certainty of which or what may change-, they are 
divided in two different sides. On one side the military that in fact, let in doubt the capacity to 
bring a democratic process and on the other side the pro-Muslim Brotherhoods who neither 
can assuredly a democratic process without the Islamization of politics. 
Whoever the new leader will be, needs to offer to the people something else than a patronage 
package linked to their own convenience, but rather some appropriate measures that 
determine how to support, to guide and organize them during the process of transformation. 
For the moment, Egypt is in a condition of uncertainty about its future transition. The 
necessary process of transformation has barely started and for the Egyptian people there still 
remains a long way to go until they’ll have accomplished establishment of a new 
governmental model.  
Nevertheless while observing an uncertain scenario; it can be observed that fundamental 
change that will affect materially the new processes in Egypt: first of all, the people are more 
attentive and want to express their opinion. Secondly they are now no longer reluctant to 
protest against a repressive government by having lost their fears and finally there exists a 
visibility generated by this young generation of the revolution Tahrir that designate without 
doubt the social and political present and the future of the country. 
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How Urbicide Turned Sarajevo into a Fundamentalist City: The 
Exploitation of Religious and Anti-Urban Prejudices during the 
War in Bosnia 
Henning Günter 
 
Abstract 
While there is a huge abundance of literature on the two concepts of “urbicide” and the 
“fundamentalist city”, there has so far been no attempt to combine these approaches. In this article I 
will show that this can be useful when religion comes into play with regard to the war on cities. I will 
argue that this was the case during the war in Bosnia lasting from 1992 until 1995. By analysing how 
urbicide was carried out on Sarajevo it will be shown that this was directly linked to the developing of 
Sarajevo into a fundamentalist city during the siege. Insofar it is necessary to look more closely at the 
interconnectedness of these two concepts.  
 
1. The modern role of cities in war: Sarajevo as a symbol of heterogeneity  
In his article on “New Wars of the City” Martin Shaw writes that cities have lost their military 
significance in the modern age (Shaw 2004: 142). In contrast to ancient or medieval times, 
nowadays they ‘merely’ serve as symbols of conquest and not so much for the military 
defence of a nation. Parallel to this development – that is, the military vulnerability to attacks 
(e.g. through atomic bombs and Guerrilla wars) – Shaw observes an “anti-urban bias” (ibid: 
143) by particular societal groups in modern times. This hostility towards the pluralistic and 
heterogeneous life in cities can be seen, for example, in Mao’s Cultural Revolution or the 
anti-urban genocide carried out by the Cambodian Khmer Rouge. Taking this modern pattern 
of anti-modernism into account Martin Coward coined the term urbicide, defining it “as the 
destruction of the urban insofar as it is the arena in which an encounter with difference 
occurs” (Coward 2004: 158). For Coward difference is the constituting element of cities. 
What happened in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to 1995 could perfectly be interpreted from 
this urbicide-point of view. Dubrovnik, Mostar, Sarajevo and Vukovar – all of these cities 
were symbols of a religious, ethnic and cultural pluralism and became, due to their 
heterogeneity, victims of the large-scale military aggression by Serbian nationalists (Vujović 
2000: 131 et seq.). What later on achieved unfortunate notoriety as the siege of Sarajevo, can 
be translated into the destruction of a city “in which for centuries four of the five largest world 
religions have lived in parallel” (ibid: 134; also Shaw 2004: 145). It is especially this aspect, 
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the heterogeneous landscape of religions with a long history of peaceful coexistence and the 
attempt to eradicate it that will be of further interest in this paper.19 
While there has been a lot of research on urbicide (among others Vujović 2000; Coward 2004; 
Graham 2011; Shaw 2004) and the implications of religion in the war in Bosnia (among 
others Appleby 2000; Maček 2000; Winslow 2002; Mojzes 1999; Vrcan 1999) so far a 
combination of these two tracks of interpretation is missing. My attempt will be to combine 
the concept of urbicide with the one of the fundamentalist city. Both are rather new theoretical 
concepts in urban geography. The fundamentalist city is a term coined by Nezar AlSayyad 
(2011: 15 et seq.) and helps understand how the spatial and social structures of cities 
contribute themselves to the rise of religious extremism. Though, I believe that urbicide is an 
adequate concept of analysing what happened externally (meaning the Serbian aggression 
towards Sarajevo), I do not consider it to be sufficient regarding the explanation of internal 
processes (meaning the everyday life within Sarajevo) that were driven by the siege. 
Therefore, it is a necessity to consult the theory of the fundamentalist city in order to fully 
understand this causation. Our leading hypothesis will be that the turning of Sarajevo into a 
fundamentalist city can be understood as the result of the anti-religious and anti-urban 
resentments that became manifest in the urbicide taking place during the siege of Sarajevo. 
Thus, the aggression by Serb nationalists, partially driven by fundamentalism, led to the 
increase of fundamentalism by Sarajevans.  
In the following I will go more deeply into the context of the siege of Sarajevo and explain 
the relevant backgrounds of the war, hereby applying the concept of urbicide. By referring to 
the concept of the fundamentalist city, I will then talk about the internal consequences that 
were caused by the siege of Sarajevo. As a result the empirical interconnectedness of the two 
concepts should be shown. In a last part I will draw up an outlook on the theoretical 
advantages that have been gained through the merge of urbicide and the fundamentalist city. 
 
2. Urbicide on Sarajevo 
In 1992 a referendum was held to determine whether Bosnia-Herzegovina would become an 
independent state. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted this direct democratic decision making 
process. They erected barricades at key transit points throughout Sarajevo to show their 
opposition to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence (Donia 2006: 277 et seq.). Protests broke 
out against these curtailments of freedom, the city’s population stood up to demonstrate 
against the impending threat of war. Eventually, Serb paramilitary forces under Karadžic’s 
leadership started shooting at civilians and attacked some of the key institutions in Sarajevo. 
                                                 
19 Several authors speak of an overlap of ethnic, cultural and religious communities that have been shaped for 
centuries by Islamic and Christian empires. This makes it hard to clearly distinguish in Bosnia between these 
features that convey identity. (Appleby 2000: 61ff.; Vrcan 1999: 109ff; Mojzes 1999: 79ff.). In particular it is 
Mojzes’ concept of ethnoreligiosity, constructed as a “part of a conglomerate of characteristics” (Mojzes 1999: 
79 et seq.), which seems most compelling for the understanding of the specific enmeshment.   
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In the following years the siege of Sarajevo was carried out as a “calculated reign of terror” 
(ibid: 289) meaning that the Serbian troops did not conquer the city completely, but instead 
took out shelling on it intermittently. This constant threat of violence should overshadow the 
life of Sarajevans profoundly.  
Coward suggests that the Bosnian war was “constituted by a genocidal violence […] that 
comprised the removal or erasure of all heterogeneous identities” (Coward 2004: 155). He 
assumes that particularly the republic Bosnia-Herzegovina was the major setting of war 
because it involved the, from a Serbian nationalists perspective, troublesome truth that the 
coexistence of different religions and ethnicities was possible. It was particularly in this area 
where the large-scale violence against the civilian population, their cultures and urban 
manifestations was carried out. Thus, it makes sense to apply the concept of urbicide, because 
it focuses on the “destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity” (Coward 2004: 
166). The Serbian nationalists sought to eradicate exactly this provocation of otherness that 
existed in Bosnia for centuries. Before we go into more detail, let us take a look on how and 
why the Serbs perceived Bosnia’s and, especially, Sarajevo’s heterogeneity as a threat. 
Several authors clearly show the long history of an anti-urban attitude held by Serbian old 
scholars (Vujović 2000: 127 et seq.; also Mašović 1999: 148 et seq.). Their perception was 
highly influenced by the fact that a lot of the cities in the Balkan area were shaped during the 
reign of the Ottoman Empire, e.g. the downtown area, the business district of the city, called 
čaršija – a word of Persian origin (Donia 2006: 13 et seq.). Serbian scholars thought the 
čaršija had a bad influence on people, since it was of foreign origin. Also, it was the place 
where the “intelligentsia with its petty morals and enormous egoism” (Vujović 2000: 128) 
lived and perverted Serbian society. In contrast to the city-dwellers, farmers and peasants 
were thought of as hardworking, uncomplicated and “protected against the bias and 
abnormality of the town culture that mechanizes life” (ibid: 129).  
These negative stereotypes about the city can be seen clearly as well in the Serbian war 
propaganda that was produced during 1992 and 1995. Sarajevo in particular, stands out as the 
city that received the most attention by Serbian nationalism since it was a symbol for peaceful 
coexistence. “For power-holders who wanted to recreate a homogeneous and closed society, 
Sarajevo was the symbol of an odious, open and pluralistic city” (ibid: 144). To give an 
example, the former President of the Republika Sprska and convicted war criminal Radovan 
Karadžić said in an interview: “We have an opportunity to divide the city by the river. […] it 
is clear that the Muslims cannot have all of Sarajevo. We will never allow that. Either it is 
ours or it will be two cities” (ibid: 135).  
While a clear rejection of the idea of mixed national communities is observable here, 
Karadžić still has a moderate position on the Muslim question, since he merely speaks of a 
division of communities. His war-friend Momčilo Krasjišnik found more radical words:  
“All assertions that the war can end somewhere outside of Sarajevo are illusory […]. Sarajevo 
is of great importance for our fight. Here it is shown that a common state is out of question 
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[…]. Sarajevo’s prospects are to be a united city in the future, but completely Serbian. The 
Muslims will have to look for their capital outside of Sarajevo, somewhere else.” (ibid).  
It should be made clear that this rhetoric was not only meant in a spatial but even more in a 
symbolic sense. Not only was it the mixing of communities in Sarajevo that raised concerns 
by Serbian nationalists but to some larger extent the memory of this in the city. Hence, it 
became an obstacle to the intended eradication of this memory of peaceful coexistence in 
heterogeneity. The Serbian troops “sought to shatter civic pride by wiping out records and 
physical manifestations of the city’s diverse history” (Donia 2006: 314), e.g. the “Olympic 
Museum”, the “Oriental Institute” or the “National and University Library”. Because of this 
Donia also speaks of a “memoricide” taking place during these years in Bosnia. One of these 
memories consisted of the various religious communities living in Sarajevo. While there are 
discussions on the exact role of religion in this war, we find clear evidence that Serbian and 
Croatian soldiers “used religious symbols, artefacts, and songs while committing atrocities 
and mocked Bosnian Muslims as ‘Turks’ and ‘traitors’ to their Slavic Christian heritage. No 
one denies that agents of genocide invoked religious justifications, including fear of ‘rising 
Islamic fundamentalism’ in Bosnia, for their policies of ‘ethnic cleansing’” (Appleby 2000: 
67).  
For the war on Muslim Bosnians religion was exploited, myths established – in short, the 
process of othering was “making their destruction more justifiable” (Winslow 2002: 341). For 
a lot of Serbian nationalists war was more plausible through equating Bosnian Muslims with 
Turks, thus, giving it a notion of revenge. It was the chance to expel those who were still 
perceived as intruders “once and for all, in order to ‘fulfil God’s will for the national rebirth 
of the Serbs.” (ibid) Winslow describes this process of demonization as follows: “When 
Serbian peasants from villages surrounding Sarajevo began to bombard the city they did so 
confusing in their minds their former Muslim friends, neighbours and even brothers-in law 
with the old Ottoman Turkish viziers and pashas who had ruled them until 1878” (Winslow 
2002: 345).  
 
In this part we have seen how, anti-urban as well as religious resentments were exploited by 
the Serbian nationalists to pursue their practice of ethnic cleansing. Both, anti-urban and 
religious stereotypes are inextricably intertwined in the siege of Sarajevo. Their consideration 
largely contributes to the understanding of what happened during those years. In the following 
chapter we will analyse what kind of consequences this war on heterogeneity – in particular, 
on the coexistence of different religious communities – had in Sarajevo. I will bring forward 
the argument that the Serbian war propaganda and siege turned the city into a place of 
increased fundamentalism, thus, leading to a reinforcement of religious identity and the 
rejection of other religious communities. This fundamentalism was clearly visible in the 
spatial structure of the city. Since the majority in Sarajevo was of Muslim belief, we will 
mainly talk about how Muslims reacted to this situation in which they found themselves 
antagonised toward the Bosnian Serbs who fought a war against them.  
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3. …when Sarajevo turned into a Fundamentalist City 
3.1 Sarajevo before the siege 
Sarajevo offered a great variety of religions and nationalities with no clear majorities before 
the war. While there were about 50% declaring themselves as Muslims, 30% as Serbs and 7% 
as Croats, there also was a large share of people considering themselves as Yugoslavs, namely 
11% (Donia 2006: 266). Compared to other areas in Bosnia we find here the largest share of 
people who defined themselves as not being part of one of the different nationalities – “those 
seeking an alternative to the major national identities” (ibid: 3). Also, these nationalities were, 
according to their share, rather equally distributed over the different districts within the city 
with very few exceptions like Stari grad and Pale where Bosnian Muslims or, respectively, 
Bosnian Serbs were the dominant group (ibid: 267 et seq.). Since nationality was in most 
cases directly related to religion, we can, therefore, speak in the case of Sarajevo of a mixed 
and multireligious landscape. 
Adding to that, before the 1990s Sarajevans themselves would have never described their city 
with the term “multi”, since this implied the existence of different ethnic, religious or cultural 
groups that do not intermingle by necessity. Instead, they used the term “common life 
(zajednički život)” and perceived their diverse city as a “neighbourhood (komšiluk)” (ibid: 3). 
This example should serve as only one among others for the daily practice of tolerance toward 
other communities. 
Another example for the usually high level of tolerance was the quite common phenomenon 
of interreligious marriages. These “mixed marriages” in Sarajevo were, unsurprisingly, in 
most cases between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, since they held the majority within 
the population of Sarajevo. Young couples often saw themselves as “Sarajevans, Yugoslavs, 
Europeans, and citizens of the world” (Maček 2000: 116). Religion, or rather the existing 
religious differences, did not play such a great role in their perceptions and lives. If there were 
any difficulties relating to the religious origin of the spouse this happened on a family basis, 
but not as much within society at large (ibid). 
However, this intermixture and high share of interaction decreased dramatically at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The “nationalism in neighboring republics posed a growing threat to 
stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo. Miloševic [...] encouraged the intensification of 
nationalist propaganda attacks against the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 
city of Sarajevo. Propagandists derided Bosnian Muslims as Serbs of the Islamic faith who 
had betrayed the Serb nation and who were conspiring to create an Islamic state with Sarajevo 
as its capital” (Donia 2006: 254).  
Though “many Sarajevans fought back, rising to defend their city and their neighbours against 
the extreme nationalisms that aimed to eradicate, in whole or in part, certain groups in the 
city” (ibid: 5 et seq.), the city could not hold firm on its atmosphere of tolerance. Ultimately, 
it collapsed under the nationalist rhetoric by which Sarajevo was surrounded. This led to a 
renaissance of ethno-religious argumentation and an urban restructuring along ethno-religious 
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lines. Thus, “the ethno-religious background had the power to mobilise Sarajevans into 
reconsidering the significance of their different national ascriptions” (Maček 2000: 154).  
To better understand what the consequences of this external threat meant in Sarajevo, we need 
to have a closer look at what constitutes the fundamentalist city first. Thus, we are able to 
contextualise the happenings in the theoretical framework provided by AlSayyad/ Massoumi. 
 
3.2 What is the fundamentalist city and how can it be applied to Sarajevo? 
The editors’ leading question in the book is: “When do certain religious rituals/ customs turn 
into exclusionary practices which ultimately lead to fundamentalist positions?” (AlSayyad 
2011: Preface IX). Since this is rather vague, the authors, consequently, stress the plurals of 
both, cities and fundamentalisms. They attempt to “spatialize and territorialize the logic of 
various types of fundamentalism” (ibid: 12). Although the definition of a fundamentalist city 
might be seen as diluted – “there are as many different types of fundamentalism as there are 
categories of cities” (ibid: 16) – the author provides some suggestions to identify a 
fundamentalist city. A first feature can be seen in the exclusion of people who are adherents 
of another religion than those of the ruling power or majority population. Second, the 
minority groups have to conform to the religious rituals that are prescribed by the majority. 
Finally, a normalisation of the forms of control that are mentioned in the first two 
characteristics takes place (ibid: 15 et seq.).  
While these features hold true for a lot of the articles comprised within the book, it would be 
misleading to compare each described city to Sarajevo one by one. Since every author 
connects its chapter to the very specific background of the respective city and intents to 
conserve the particular patterns, it would not make any sense to disregard this idiosyncrasy in 
the case of Sarajevo. It is my argument that because of urbicide taking place and the raging 
war being a constant threat for Sarajevans, one needs to emphasize the very specific context 
in which the fundamentalist city Sarajevo emerged. Thus, we need to identify these particular 
historical and contextual reasons that made the emergence possible.  
Nevertheless, there are some points mentioned in the book that could be easily applied to the 
case of Sarajevo. Two examples for this structural similarity are the chapters on the 
communalised city Ahmedabad by Renu Desai and the postsecular urbanisms of Delhi by 
Mrinalini Rajagopalan. In these the authors talk about the restructuring of the respective city 
by Hindutva politics and the “ways in which the ideology has been embedded in the city and 
in the lives of its residents” (Desai 2011: 99). The rise of communalism in Ahmedabad 
developed in tandem with the rise of modern nationalism which is based to some large extent 
on religion. Hindus perceive the foundation of India as a secular nation-state – meaning the 
equality of all religions – as an assault on their Hinduness and practice the “militant rejection” 
(ibid: 103) of this institutionalised right. Hence, since the beginning of the 1960s we can 
observe recurring acts of violence against Muslims caused, among other reasons, by the 
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decline of the city’s civic institutions, the changing political economy, the demise of working-
class solidarities and the othering of Muslims.  
Several characteristics of this restructuring can be identified besides the proliferation of 
violence. First, we find a higher concentration of homogenous religious communities living 
separately, next to each other. This spatial separation is clearly marked by boarders, be it 
symbolical (e.g. by rickshaw drivers’ routes according to their religion) or material ones (e.g. 
by built walls). Due to the fear of violence, residents move out of former mixed 
neighbourhoods into increasingly homogenous ones. This has, for instance, created in 
Ahmedabad the “Muslim ghetto” Juhapura which is called colloquially by Hindus “mini-
Pakistan” (ibid: 112).  
Therefore, besides this material reshaping of the city, we see a second feature of the 
fundamentalist city Ahmedabad that consists in its discursive reshaping. By making use of 
socio-spatial language the area of Juhapura is equated with Pakistan, which is nothing India’s 
long-time enemy. Indian Muslims are being associated with Pakistanis, hereby undergoing a 
“devaluation”. Since they do not show any “inheritance of Hindu blood by birth” 
(Rajagopalan 2011: 259), they are not considered to be of the same nation. Needless is to say 
that this rejection lacks any historical accuracy. Also, there are urban localities in Ahmedabad 
declared on street signboards as part of the “Hindu Rashtra”, which literally translates into 
“Hindu nation” (Desai 2011: 113).  
Thirdly, we find the destruction of religious symbols and/or the insertion of iconography of 
one’s own religion into public space. This could be observed in the riots taking place in 1992 
during which the famous Babri Mosque in northern India was demolished. This demolition of 
religious sites was carried out even more aggressively in, what later came to be known as, the 
“Gujarat carnage” – the outbursts taking place in 2002 in and around Ahmedabad during 
which Muslim graveyards, mosques and Muslim-owned residential and commercial property 
was systemically destroyed on a large-scale. (ibid: 112 et seq.) Whereas in Ahmedabad the 
occasional outbreaks of violence are analysed, in Delhi it is the “everyday practices” 
(Rajagopalan 2011: 266) that are of the author’s interest. Rajagopalan describes how in 
numerous acts of appropriation public spaces, like traffic roundabouts, are decorated with 
Hindu iconography, e.g. warriors that, allegedly, fought the “invasion” of the Mughals (ibid: 
266 et seq.). Hence, in Delhi we find a situation in which everything is being tried to 
eliminate the Muslim heritage of the country and reclaim the past by erasing any traces of 
cultural heterogeneity.     
Consequently, it is not only the spatial segregation of two religious communities that is 
visible in the cityscapes, but even more so the construction and fixation of two different 
identities as antagonistic (ibid: 105). In the following chapter our aim will be to apply the 
features of the fundamentalist city mentioned above, in this case exemplified by Ahmedabad 
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3.3 The war within: growing fundamentalism in Sarajevo 
When we follow the principles of a fundamentalist city, exemplarily described in the last 
chapter for Ahmedabad and Delhi, we see some quite similar results for what has happened 
during 1992 and 1995 in Sarajevo.20  
In a first step I will analyse how the spatial structures of the city were reshaped. This did not 
happen at such a large scale as it did in the cities in India. Thus, instead of speaking of spatial 
segregation, I will argue that decreased possibilities of interaction between different religious 
communities evolved.  
One example for this was the mixed marriages that never had been any major problem in 
Sarajevo’s society. However, when war broke out, these “were the ones that were the most 
difficult to keep intact” – they became an “anomaly”. The head of the Muslim community 
even equated children, born by interreligious couples, as “rotten eggs” (Maček 2000: 115). 
Additionally, mixed marriages were not “interpreted [by Muslims] as a normal result of the 
plurireligious and pluricultural nature of the society” (Vrcan 1998: 123), but have been 
explicitly condemned as a means to reduce their community. Insofar Muslims, for their part, 
perceived mixed marriages as one strategy among others, how Serb nationalists tried to 
eradicate their existence in Bosnia.  
Another example was neighbourly mistrust. As described above, before the war 
neighbourliness was of great importance and one of the essential equalizing factors for an 
existing plurireligious society. However, during war times there was a lot of suspicion 
between neighbours, especially between those of different religious backgrounds (Maček 
2000: 132):  
”There was a general mistrust, […] an amount of fear. You could see that also they were suffering, that 
they didn’t have anything, that they also were threatened, but it was simply irritating that when a shell 
exploded, and we would unconsciously curse their Chetnik-mothers, these people would just keep 
silent. Naturally there was mistrust. They were quiet but perhaps they felt fear and shame. But they 
didn’t condemn it [the shelling, Karadžic, and the Serbian cause at large]. They never wanted to say 
who had injured them. They say that they had hard times, terrible, no food, so who is responsible for 
there being no food in Sarajevo?”  
A third example for the decreased possibilities of interaction between different religious 
communities was the growing importance of Sarajevan congregations. Most of the people 
eventually turned to a religious community, because they needed refuge, food and/or money. 
Religions, thus, experienced a considerable revitalisation. But since the distribution of 
humanitarian aid was done along religious lines, it led to a growing separation. Furthermore, 
“conditions were set for the distribution of aid” (ibid: 189): hence religion forcibly played a 
bigger role on a day-to-day basis. The example is given by Maček of Catholic priests who 
were sent to each home for blessing in order to receive help. The Christianisation of homes 
                                                 
20 In the following my observations will be based to a certain extent on the book by Ivana Maček, since this was 
the only qualitative and in-depth description of the happenings inside Sarajevo that were available. 
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was, thus, necessary when help by the Caritas was sought for. “The blending of the basic 
means of existence with spiritual matters and politics caused a lot of indignation, but it still 
entered the social fabric – survival, religiosity and nationality became hard to separate” (ibid: 
191).  
A second feature of the Fundamentalist City consisted in a discursive reshaping of the city. 
Also, for this characteristic we find several examples. For instance, SDA members (the 
Muslim party which dominated politics from 1991 onwards) presented themselves in 
television going to mosques. Before the conflict had broken out this was clearly part of the 
private and not public life. In general, television channels showed greater interest in religious 
matters. Thus, in media controlled by Serbian nationalists Muslims were equated with 
“Turks”, as the enemies and villains, whereas it was the other way round in Muslim-
dominated TV with Serbs being equated with “Chetniks” (ibid: 166 et seq.). 
Furthermore, the discursive reshaping could be seen in schools where for most parts Islam 
was introduced. The responsibility for the organisation and financing of religious studies was 
given to the respective local religious communities which mostly meant that either Islam was 
taught or no religious subject at all. “As Islam was becoming the state religion, most people 
did not want their children to stand out in any way, so they sent them to these classes” (Maček 
2000: 173). Also, new textbooks were printed. For the subjects “History” and “Language and 
Literature” texts and illustrations were changed in favour of Muslims. This also meant that the 
literature was cleansed of all Bosnian authors of non-Muslim origin. The aim here was the 
formation of a Bosnian Muslim identity “as the original, and superior, people” (ibid). 
When analysing the discursive reshaping of Sarajevo one cannot overlook language itself. 
Changes in vocabulary and pronunciation were made to distinguish more clearly between the, 
otherwise, very similar Serbo-Croatian. Hence, “the uniqueness of Bosnian was to be found in 
its ‘Islamic component’” (ibid: 174). Muslim Sarajevans tried to use Turkisms (or, where non-
existent, created Turkisms like introducing the letter “h” in places where, especially, in Serbo-
Croatian, it is omitted) and avoided Slavic synonyms (Perry 2005: 224 et seq.). Hereby, 
language was also an indicator of belonging. Serbian and Croatian became “almost overnight 
[…] minority languages” in Sarajevo (Maček 2000: 176).   
The last feature used for the description of what was described as characteristics of the 
Fundametalist City in India is the destruction of religious symbols and/or the introduction by 
iconography of one’s own religion in public space. It holds also true for this point that the 
actions taken in Sarajevo were by far not as extreme as they were in the case of Indian cities 
being shattered by the Hindutva movement. However, we find certain kinds of fundamentalist 
occurrences that show an increased “public display of religion” (ibid: 160) in Sarajevo.  
In this sense the colour green can be particularly depicted. Green, as one of the symbols of 
Islam, could be found more broadly in public than in pre-war times. Whereas street-name 
plates and police uniforms were beforehand blue, they were changed to green during the war. 
Also, most plates were in Cyrillic and Latin script, but then gradually removed and replaced 
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by exclusively Latin ones. Thus, the pre-war equality of Western and Eastern scripts had been 
erased. Furthermore, the contents of those plates were often changed. Donia describes this 
practice “as a way of expressing a current state ideology” (ibid: 171). Whereas in pre-war 
times there still were a lot of partisan and communist heroes depicted by street names, this 
was transformed to national heroes of, exclusively, Muslim origin.   
Another issue was that fallen soldiers of the Army of Bosnia were called Šehidi. Though the 
institution “fallen soldier” already existed in former Yugoslavian times it was a novelty that 
this became now restricted to soldiers of Muslim belief. This happened because the status, 
and, consequently, the considerable monetary aid that came with it, was not given by 
Sarajevan’s own government but by the Muslim organization IGASA (ibid: 170). Besides 
demanding their beneficiaries to stick to certain Muslim rules, there was another, more 
obvious, element of public display of religion. There were special graveyards for fallen 
soldiers of Muslim belief – Šehidi – that were reserved for this group of people. Neither 
civilians nor fallen soldiers that were non-Muslims could be buried in these graveyards. 
Hence, “non-Muslim soldiers who lost their lives were placed in a somewhat degraded 
category of ‘fallen soldier’” (ibid: 171). This religious discrimination became, thus, highly 
evident in the urban fabric.   
 
4. Outlook: on the interdependence of urbicide and the fundamentalist city 
in Sarajevo 
The previous chapter showed some examples of fundamentalist occurrences within the city of 
Sarajevo. While one does not find any major public outrages, as was exemplified in the cases 
of India, there are still incidents leading to the assumption that religious extremism played a 
greater role during war-time. Through analysing the decreased possibilities of interaction 
between different religious communities (1), the discursive reshaping of Sarajevo (2) and the 
increased public display of religion (3) we could observe that religion was, indeed, a feature 
leading to the exclusion of certain groups. In the case of Sarajevo this, by and large, meant the 
exclusion or discrimination of Bosnian Serbs, since they were equated with the city’s 
aggressors. Through everyday practices, as was exemplified by street plates, language, school 
books or graveyard regulations, we see a normalisation and institutionalisation of 
discrimination and control. However, it also became clear that it is hard to distinguish more 
adequately between religious and national features, since they were intertwined in the case of 
Bosnia. Thus, fundamentalism and nationalism should be equally stressed when analysing 
what happened during the siege of Sarajevo (Mojzes 1999: 79 et seq.). 
Maček writes in her book: “the fact remains that religion became an important part of 
Sarajevan life in a very short time, which would have been impossible without the war life-
circumstances.” (Maček 2000: 194) This also holds true for fundamentalism, since there were 
no signs of such trends before the war in the city. One difference that needs to be highlighted 
between the fundamentalist cities described in the book by AlSayyad/ Massoumi and Sarajevo 
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lies, therefore, in the time-factor. One can speak of a relatively rapid development. Without 
the siege of the city and the more than exceptional war-time situation most citizens probably 
would not have been tempted to follow exclusionary practices. However, one should not 
forget that religion was a feature that could easily be used, since resentments against other 
religious communities were latent and could, evidently, not be erased completely by Tito’s 
“civil religion of brotherhood and unity” (Perica 2002: 89).   
Urbicide, the attacks on buildings and communities with the intention to destroy the 
conditions of heterogeneity (Coward 2004: 166), taking place on a daily basis for about four 
years in Sarajevo and being, at least partially, driven by fundamentalist motives, the exclusion 
of other religious communities for being a substantial element of heterogeneity, makes the 
rise of fundamentalism in the city plausible. It needs to be seen how deep this cut has been in 
the peaceful coexistence of the diverse Bosnian populations since “bitterness over the war has 
contributed to mutual suspicion and hatred among members of all three major religious 
groups” (Winslow 2002: 350). What makes confident though, is that in contrast to other 
Bosnian cities, there was no religious building destroyed in Sarajevo. Despite the heavy 
shelling of mosques by Serbian troops, all churches remained untouched. Fortunately, not 
every sign of the centuries-long peaceful coexistence vanished during the siege of Sarajevo.  
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The Sacral Geography of Zionism: Israeli “Homeland” Protection 
and Geopolitics 
Eric Rösner 
 
Abstract 
The Middle-East conflict is one of the most intensively discussed political crises in the worldwide 
media. The following article shall try to clarify some fundamental facts for the understanding of the 
background and the causes of this conflict. This work shall be seen as a thought-provoking impulse 
and contribution for the extensive academic discourse on this complex matter. The paper focuses 
especially on the aspect of Zionism as one conflict component among others. Firstly, a brief definition 
of Zionism will be given and an overview on the main standpoints of the involved conflict parties. 
Secondly, with the analysis of a case study, the politics of the state of Israel and the influences 
concerning the relationship between the different parties will be represented briefly. Finally, some 
issues and further potentials for conflict mitigation in the peace making process will be outlined. 
 
1. Introduction 
The conflict between Israel, the Zionist movement and the Arab community is still one of the 
most debated political issues in recent history even though it has lasted already for more than 
one hundred years. The reasons for this astonishing durability of the conflict are to some 
extent the opposing religious positions with territorial implications which can hardly be 
debated and negotiated in a normal way (Mardam-Bey 2012: 5). The contested territories play 
an elementary role in the three monotheistic religions that are rooted in the region. Therefore, 
Jews, Christians and Muslims feel deeply rooted with the contested space. As Elisabeth 
Heidenreich (2010: 71-72) underlines, we have to understand the context as religious 
identities which constitute a sacral geography in overlapping spaces. Jerusalem is the best 
example to substantiate this theoretical context of sacral geography. The town unified the 
origin of the Jews, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and Mohammed’s ascent into heaven. It is a 
spatial agglomeration of religious sanctuaries with different claims of ownership 
(Jaeger&Tophoven 2011: 76-77) which creates a great potential for conflicts. 
 
2. Zionism 
The Zionist Movement is more than 2000 years old and based on the development of the 
diaspora21. The diaspora means the statelessness, migration and scattering of people away 
from an established homeland in more than one direction. Amar-Dahl (2012: 10-12) 
underlines that there were different understandings of the meaning of diaspora already in the 
                                                 
21 For further information on Jewish history please refer to Mardam-Bey (2012: 150-157)andJaeger&Tophoven 
(2011: 257-265). 
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19th and 20th century. Consensus among the different groups, however, is the hope for a 
Jewish State in the ‘Promised Land’, whichgave rise to what is called Zionism (Amar-Dahl 
2012: 13). 
One of the most important visionaries of Zionism is Theodor Herzl. He is the author of the 
book “The Jewish State” and furthermore the initiator of The First Zionist Congress convened 
in Basle (1897) “Theodor Herzl if not the originator of the concept of Zionism was definitely 
the visionary, catalyst and leader of political Zionism” (Melnick 2013: 3). The results of the 
First Zionist Congress give a very good overview about the main goals of Zionism (Melnick 
2013: 3):  
“Zionism aims at establishing for the Jewish people a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine. 
For the attainment of this purpose, the Congress considers the following means serviceable: 
1. The promotion of the settlement of Jewish agriculturists, artisans, and tradesmen in Palestine. 
2. The federation of all Jews into local or general groups, according to the laws of the various countries. 
3. The strengthening of the Jewish feeling and consciousness. 
4. Preparatory steps for the attainment of those governmental grants which are necessary to the 
achievement of the Zionist purpose.” 
Different movements of Zionism have evolved over time.The political Zionism was founded 
by Hertzl. The main thesis in Hertzls “Jewish State” is that a Jewish community does not need 
definite borders or a specific language. He reckons that anti-Semitism gave origin to and 
constitutes the urgency for the foundation of a Jewish State. With the intensifying anti-
Semitism in the late 19th-century there were only two opportunities for the Jewish community: 
assimilating in other societies or (re-)establishing the Jewish State (Amar-Dahl 2012: 19-20). 
Moshe Zuckermann (2010: 14) states that the anti-Semitism and the diaspora served as a 
justification for a Jewish State granting safety from the Jews enemies. Consequently, 
Zuckermann (2010: 13-15) therefore expresses his opinion that the Jewish State to some 
extent needs this enemy and has to maintain this construct. 
Another interpretation of Zionism is focused on a religious viewpoint. Religious Zionism 
signifies the foundation of a Jewish State in order to bring together the diaspora through the 
colonisation of the Promised Land (Amar-Dahl 2012: 15-16). Contrary to this, the Orthodox 
Jewish community believes that the judgement by God and the awaited Messiah is the only 
legitimate way to release the Jews from life in exile by joining them in the ‘Promised Land’ 
(Amar-Dahl 2012: 14). Goldman (2009) describes this internal conflict with the following 
words: “Only the Messiah, sent by God, could restore the people of Israel to its land. And it 
was the Messiah who would rebuild the Temple” (Goldmann 2009: 5). 
Cultural Zionism is focused on the Hebrew identity. Amar-Dahl (2012) explains this position 
with the help of Achad Haam. It means the possibility to settle a small part of the Jewish 
community in the Promised Land. The main part of this process is the establishment and 
territorialisation of a Hebrew culture, language and a classical national character. Afterwards, 
it should be possible to found a Jewish State (ibid: 20-21). This position is less restrictive but 
it intended to isolate the Hebrew culture from all other cultural influences. Amar-Dahl (2012: 
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21) explains these influences as a cosmopolitan project against the Jewish State in the proper 
sense. He underlines that the main goal of cultural Zionism is the renaissance of a Hebrew 
culture and people. 
Political Zionism is the dominant position in recent history and present. The reason for this 
victory over the other positions is the Holocaust. Goldman (2009) enunciates this in the 
following words:  
“But this hope was neither political nor military. Jews in the dispersion were powerless, and they did 
not come to any consensus about the need for a homeland. Rising anti-Semitism in nineteenth-century 
in Europe, particularly in Russia and Romania, as well as in France and Germany, helped shape a 
nationalist consensus to which many Jews soon subscribed” (Goldmann 2009: 3).  
The result of this rising political Zionism is the foundation of Israel in 1948 after the 
Holocaust and the end of World War II. Figure 1 shows the composition of the Jewish 
immigrant community in the region in 2008. At that time, Israel had a population of 5,57 
million Jews, whereof 3,04 million were immigrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own figure referring to 
Jaeger; Tophoven 2011: 46 
Fig. 1: Composition of the Jewish community in Israel of 3,04 million people with 
immigration background in 2008  
 
3. The different parties in the Middle East conflict 
At this point it is important to outline the different parties in the conflict and the distribution 
of power among them. The state of Israel is the most powerful conflict party. Since 1948, the 
year of the establishment of the Jewish state to be known as the State of Israel, it could count 
with the support of the Western countries in this development.Israel can be seen as the main 
power in the region also through its great military power. Amar-Dahl (2012: 52-61) shows 
with quotes from Shimon Peres, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize,that there is a widespread 
conviction among the Jewish that the great Arab resentment against the Jewish community is 
deeply rooted in Arab societies and therefore justifies to build up and maintain the extensive 
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military power of the state of Israel to protect itself. Furthermore, Amar-Dahl portrays the 
point of view that the Arab societies are ‘barbaric’ with a lower level of civilization. For this 
reason, the Arabs are determined as an opponent group for the Israeli state against which the 
Jews have to take measures of self-defence (ibid: 56). Such statements seem to support the 
hypothesis of Zuckermann (2010) that the state of Israel needs an image of an enemy, 
nowadays not just regular anti-Semitism but rather the neighbouring Arab societies. Amar-
Dahl (2012: 113-115) criticises the development of a strong military force in Israel upon this 
justification and speaks of a „Military Civilization”. Her main point is that the lines between 
military and the civil society are blurred and the society is characterised by wide acceptance 
ofthe state’s military interests22. 
In recent decades,the Israeli government switched between right and left parties. Zuckermann 
(2010: 97-99) claims, however, that a real political left with a pacifist agenda would not be 
accepted to govern Israel. He mentions the security doctrine of the Israeli State and the 
permanent fear of the dangerous Arab enemies which are seen as the reason for restrictive 
political measures.The only differentiation between left and right parties in Israelcan be found 
in the rigour of the discourse on the right security measures. 
Provocative statements of some Israelis, like the following, underline to which point the 
mutual relationships have already been deteriorated: “To stand against Israel is to stand 
against God” (Carenen 2012: 189). Shahak (1982: 4) points out that  
“the idea that all the Arab states should be broken down, by Israel, into small units, occurs again and 
again in Israeli strategic thinking. For example, Ze'ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha'aretz (and 
probably the most knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the ‘best’ that can happen for 
Israeli interests in Iraq: ‘The dissolution of Iraq into a Shi'ite state, a Sunni state and the separation of 
the Kurdish part’ (Ha'aretz 6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect of the plan is very old”.  
On the opposite side, also the Arab nations and the Islamic World have developed an enemy 
stereotype concerning the Jewish State. The demographicalchanges inthe region throughout 
the past century have aggravated mutual resentments. In the past centuries therewas a great 
majority of Islamic people but with the foundation of Israel and the intense immigration of 
Jews and the displacement of a great number of Muslims the distribution has changed towards 
a standoff (Amar-Dahl 2012: 44-45). Jaeger and Tophoven (2011: 65) refer to this 
transformation as being caused by a “manoeuvrable folk”. According to Amar-Dahl (2012: 
60-62) the natural consequence is a development of pan-Arab nationalism which has the main 
goal to unify the Arab countries against Israel and to jointly defeat the enemy, breaking his 
regional hegemony in military and politics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Amar-Dahl (2012: 113-115) The Military Civilization of the Israeli democracy. 
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4. The casestudy: Israeli settlement policy 
After the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the following first war between Israel 
and the Arab countries Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq the different 
parties found a compromise concerning the definition of the borders of Israel. These borders 
are known as the Green Line. In this case Israel was able to consolidate its power and 
legitimation in the region. Over time and with persistent conflicts in the region (Six-Day War, 
Yom Kippur War etc.) the Israeli State has expanded its territory beyond the Green Line and 
founded Jewish settlements in areas which were originally destined for the Arab or Palestine 
community. The starting point of this development was the Six-Day War with an Israeli 
victory including territorial gains and the negation of the Jewish State by the Arab League. As 
a response to this position, Israel started to build settlements in the conquered territories, 
especially in the West Jordan region (Deutsche Welle 2013). Figure 2 gives a short overview 
on the changes in distribution and settlement. Many Palestinians were forced to leave. As a 
consequence the Palestine community, represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) intensified the fight against the Jewish State in the first Intifada and proclaimed the 
Palestinian State in 1988. This state was indirectly recognized by the UN against the 
opposition of Israel. A transformation towards a smouldering conflict took place; with an 
increase of violence duringthe second Intifada in 2000. Both parties, however, state at least 
officially that a peaceful further coexistence is the only way (Jaeger&Tophoven 2011: 66-68). 
 
Source: Jaeger; Tophoven 2011: 52 
Fig. 2: Historical development in the Middle-East 1947-1993  
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Gorenberg (2012: 62-65) analyses the legitimation of the Jewish settlement development. 
Hestatesthat the justification of the Jewish settlement, especially in Ofra, which is a part of the 
West Jordan Land, is ambivalent. The Israeli point of view was that the settlements were legal 
because the region was stateless in 1967 when the settlementprocess started. But even the 
Israeli civil administration confirms that no regular building licences exist. Gorenberg (2012) 
states that in this region development plansare not available and this is why the settlements 
built on Palestinian ground are formally illegal and contradict international agreements. 
Political changes or simply the fact that more than 100,000 people live in this area are seen by 
some policy analysts as the main reasons for stagnation (Deutsche Welle 2013). In 2002, in 
the main settlement areas 206,000 Jewish settlers lived beside 2 million Palestinians in the 
West Jordan area; 1,1 million Palestinians together with 7,000 settlers in the Gaza strip and 
200,000 Palestinians with 170,000 Jews in East Jerusalem (Jaeger&Tophoven 2011: 70). 
The influences of this policy, together with other measures in the political life of Israel, are 
logical for both sides. Israel pursues a security doctrine with Israel as the main power in the 
region. Indirect consequences are the discrimination of the Arabs in Israel and the occupied 
areas and, finally, the smouldering conflict between the different religions. The mutual enemy 
construct pokes the hate between the nations and cultures and complements the matrix for 
PLO, Intifada and recent violent organisations against the Jews. The answer from the Jewish 
community is similar: it is violence against the terrorists and sometimes also against civilians. 
Mardam-Bay (2012: 113) notes an interesting quote from Elias Sanbar, who is a Palestine 
politician with residence in Paris, which shows the real situation in the minds of the Arab 
community. Concerning the intended Palestine accession to the UN he said that the Palestine 
society is confident with the principles of the international law but it is difficult to imagine 
that this law will prevail after years of war. For him it is difficult to imagine that diplomatic 
negotiations will effectively take place in the actual situation and that Israel does not ignore 
the international law. Apparently, the mistrust against the Jewish community, especially 
against the Israeli government is deeply rooted in the minds of Palestinians. If Israel perceived 
that the foundation of the Jewish State, in the context of the differentiated sacral geographies 
of the respective territory, was also a great and problematic incision in the history of the Arab 
community, a consensus could more likely be achieved (Gorenberg 2012: 245). The other 
essential condition for this process is a secular Palestine state. A radical and terrorist affected 
state or movement is not able to participate effectively and seriously in a political peace 
building process. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The enemy construct on both sides provokes mutual hatred and suspicion and keeps 
nourishing rigid military actions and terrorist activity. It is difficult to imagine that a 
diplomatic solution of the conflict will be possible in the present situation. There is no doubt 
that Israel has to protect itself because there are dangerous developments in parts of the Arab 
world and history proved serious threats to be real. The rigid Israeli security doctrine has 
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surely contributed to the deepening of Arab resentments against Israel. If Israel acknowledged 
an independent Palestine State, it is possible that relationships could be normalised and 
conflict mitigation mechanisms could be regulated and institutionalised between both states. 
A problem for this process is actually the national identity of both Israel and the neighbouring 
Arab countries. It could be more productive if a separation from religion and state became the 
foundation of the national identities on both sides. Israel has strived for the status of the 
hegemon of the region for own security purposes. Now an effective step could be an increased 
offer of economic, political and social support in favour of the weaker neighbours. In the 
society of Israel first movements and developments are visible which follow the goal of 
reconciliation. The opportunities of secularised politics should be used. But it is also 
important that the Arabs fight anti-Semitism in their governments and within their societies in 
order to give peace with Israel a fair chance. Under such circumstances a peace process, as 
initiated through the Oslo contracts, should be more effective and durable in the future. 
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Is the Global Counter-Terrorism a Complex or a Paradox? 
Inspirations from the ETIM issue in China  
Shengjian Wu 
 
Abstract 
For China, the issue of East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) does not only concern the 
national sovereignty, but also the cross-border anti-terrorism cooperation. The Chinese government 
has labelled the ETIM as a terrorist group since almost 20 years, whilst only after 9/11 the U.S. 
government had placed the ETIM on its own Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL), however, not on the 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations List (FTO). The U.N. followed in the same way to further 
internationalise the ETIM issue. The involved complicated scopes revealed a wider range from 
counter-terrorism campaign to regional security and from nationalism to cultural liberalism. Based 
on limited accessible literature on the ETIM, on the Uyghur minority and China’s political agenda on 
Muslims, on the potential abuse of human rights and the American diplomatic reactions towards the 
ETIM, a multidimensional and integrated triangle-approach should have been applied, while the three 
main prolocutors around the ETIM issue, namely the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the Han-Chinese 
administration and the globally leading anti-terrorism player – the U.S., have all deliberately ignored 
the hidden extensional facts that revealed complicacy. Rather than to verify the verbal definition on 
ETIM terrorism, we’ll examine the effects of potential ideological interventions from three sides 
towards the ETIM issue and rethink the subtle role of the U.S. in between. The issue of ETIM is a 
series of tensions. Through a geopolitical perspective, we want to gain more insight about the 
psychology of terrorism, the identity politics and the imaginative geography of American global terror 
threats. Finally, we may also refresh our knowledge on terrorism by examining the multidimensional 
case of Uyghur terrorists. 
 
1. Estrangement between Han- and Uyghur Chinese 
The first essential aspect to be put forward is the geopolitical feature of the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region, which shall be highlighted in an internationalised complex of the ETIM 
issue. Xinjiang is located far from the capital Beijing, with its central administration of China, 
while it is much closer to its ethno-religious relatives in central Asia, where several radical 
Islamic terrorist groups have been sheltered23. Prior to the 20th century, the non-Turkic 
speaking Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Huis had originally dominated the Xinjiang region, referred 
to as the pivot of Asia. Its demographic structure started to change notably both in terms of 
ethnic composition and spatial distribution after the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1949, resulting in massive Han-Chinese immigration and the Han-dominated 
                                                 
23 The three most notorious Islamic terrorist organizations in the bordering countries of Xinjiang include al-
Qaeda since 1988, the Hizb ut-Tahrir with worldwide affiliations and the O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati. These 
organisations are involved in terrorism in Uzbekistan, civil war in Afghanistan (1996–2001) and war in 
Afghanistan (2001-present).  
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agglomeration (Fig. 1) in northern Xinjiang, which was and is economically more developed 
and more urbanised. This spatial estrangement also occurred in the Han-dominated urban 
communities24 and gradually caused an awakening of Uyghur nationalism, leading to a 
separatism threat for the neighbouring ethnic counterpart – Han Chinese.  
 
Source: edited upon data from the Xinjiang Research Institute of Social Sciences  
Fig. 1: The demographic distribution on the basis of the three largest ethnic groups 
(June, 2009) 
 
1.1 The Han-Uyghur tensions in the contemporary context 
On one hand, the Xinjiang region has gained more geopolitical importance due to its rich 
reserves of gas, fossil oil and minerals which sustained China’s secure access to the strategic 
resources. In return, the central government has enhanced its military and economic control 
through the nationalization of mines and oil deposits, nourishing unsatisfaction among the 
native Uyghurs. On the other hand, the fall of the former Soviet Union, the rise of post-
colonial nationalism and the emergence of Muslim radicalism have caused ideological 
disturbances in central Asia, by which the Xinjiang region was also affected as the 
intersection of communism and capitalism, of Confucianism and Islam. The socioeconomic 
and ideological tensions have challenged above all the efficiency of integration policies of the 
                                                 
24 According to official census data from 2000, the Han Chinese constituted the ethnic majority with 75.3% of 
the population in Ürümqi and 78.1% in Karamay, the two most industrialized cities of the region. 
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central government and suggested a more localised or flexible development model in case of 
ethnic movements. The July 2009 Ürümqi riots25 have to some extent expressed the failure of 
the existing administrative settings and identity politics in Xinjiang. They have strengthened 
the Han-Uyghur tensions and brought about a consequential reinforcement effect of Uyghurs’ 
ethno-religious adherence to their Turkic Islamic identity. Among these tensions, the ETIM 
terrorists could easily find their petri dishes for radicalism and mobilise revengeful violent 
separatist activities. Crime records of detained ETIM members have proved the positive 
correlation between the Han-Uyghur political tensions and Muslim terrorism.  
The central government of China has reformed a series of national integration policies for the 
Xinjiang Uyghurs since 1976. They include the bilingual education system, financial 
subsidies for the less developed Uyghur dominated communities, exemption from birth 
control policy, among others. Their goals were to advance the college admission rate of native 
Uyghurs, to boost the local infrastructure for better communication, and to balance the 
demographic structure against the growing number of Han immigrants. However, empirical 
observations have shown that modified integration policies have not relieved the Uyghurs’ 
discontent about their socio-economic status and endangered identity (Howell & Fan 2011: 
120-123). Despite the remaining ethnically based disparity of income, Uyghurs also felt 
unequally treated in a Han Chinese dominated society. Tensions beyond material goods were, 
for example, religious intolerance or unofficial ceiling of Uyghurs’ careers in administrative 
systems.  
 
1.2 Identity crisis between nationalism and Ummah 
Identity has always been a commonly used instrument of ethno-religious terrorism preachers, 
such as the ETIM leaders. The keyword of the ETIM concerning identity is “Turkic”, which 
expressed the Uyghur nationalism with a Turkic national identity. In reality, it’s quite hard to 
define the anthropological term Uyghur as a distinguished ethnic identity. If we retrieve the 
history of Uyghurs in Xinjiang two basic approaches, the primordialist and constructivist 
approach, can explain how ethnic identity has been shaped. The primordialist approach sees 
ethnic identity as naturally inherited characteristics. The Uyghur separatists, however, utilise 
the terms “Turkic” and “Uyghur” inter-changeably, since Uyghur was actually the 
miscegenated offspring of a small coalition of Tiele26 tribes from Turkic origin in northern 
                                                 
25 The July 2009 Ürümqi riots have started as peaceful demonstrations. They involved about 1,000 Uyghurs 
protesting against impartial justice in an interracial criminal case and ended as a series of riots with racial hatred. 
The riots were considered by the Chinese Communist Party as a severe signal of failed integration policies.  
26 The Tiele (Chinese: 鐵勒), also named Chile (Chinese: 敕勒), Gaoche (Chinese: 高車), or Tele (Chinese: 
特勒), were a confederation of nine Turkic peoples living to the north of China and in Central Asia, emerging 
after the disintegration of the Xiongnu confederation in the year 552 AD. 
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China.27 This Turkic blood tie couldn’t unify all oasis inhabitants in Xinjiang, as it had strived 
for an unrealistic pan-Turkic territory for all non-Han inhabitants there. Instead, the ETIM 
separatists were inclined to accept a more socially constructed ethnic identity of “East-
Turkic” or “Uyghur as Muslim”. This constructivist identity strategy by the ETIM separatists 
has grasped two core elements of “Uyghur” identity, namely the commonly used “Uyghur” 
language and the shared faith in Ummah al-Islamiyah, a collective nation of Islamic peoples. 
The repressive ethno-religious policies applied by the local administration have undoubtedly 
reinforced the Beijing-acentric ethnic awareness of Uyghur Muslim, as the most important 
marker of the Uyghur identity was their Islamic traditions. 
Misgivings about political terrorism by the central government in Beijing couldn’t be easily 
removed in consideration of the Islamist factor in a post 9/11 era. Beijing still worried that the 
Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic consciousness may be fused together to produce an ethno-
religious conflict in Xinjiang. Scholars, such as Abanti Bhattacharya, an associate fellow at 
the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, have doubted on China’s ideological 
intervention in the light of the Uyghur ETIM terrorism. He reviewed China’s nationalism 
history since the post-war period to suggest that the government’s attempt to revive 
nationalism with high compatibility for all domestic ethnicities was not only relevant for 
China’s national integration but also the security of its border lands. Rather than blurring the 
distinction between separatism and terrorism, China should adjust its nationalism-oriented28 
regional autonomy policies to match the Uyghurs’ appeals for more autonomy. 
 
2. Limited cooperation between the U.S. and China 
China has declared itself as a victim of terrorist attacks by some Muslim extremists or ethnic 
Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang since the 1990s. The international emergence of some Uyghur 
activists was reportedly detected in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in 1997 where they 
received military training. In January 2002, a Chinese government study reported that the 
ETIM has received money, weapons, and support from al-Qaeda. Thus, China’s concerns 
about cross-border terrorism appeared to place it in a position to support Washington’s global 
counter-terrorism campaign and share intelligence resources after the attacks of September 
11, 2001. Only 17 days after the attacks, China voted with all other attendants in the Security 
Council for Resolution 1373 that aimed to contain terrorist groups in various ways, 
                                                 
27 The fall of the Uyghur Khaganate in the year 842 has caused Uyghur migration from Mongolia into the Tarim 
Basin. This migration assimilated and replaced the Indo-Europeans of the region to create a distinct identity, as 
the language and culture of the Turkic migrants eventually supplanted the original Indo-European influences. 
This fluid definition of Uyghur and the diverse ancestry of modern Uyghurs are a source of confusion about 
what constitutes true Uyghur ethnogenesis and ethnography.   
28 The Preamble to the 1982 Constitution states, „Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of 
minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established for 
the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People’s 
Republic of China“. 
158 
 
reaffirming the need to combat terrorism through a wide global cooperation. Simultaneously, 
Washington has come to realise that the rising authority of China might challenge America’s 
leading role in international geopolitical issues. Central Asia, as the pivot of the Eurasian 
continent, is essential for America’s global geopolitical strategy.  
 
2.1. The paradoxical “Balance of Power” in Eurasia 
China has become the world’s second largest economy29, strongly increasing its political 
influence in eastern Asia. To maintain America’s geopolitical interests, the U.S. has promoted 
its alliances with India, Japan, South Korea and Afghanistan with the dual purpose of 
containment and balance of power (Fig. 2). The containment strategy implied an isolated and 
encircled situation for China, in which the countries bordering China stretched in a southern 
arc from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and farther to South and Central Asia. Based on the 
common concerns over China’s emerging power and political ambitions, this “coalition” has 
been expanded to include countries such as Cambodia, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. But a further shared concern shouldn’t be ignored within this topographically and 
ethno-religiously complicated region, namely the transnational movement of terrorism. In the 
case of ETIM, both America and its Asian followers have carefully noticed its linkage to the 
transnational Islamic fundamentalist movement. The largest supporter of the American 
“balance of power strategy” – India, is also worried about the growth of radical Islamic 
separatism in Xinjiang because India has not yet to be free from the troublesome Jammu and 
Kashmir areas30 where a violent fundamentalist movement together with the emergence of 
nationalism ever occurred. Thus, India, as much as the U.S., would be cautious about the 
evolution of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in Xinjiang and Central Asia. 
The Anxiety of the U.S. about China’s rise – especially in military sense, the impendency of 
China to ensure its energy access and territorial security against civil strife, together with the 
regional socio-political transformation within Central Asia itself, have formed a “stress 
triangle”, which changes the power competition between the U.S. and China. While the 
couplet of counterbalanced American geopolitical policies, namely “regional alliances for the 
balance of power” and “regional cooperation for the global war on terrorism”, have 
demonstrated constraints in the extent of Sino-American counter-terrorism cooperation. 
Especially in fields like information sharing and technicians’ dispatching, the two great 
powers still lack mutual trust to strive for a closer bilateral relationship. The Bush 
                                                 
29 According to the World Economic Outlook Database of International Monetary Fund, which is updated on 
April 2013, the socialist market economy of China is the world's second largest economy by nominal GDP 
(8,227.037 Billion U.S. dollars) and by purchasing power parity (12,405.670 Billion U.S. dollars) after the 
United States in year 2012. 
30 Jammu and Kashmir has an international border with PRC in the north and east on the southwestern part of 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomy Region, where the most Uyghurs are agglomerated. What’s more, Jammu and 
Kashmir also have a Muslim majority population. Thus, Xinjiang also matters for India’s territorial security and 
political stability.  
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administration has designated the ETIM as a terrorist organisation in August 2002. 
Washington has reportedly allowed PRC interrogators access to Uyghur detainees at 
Guantanamo in September 2002. 
 
Source: Fallon, J.E. 2013. U.S. Geopolitics: Afghanistan and the Containment of China. In Small Wars Journal  
Fig. 2: The Army Garrisons and military alliances of U.S. around China (2013) 
 
2.2. Pursuit of domestic stability and the “War on Terror”  
Many official counter-terrorism actions, transnational or domestic, have been labelled as 
humanitarian interventions. However, Edward Snowden’s political asylum in May 2013 
rewarmed the debate on counter-terrorism strategies in the light of potential human rights 
abuse and supposed humanitarianism with unexpected terrorist-like outcomes. Such a pre-
emptive logic concerning the “war on terror”31 also existed in China’s domestic counter-
terrorism strategy. For example, Chinese newspapers published a list of supposed ETIM 
members (Todd 2010: 162-180), without reliable proof for their linkage to terrorism. Experts 
from all over the world have reiterated that there is no internationally accepted definition of 
the term ‘terrorism’. America declared a humanitarian “war on terror” and China vowed to 
fight with “iron fist against separatist”. The first strategy has largely concentrated its focus on 
the Islamic World and the latter on the north-western border land of Xinjiang. But will they 
                                                 
31 The term ‘War on Terror’ was first used by George W. Bush on 20th September 2001, to signify a global 
military, political, lawful, and conceptual struggle—targeting both organizations designated as terrorist and 
regimes accused of supporting them. But the political scientist Francis Fukuyama notes that “terrorism” is not an 
enemy, but a tactic. Its misemploy obscures differences between anti-occupation insurgents and international 
mujahideen (Fukuyama, 2006).   
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evolve to become simply a repressive legislative system against anti-Americanism and an 
overexerted national security policy against anti-separatism?  
A unilateral definition of terrorism is often based on the assumption that the counter-terror 
force is characterised by positive aspects as humanity, civilisation, security, peace, rationality, 
legitimacy and so on. Criticism against the warlike counter-terrorism often pointed out that 
the terminology “War on Terror” in itself relies on violence and to some extent reveals a 
certain retaliatory mind-set of wiping out in-human violence by means of ‘human’ violence. 
This problem is also to some extent reflected in the terminological stiffness of China’s “iron 
fist against terrorism with separatist intentions”. Both Washington and Beijing need an in-
depth self-criticism regarding the demarcation of terrorism. 
 
3. Spatial order, identity and imaginative geography 
Analysing terrorism is a demanding research task and the respective terminology should be 
chosen carefully. In the case of ETIM, differentiations become difficult between the actions of 
Chinese nationalists and Uyghur nationalists, between Muslim fundamentalists and Muslim 
racists, between terrorist engagement and terrorist involvement. Every individual ETIM 
member has its own motivation, aim and means of intervention to struggle for a strengthened 
position of the Uyghurs (Borum 2004). The ‘terrorist’ as a uniform object, however, is vague 
due to underlying multiple identities and cross-domain movements. Individual approaches to 
the countering of specific expressions of terrorism are therefore necessary. The leading 
geopolitical perspective taken by the U.S. concerning the global anti-terror framework – the 
commonly disseminated media images of terrorism and the cooperation models for counter-
terrorism – shall be reviewed. Here we find an imaginative geography behind Washington’s 
global geopolitical strategies that has been produced to describe the ‘so close yet so distant’ 
terrorism. 
 
3.1 The landscape narratives of urban regeneration  
We have mentioned time and again about the role of religion as an emotion-charged mental 
agent in terrorism, while we often ignored the role of space as medium, or the socially 
constructed landscapes within it, which symbolized and reflected the power relations between 
classes and ethnic groups. Meanwhile, these power-relation-charged landscapes can arouse 
certain psychoreactions among different ethnic inhabitants. Islam, according to Fischel (1956) 
and Hassan (1972), shall be an urban religion. Religious practices, especially those relating to 
authority, emphasized the social gathering. An Islamic city, like Ürümqi, was expected to 
reflect the rules of Sharia in terms of physical and social relations between neighbors and 
social groups. While the Han-Immigrants, who were considered to be mostly atheists and 
pagans, have inevitably changed the traditional Islamic urban pattern into more secularized. 
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A representative urban regeneration that perceived by Uyghurs as spatial disorder linked to 
identity crisis was the regeneration plan of Kashgar’s old town since July, 2009. This $488 
million project would demolish thousands of traditional mud-brick houses, and relocate 42% 
of Kashgar’s residents, officially for reasons of dangerous overcrowding, poor drainage, and 
fire hazards. Unlike Ürümqi, the capital city of Xinjiang region, Kashgar has always been a 
Uyghur-dominant urban region in terms of population with less than 8% registered Han-
residents till the end of 2012. The ethnic majority Uyghurs owned a collective cultural 
inheritance in forms of landscapes ranging from the Id Kah Mosque, the largest mosque in 
China, and the tomb of Afaq Khoja, the holiest Muslim site in Xinjiang, to the most intimate 
home spaces, which were mostly two-storey houses with white-washed plaster walls and 
painted ceilings inside. Both their public and private spaces will be transformed into high-rise 
apartments, plazas and reproduced “ancient” Islamic architectures. The existing methods of 
renovation are not “culture-sensitive” enough to show respect for the traditional values, 
lifestyles and social rules of Uyghurs. The location of Mosques was decentralized and the 
height of them exceeded by surrounding towers, while the governmental and commercial 
buildings have set up a new landscape of authority, politically and capitalistically.   
 
3.2 The imaginative geography of ‘big players’ 
By applying the concept of “Imagined Geography” of Edward Said an attempt should be 
made to rethink the U.S.-centric perception of terrorism at global level. Heavily influenced by 
Michel Foucault, Said (1994) conceptualised the “Imagined Geography” as a tool of power, of 
a means of controlling and subordinating geographical constructs with certain characteristics. 
Following Foucault’s critical approach, power is seen as being in the hands of those who have 
the right to objectify those that they are imagining. Thus, the coined term “Imagined 
Geography” here is suggested to mean ‘perceived’32 and ‘constructed’. It refers to the 
perception of spatial dimensions of terrorism that were created through certain images, texts 
or discourses, including movement of terrorists, location of terrorist camps, distance of 
terrorism attacks and spatial relations or integrations of terrorists. Based on the 
performativity33 of consummating new non-national frontiers against terrorism, the warfare 
images of counter-terrorists in Iraq even intruded reality games. By simulating a virtual space 
where an expected terrorist may exist, the “Imagined Geography” allows the visual receivers 
or players to be part of the cooperative forces operating against distant terrorism. These media 
                                                 
32 Perception is the core word in Foucault’s philosophy. For him the way that knowledge and perception 
functioned in social hierarchies of power was of special significance. Foucault outgrew structuralism and 
focused on self-perception and social relations in a manner that tackled juicier real-life issues. 
33 The “arc of crisis” has been used by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1978 as the description of an area stretching from 
the Indian subcontinent in the east to the Horn of Africa in the west, with the Middle East as its core. This arc 
holds in its subsoil about three-fourths of the estimated world oil reserves, and it was and still is the locus of one 
of the most intractable conflicts between Zionism and Arab nationalism. Given the increasing tensions between 
America and the Islamic world, the term “arc of crisis 2.0” may revitalise its geopolitical sense towards 
American global counter-terrorism (Rehman 2013). 
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reflected the imagined geography of the ‘War on Terror’ by utilizing what Deck34 (2004) has 
seen as “a cult of ultra-patriotic xenophobes whose greatest joy is to destroy, regardless of 
how racist, imperialistic, and flimsy the rationale” for the simulated battle may be. 
Distant terrorism can arouse more fear for its uncertainty, invisible terrorism has the same 
effect for its obscureness.  For this sake Washington recalls its enunciation from late 1970s to 
reconstruct the ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to 
Afghanistan. By the eastern end of this arc China is located as an emerging great competitor 
who is striving to gain more authority in regional security issues. Will the US continue to 
follow its founders’ tolerance and openness, even towards regimes that do not mirror the 
American values and geopolitical interests? Will China’s nationalism and the U.S. ultra-
patriotism conflate to rebuild a regional or even global imagined geography of terrorism? 
With the approach of “Imagined Geography”, we want to reemphasise that the cultivated soil 
for terrorism is also partly a consequence of policies of cultural hegemony. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We view terrorism as several couplets of tensions so that we can comprehend better its 
complexity beyond the mere dimension between terrorism and counter-terrorism. The ETIM 
issue is a typical example of confused nationalism and separatism, of mixed concern for 
stability, regional security and global peace. The spatial expressions of terrorism in the sense 
of geopolitics are not limited to be material; moreover no terrorism is static for our time-lapse 
perception. We also need to reiterate that there is no universally accepted definition of 
terrorism, while ideological prejudice or imaginative prognosis about the existence of 
terrorism may lead us to a pre-emptive designation of terrorist groups. The two big players 
U.S. and China, situated in a mutually dependent relationship, instead of returning to a 
worldwide climate of a new Cold War, should learn to rebuild mutual trust in the face of 
global terrorist threats.  
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Ethno-Nationalism and the Construction of Hindu Identity  
Tobias Scheu  
 
Abstract 
The violence of Hindu extremism in modern India has increased in the last years. The right-wing 
Hindutva movement wants to create an Indian state, which consists only of a homogenous hinduistic 
society and culture. The article examines how the mobilisation of people and the rising of the 
Hindutva movement could be explained by historical considerations and thus post-colonial 
identification processes within Indian culture and society. In order to explain this, the organisational 
structure and the contents of the movement will be examined and connected to the cultural and 
historical discourse in modern day India. By doing so there will be a relationship established between 
identification processes in spatial and societal discourse.  
 
1. Introduction  
India, with a population of 1.028.737.436 (India 2013) at present, is one of the largest 
democracies in the world. It consists of different languages, ethnic groups and religious 
factions. Due to the fact that there are many different religious groups, India is mostly known 
for the religious group of Hindus and thus could be called as the land of Hinduism. But only 
few people know that India has the second largest Muslim population (after Indonesia) in the 
world (Reetz 2007). Despite this enormous population, Muslims in India are a religious 
minority (see table 1).  
Looking at the development in India over the last 30 years, a rising of national chauvinism 
against Muslim people can be observed. This national chauvinism was started by the Hindu 
right-wing nationalist movement (Hindutva), which has the aim to create “a Hindu state in 
which minorities must assimilate to the majority culture and language, revere the Hindu 
religion, and glorify Hindu race and culture” (Marshall 2008: 119). This movement also leads 
to violent actions against Muslims places of worship, recent example was  the demolition of 
the the Babri-mosque in Ayodhoa.  
Due to the fact that Hindu people represent the majority of religious people in India, one must 
ask how this violence and the rising of the Hindutva movement can be explained. It seems 
unlikely that they want to gain special religious rights by attacking Muslim people. Instead, it 
seems that the movement is rooted in contexts of the post-colonial othering and identity 
processes against the Muslims and thus violence could be seen as a way of creating a common 
Indian identity through emphasising the expression of a common ‘Hindu nation’. In this 
article I want to present some aspects how the Hindutva movement uses an identity concept, 
which merges spatial and territorial identities to mobilise people by creating the vision of a 
common Hindu nation (Hindu Rasthra).  
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2. Theoretical Considerations  
Identity could be defined as a social concept, which describes the feelings of an individual 
towards its own role within a society and thus, this identity is learned by the socialisation 
within a specific group and culture (Hilmann 2007: 355). In this sense it can be argued that in 
the process of socialisation and self-identification there are processes of classifications 
towards other people, to segregate oneself by distributing them in groups. But this segregation 
is influenced by the social status of a person and thus varies between cultures and peoples 
around the world. In this way every categorisation of people in groups (e. g. castes) could be 
understood in terms of social ascription by peoples and groups. In conclusion, identity (i. e. 
religious identity) is less an objective concept to categorise and describe people, it is much 
more a social construction (Reuber 2012: 45). Identity is always a fluid concept embedded in 
social contexts and spaces.  
Space and territory identification processes also go along with the attributed social differences 
of groups (e. g. religion, culture, sex) and therefore groups identify themselves both, with 
space and a special ascription of social difference to these spaces. This means, space also 
borders between groups. Space is an areal representation of the socially ‘ascribed’ differences 
between groups and therefore space has specially characteristics (Reuber 2012: 45). These 
characteristics are connected with the group ascriptions, like Muslim people or Hindu people. 
With spatial representation there is also a space-oriented identification and development of a 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006) by each group with relation to space. So due to the 
imagination of special spatial differences ascribed to groups, the rise of the feeling of a 
common identity starts, and this imagination leads to a hegemonic concept that influences the 
social practices and social institutions (e. g. social systems) (Reuber 2012:49) and also the 
material culture (e. g. the meaning of symbols) of a society.  Hence, the process of self-
identification merges with the ‘ascribed’ spatial differences. In the case of religious conflicts 
spatial identification is also merged with religious practices and therefore also with national 
and ethnic identities (Rinschede 1999: 108). 
It must be added, that “identities are always formed in relation to others and that a constitutive 
link exists between identity and recognition” (Bhargava 2003: 12). Therefore, identity 
influences how people see their environment and shapes their interactions with other people. 
In this way identification processes by the Hindutva must consist of territorial concepts and 
also cultural (religious) practices to help people identify themselves with the Hindutva 
movement and potentially change their minds to attack Muslim people. To establish such 
change of mind, one must ask how the Hindutva movement executed this influence over the 
Indian people and how it connects to Indian discourse about identity, culture and present 
debate.  
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3. Influences on the Hindutva movement  
3. 1 The Hindu-Identity?  
Until India’s independence in 1947, achieved through the struggles of prominent activists like 
Mahatma Ghandi and Jawaharlal Nehru, India was a colony of the British crown. The Indian 
people were administrated by British officers and bureaucrats. With the aim to administrate 
the Indian people, they had to measure how many people lived in India and to find a way to 
describe the people. In this context the term “Hindu” and also “caste” was first established by 
the British colonial power to describe and categorise the people who lived on the Indian 
subcontinent. With the establishment of the description of the people as “Hindu”, an 
‘imagined community’ (Benedict Anderson) was created. Afterwards, this categorisation 
ascribed group belongings were internalised by the Indian population. This internalising then, 
lead to the establishment of ‘real’ social differences. This eventually resulted in group 
identities, which differentiated people against other people within a spatial context (Wolf and 
Schultens 2009: 165).  
The categorisation of the Indian people into a Hindu majority and a Muslim minority is 
therefore a result of the British colonial project (Oza 2007: 155). After the British had left and 
India had become independent, the groups gained strong self-identification around their 
ascribed identities (e. g. religion, caste). In this sense, the Hindutva movement carried on the 
British description process. This meant, instead of a common British enemy, that the 
Hindutva movement reinterpreted the historical context in a new way. Foreign religions 
became the new enemy, which had to be destroyed. This leads to a cultural identification with 
a homogenous religious culture.  
 
3. 2 Cultural Influences  
The Hindutva movement was also influenced by the historical concept of the two Indian 
nations, which consists of the question what India truly defines. These definitions orbit the 
question whether ‘India’ is based on a territorial concept or if “India” is more of a cultural 
concept (Wolf/Schultens 2009: 166). This would have huge implications in reference to 
cultural and spatial identification processes within and between groups. This debate around 
the cultural or territorial concept of India also leads to an enhancement of the religious group 
identity. The groups of Muslim and Hindu people identify themselves mostly within a cultural 
concept. The tensions between these groups also lead to the post-colonial separation of the 
Indian state in the “Islamic Republic of India” (Pakistan) and the “Hindu-State India” 
(Rinschede 1999: 108; Hörig 1999: 126).With the establishment of the two states, also the 
religious groups moved into the particular state of their religion. However, it could be noticed 
that a lot of Muslim people stayed in India (Reetz 2007) and don’t moved to Pakistan. Even 
toady, this strong religious separation is observable in India and Pakistan (s. tables 1 and 2).  
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The Hindutva movement connects to cultural and spatial separation, when it proclaims the 
Muslim minority as an inner enemy. Due to this historical discourse, the Hindu-state India 
should only consist of Hindu people. Consequently, there is a historical ideal of a 
homogenous Indian state with one single culture.  
This spatial separation and cultural differentiation between the religious groups within India 
was further supported by western Orientalists, which sought to explore the “deeper India” and 
therefore differences between the cultures. This ascription in Western culture, lead Indians to 
ask what differentiates India from other nations and cultures. This question about the “true” 
India, its history and its culture, lasts till today. Hence, it could be argued that this search of 
the true India lasted up till today and that the Hindutva movement used this search in its own 
way. This is organised by emphasising the Hindu culture and Hindu society as the cultural 
foundation of India. With this cultural concept, which is also embedded within a spatial 
context, the Hindutva movement is therefore a kind of identity framework for the upper 
classes of India, which may possibly loosen the power in the context of globalisation and the 
weakening of national identities and could therefore deny the modernisation of the Indian 
societal system (Bhargava 11f.).  
The Hinudvta movement is further successful, because it falls back on the Indian traditions, 
which are rooted back in the ancient Indian times and shaped Indian society since then 
(Mahlhotra 1990: 174). These traditions – traditional pluralisms, holism, and a hierarchic 
social system order (Mahlhotra 1990: 175ff.), play crucial roles within the Indian identity 
framework. Because on one side they offer an identity framework to conservative people and 
on the other side, they emphasise Hindusim as a tolerant religion, which respects individual 
religious practices. Therefore, Hinduism shouldn’t be called an organised religion (e. g. 
Islam). In this way the Hindutva movement uses this traditional religious insecurity of a non-
organised religion to nowadays create something like an organised Hindusim with a ‘true’ 
interpretation, which has central gods and a common culture. Further it could be argued that 
the insecurity of Hinduism also leaves place for multiple possibilities of religious 
interpretations. So the Hindutva movement gives a framework and orientation within the 
different religious groups and practices by proclaiming what makes a Hindu a ‘right’ Hindu.  
 
3. 3 Institutional Influences  
Despite these historical and cultural influences and discourses, which enable the Hindutva 
movement to mobilise people by group identification on religious grounds, the conception of 
different religious groups is also influenced by the Indian constitution.  
The Indian constitution defines India as a secular religious state, which guarantees “all 
persons (…) equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice 
and propagate religion” (India 2008: 13). This secularism also serves as a foundation for the 
Hindutva movement to act as an religious movement against other religious groups (e. g. 
Muslims) since the constitution construes the term ‘Hindu’ “as including reference to persons 
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professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious 
institutions shall be construed accordingly” (India 2008: 13). That means, the term Hindu is 
used here in an historical and cultural way, by connecting the religious practices of Sikh, Jaina 
or Buddhist with their territorial origin in India. Other religions (e. g. Christians or Muslims) 
therefore cannot be ‘real’ Hindus and therefore the people who lived on the Indian 
subcontinent are culturally those who belong to Hinduism. In this way it is construed by the 
Indian constitution. This framework of differentiation between religious groups, especially 
others (e.g. Muslims) and Hindus is a clear proposition of the othering process.  
This framework of emphasising religious and cultural practices also supports the 
differentiation between “them” (Muslim) and “us” (Hindu). This also happens to some extent 
in Indian legislation. Since the state is secular and wants to support cultural diversity within, 
the Indian state also allowed some religious (Muslim) communities to use their own Islamic 
familiy law (Hörig 1999: 128). This legislation in favour of minorities is therefore seen by 
traditionalist groups as a threat to the majority, hence secularism is in this case used to favour 
minorities (Bhargava 2003: 16). This legislation and the special status of such groups within 
the Indian identity context, also creates insecurities among the Indian population. It is unlikely 
that such legislation did not influence the rise of the Hindutva movement by giving the 
minority special rights, which also stresses the othering process between the groups and hence 
supports the identity building processes within the groups.  
To sum it up, there are a lot of historical and cultural factors that influenced the rising of the 
Hindutva movement, but the most influences that lead to the rise of the Hindutva movement 
can be traced back to the post-colonial history of India. The mentioned discourses mostly 
influence thoughts and actions of individuals, but to explain how the Hindutva movement 
rises and gains attention we must also look which contents are proclaimed by the movement 
and how it is organised to enforce its ideology within the Indian population. The next chapter 
will analyse these questions by looking at some theoretical considerations about the 
mobilisation of people and how the Hindutva movement reached its goal with its 
organisational structure and content.  
 
4. What is Hindutva and how does it work?  
4.1 Theoretical considerations  
To explain how the Hindutva movement uses identification processes to mobilise people, it 
must first be considered that the role of religion in this context should be seen as an important 
factor of mobilising people (Hasenclever/Don Juan 2007: 10f.). Especially in India “religion 
is […] constitutive of society and the traditional vision of life is holistic” (Madan 1989:116). 
This mobilisation process is used by the Hindutva movement through a reinterpretation and 
the creation of a common Indian identity. Hindusim must therefore be seen as some kind of 
political religion, which is primarily instrumentalised by religious groups and people within a 
social system (Bötticher/Meres 2012: 24) to gain power.  
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That means religion as an explanation variable of Hindu extremism is important to reflect the 
role of religion for establishing the social system of India and the shaping of power relations 
between the groups within the caste system (for example Dumont 1976). The rise of the 
Hindutva movement and their clashes with other religious groups, is not only to religious 
topics, also territorial, political, and ethnical elements play a crucial role in religious conflicts 
(Rinschede 1999: 126) within the Indian nation. Due to the fact that through globalisation 
religious identities are put under pressure by reshaping religious meanings and also religious 
authority (Hefner 1998), anti-modern movements gain power. It must be noted, that the 
Hindutva movement itself is located within the discourse of minority rights. The conservative 
members of the movements are afraid of losing their privileges as Hindus (Mahlhotra 1990: 
181). Therefore, the movement wants to re-establish the privileges by emphasising the 
importance of a ‘real Hindu culture’ to maintain the traditional way of Hindu life (with castes) 
and create a common culture.  
 
4.2 Contents of Hindutva and societal implications  
The thematic contents of the movement are rooted in the Hindutva manifest of Vinayak 
Damodar Savarkar, who wrote about Hindutva as a concept, to create a homogenous society 
of Hindus (Hindu Sanghatan), with a powerful Hindu state which is dominated by Hindu 
culture (Hindu Rasthra) (Wolf 2008: 27). This concept merges territorial space identification 
with cultural societal concept that consists of a homogenous society. This combination also 
includes some othering process against different religious groups, which are not Hindu. For 
Savarkar, Hindu is not just a religious practice, it is also a concept of belief, which refers to a 
spatial identification with India. ‘Real’ “Hindu are persons who regard this land from the 
Indus to the sea as their fatherland as well as their holy land” (Bhargava 2003:12). Following 
this statement from Savarkar, religions other than the “classical Indian ones” are not real 
Hindu religions. People, who live in the spatial place of India, may practice these religions, 
but following Savarkar, they aren’t Indians, because they don’t believe in India as their holy 
land. Therefore the othering process is much more supported by this belief. By this definition 
the Hindutva movement gains additional ideological power, which favours only the majority 
of Indian people. But this belief and view also simplify the religious distribution in India, 
because most of the Indian Muslims and Christians are converted from lower Hinduism castes 
(e. g. Dalits, Adivasi) to reach a better social position (Hörig 1999: 126). Since they have their 
home in spatial India, these people aren’t included in Savarkars ideology. They lost their 
status as Indians, because they have a different belief than the Hindu religion.  
Following this argument, the framework of a common identity is created by a common spatial 
territory and a common belief in the same religious practices. Therefore, this 
conceptualisation offers an identity framework for conservative people, who are feared of 
losing the (religious) identity through the social modernisation of India.  
170 
 
The Hindutva movement is therefore best described as an ethno-nationalist movement that 
defines ethnic groups by a religious spatial ascription. It is further a cultural movement, which 
wants to create an identification framework for Indians by emphasizing and glorifying the 
Hindu culture of the past by three main pillars: A common nation (Rahstra), a common race 
(Jati) and a common civilisation (Sanskrit) (Wolf 2008: 27f.). Additionally, it denies the 
cultural heritage of the Muslim rulers to the Indian culture in arts and architecture (Ratan 
1998: 207). In this position the denial of the Muslim culture today is also assigned to the 
history and henceforth the Indian history is also reinterpreted in the context of alienation 
against Muslim groups.  
Following Hasenclever and Don Juan (2007: 13), the effectiveness to mobilise people 
depends on the contextual interpretation and the institutionalisation of these contextual 
religious interpretations: If a specific interpretation of religion or history becomes an 
institutionalised ‘moment’ in society (e. g. culture, political parties, television) it influences 
the discourse about a topic and hence it influences the identity building process of a person 
and thereby the perception of their own environment. Within long-standing conflicts between 
groups (e. g. Muslims vs. Hindus) radical religious messages get a basis to be institutionalised 
within social institutions (e.g. political parties) and lead to violence actions against other 
groups (Hasenclever and Don Juan 2007: 14).   
By emphasising the spatial and ethno-religious separation between different groups, by 
claiming that only Hindus have the rights to be part of the Indian nation and society, the 
Hindutva movement also creates an imagination of an India, that doesn’t consist of Muslim 
people. As a result all Muslim symbols, which are connected with an active Muslim presence 
(Oza 2007: 154) must be destroyed in public space. By destroying the Babri-Mosque in 
Ayodha, which was proclaimed by the Hindutva-movement to be the birthplace of the Hindu-
god Ram the Hindutva movement reinterpreted the public space. This action has been a 
turning point of religious conflicts in India, as it symbolised to the Indian people a re-
establishment of a common Hindu religion and culture (Wolf 2008:30), which doesn’t just 
exist in mind but also materialises in manifest culture.  
This re-establishment of a Hindu-culture is supported by the organisational structure of the 
Hindutva movement. The main components of the movement could be summarised under the 
term of Sangh Parivar (family), which consists of the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), 
the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) (Wolf 2008: 28ff) 
and together they form a nationwide cultural and political network (Bhargava 2003: 11). By 
using all societal potential and options, the implementations of the Hindutva manifest happens 
trough the usage of “memory, emotion, prejudice, religious difference, and the generalized 
deprivation to advance their extremist agenda. They are inventing a new anti-Muslim 
Hinduism” (Bhargava 2003: 14), which is implemented in society by the network of different 
organisations, within the Sang Parivar to establish the cultural and identification framework 
for Hindutva (s. Wolf 2008: 28f.):   
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• The RSS was established in 1925 and is a voluntary union with the aim to 
establish the Hindu national state by focusing on the Hinduistic conception of a 
societal system and therefore the denying of the democratic system as not suitable 
for a Hinduistic state.  
• The VHP is a common organisation that unites the different Hindu groups over the 
world under one umbrella group. In this group the Sangh Parviar gains influence to 
the different groups and can change it ideological. It emphasised a pan-Indian 
Hinduism, which consists of common rituals, feasts and gods and therefore it also 
emphasised the peaceful character of Hindusim in strong opposition to the violent 
history of the Muslims rulers. But it also emphasised the inherently violent 
character of Hinduistic gods (Ratan 1998: 205) to legitimise the use of violence.  
• The BJP is the political party that wants to implement the framework of Hindutva 
in political concepts and legislations.  
Obviously the social movement Hindutva did not only use the political system in order to 
create a Hindu state, but also utilised other sources outside the classical political fields to gain 
power. The Hindutva movement is therefore a modern movement, which uses activities 
within a societal network (Wolf 2008: 29) to implement ideological ideas within society and 
thus creates a framework for identity processes by differentiating between different religious 
groups. Further the different organisations cover the whole Indian society with all cultural and 
societal aspects. Therefore, the movement reaches almost the whole population of India with 
its ideology. 
 
5. Final remarks - Hindutva as a Threat to Indian society?   
Hindu-nationalism uses the historical Indian discourses to reinterpret Indian history and uses 
these to create a new common identity framework, which denies the existence of Muslim 
culture and other religious groups. This framework emphasises some kind of ethno-
nationalism within the Indian society, which is used to mobilise “the masses on ethno-
religious grounds – through stigmatization and emulation” (Bhargava 2003: 12) on historical 
terms and cultural discourses, which could be backtracked to India’s colonial times. In this 
period the term Hindu was used by the colonists to describe the population and therefore 
group identity processes on this classification were established over history. In this process 
the differentiation in India between Muslim and Hindu people got stronger and it further lead 
to the rise of the right-wing Hindutva movement.  
This movement concentrates on the emphasis on religious difference and uses them to 
establish a framework based on cultural and spatial factors to create a common Hindu nation 
by declaring the Muslim population as an inner enemy. Despite the movement spread in all of 
India, the people critically view it, as it is “becoming concerned about the strategies being 
employed to propagate the movement’s message – in particular the use of violence” (Ratan 
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1998: 214).  In this sense the movement will be challenged in future judged by their members. 
The marginalisation and alienation of Muslim groups work within the context of Muslim 
groups as enemies by identification through the Hindutva movement. Since the attacks of 9/11 
the global perception of militant religious extremism by Muslims increased. This fact fits 
perfectly in the Hindutva framework of Muslims as enemies. They are not envisioned as 
enemies anymore, but pose as a real threat to the Indian society and nation through their 
attacks. But this insecurity between imagined enemy and real enemy “suits their purposes [of 
the Hindutva movement] perfectly, and this is precisely what Indian politics and society now 
presents to them” (Bhargava 2003: 17). This insecurity is a chance to gain peace at the 
societal fault lines between these religious groups.  
 
Table 1: Religious Groups in India 2001 (absolute and percent)  
 Number %   
Hindu 827.578.868 80,5   
Muslim  138.188.240 13,4   
Christian  24.080.016 2,3   
Sikh 19.215.730 1,9   
Buddhist 7.955.207 0,8   
Jain  4.225.053 0,4   
Other Religious Communities  6.639.626 0,6   
Total 1.028.610.328 100,0   
Source: Census 2001: 
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/religion.aspx (accessed 
22.7.2013) 
 
Table 2: Religious Groups in Pakistan 2013 (percent)  
Religious Groups in Pakistan 
2013 Number  %   
Muslim n. a. 96,28   
Christian n. a. 1,59   
Hindu (Jati) n. a. 1,6   
Qadiani (Ahmadi) n. a. 0,22   
Scheduled Castes n. a. 0,25   
Others n. a. 0,07   
n. a. = non avaiable       
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics:      
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/population-religion (accesed 
22.7.2013)   
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Analysis of the Main Actors and Dimensions of the Northern 
Ireland Conflict 
Ceyhun Güngör, Cathrin Kiemel 
 
Abstract 
The conflict in Northern Ireland was one of the most crucial ethno-social conflicts with 
religious background and is still a critical issue in the British society. Main events as the 
Bloody Sunday or the Good Friday Agreement influenced the process of “the Troubles” and 
caused multi-dimensional impacts. It is also important to consider personalities, such as 
Margaret Thatcher or Bishop Patrick Buckley, in order to understand specific developments 
in the conflict process. Especially the role of the church and state institutions is significant for 
the understanding of the conflict roots.  
 
1. Introduction and methodology 
The Irish island is divided into two different parts. The first, southern Ireland, which is also 
called the Republic of Ireland is independent and mainly consists of Roman Catholics. 
Contrary to this, the northern region namely Northern Ireland belongs to the United Kingdom, 
with a majority of Protestants (see figure 1). Out bounding from this situation, the conflict in 
Northern Ireland is based on the differences between the two majority groups on the Irish 
island. The Nationalists (Republicans) are mainly Catholics and understand the whole island 
of Ireland as a natural entity which should be independent. In comparison to this, Unionists 
(Loyalists), who are mostly Protestants, want to remain part of the United Kingdom (Otto 
2010: 9ff.). 
 
Fig. 1: Religion in Northern Ireland, 2011  
Source: Oown chart based on Devenport 2012 
A significant phase of the conflict in Northern Ireland was the time between the civil rights 
march on 5 October 1968 in London Derry and the assignment of the Good Friday Agreement 
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(Belfast Agreement) on 10 April 1998. This period was the peak during the conflict, which is 
known as “The Troubles” and characterized by many violent actions, such as terrorist attacks 
and oppressive governmental interventions. This strife caused about 3.600 fatalities and 
50.000 injured victims and still is present in the consciousness of Northern Ireland (BBC 
2013a). 
Reviewing the scientific debates on the Troubles there are currently two main directions 
which refer to the roots of the conflict. One direction states that the reason for the conflict is 
based on socio-economic problems. The other direction asserts that the different fundamental 
convictions of the Catholics and Protestants are the main factor for the conflict (Kienzle 2003: 
7). In order to focus on this scientific debate it is important to analyse the impact of the church 
and the state, which are the two major actors. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse the 
religious and governmental dimension of the conflict in Northern Ireland.  
In order to illustrate the meaning of the selected events and to define their general influence, 
the paper develops a detailed characterisation of their multi-dimensional impacts.  
This paper describes first the three events of the Northern Ireland Conflict - Bloody Sunday, 
Good Friday Agreement and The Republican Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison. On this 
foundation, the two main actors, state and church, will be investigated more closely and 
linked to important persons and the three case studies. The following chapter deals with the 
analysis of the political, emotional, religious, peaceful and violent impacts of the three main 
events. Finally the outlook will show that the Northern Ireland conflict is still a present issue.    
The main method in this paper is a secondary and hermeneutical analysis of literature in order 
to receive consolidated background information with the focus on historical events and 
important figures. Especially for the whole understanding of the conflict, it is significant to 
concentrate on the historical context. Referring to the importance of the main events, the aim 
is to identify their impacts on the society and policy. The method therefore is to form logical 
categories which are strongly connected to the impacts of the main events.  
 
2. Analysis of the main conflict events and actors 
This chapter deals with the role of the main events and figures of the church and the state. The 
first part is an overview of main events and figures that are chosen by their importance. 
Through the entire literature analysis, the events Bloody Sunday, Good Friday Agreement and 
the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison were significantly present and therefore these events 
can be seen as relevant for the whole conflict. Analogous to this, the main actors for the 
church namely Bishop Patrick Buckley, Father Patrick Ryan, Kenny McClinton and for the 
state, Margaret Thatcher, John Hume and Tony Blair were identified as denotative. Finally, 
the main events and characters will be analysed concerning their influence on the Northern 
Ireland conflict. 
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2.1 Main events in the development of the conflict 
The Bloody Sunday  
The so-called Bloody Sunday was one of the most important events in the history of the 
Northern Ireland Conflict. On Sunday, 30 January 1972, an organised illegal demonstration 
by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association took place in Derry. The parade sought to 
protest against the ban on all marches of 9 August 1971 (Wichert 1994: 201). 
In the course of this parade, it was ambushed and demonstrators were attacked with stones. As 
the situation began to get out of control, soldiers of the first Parachute Regiment were 
instructed to arrest most of the demonstrators. At the intervention of the Paratroopers, thirteen 
people were killed and the same number injured. One of the injured died a few months later. 
The British Army defended this human loss as self-defence of the paratroopers, while most of 
the people, which were present on that day, saw it as murder (BBC History 2013b). This was 
mainly the case, because the injured and people killed were attacked from behind (Otto 2010: 
101). Lord Widgery, Chief Justice of Great Britain issued a report documenting, that the 
Army behaved correctly at all times of the intervention. Later, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
allowed a public inquiry, which determined twelve years later the innocence of the victims 
and thus the guilt of the army. The next Prime Minister, David Cameron, strongly criticised 
the happenings of the Bloody Sunday and the role of the military (BBC History 2013b). 
 
The Good Friday Agreement 
The Good Friday Agreement between the governments of the United Kingdom, the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland on 10 April 1998 is one of the most important agreements 
during the conflicts in Northern Ireland. This agreement implements consent between all 
parties and aims at stopping the violence of the Troubles period. The Agreement contains a 
number of regulations with the aim of demilitarising Northern Ireland and boosting its self-
determination. Furthermore, the Republic of Ireland abdicates the reintegration of Northern 
Ireland with its “six counties” and all people in Northern Ireland have the right of upholding 
dual citizenship of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Regardless of the smaller 
violent incidents between the parties after the agreement, the Good Friday Agreement was 
essential for the whole peace process in the Northern Ireland conflict (Wolff 2003: 14ff.). 
 
The Republican Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison  
During the Troubles, large parts of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irish 
National Liberation Army (INLA) were kept in British prison. These prisoners were treated 
like usual criminals, but they demanded to be seen as prisoners of war. The first hunger strike 
in 1980 was connected to certain allowances referring to their status in prison. Exclusive 
rights, such as communicating with other prisoners or refusing the prison work were finally 
permitted by the British government and lead to the end of the first hunger strike. Later they 
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decided to start a second hunger strike in 1981 as the prisoners still had to wear prison clothes 
which still marked them as usual criminals. On October 1981 the second hunger strike ended 
after the deth of ten members of the IRA and INLA. The reason for the ending was the 
stepwise acceptance of the British government of all claims, including the permission to wear 
civil clothes in prison. The hunger strikes are also associated with the expression “H-Block”, 
which was the cellblock of the striking prisoners (BBC History 2013c). 
 
2.2 The role of the church  
This chapter analyses the church as an important actor in the Northern Ireland conflict. The 
first part focuses on the three main characters Bishop Patrick Buckley, Father Patrick Ryan 
and Kenny McClinton and outlines their role in the conflict. The second part focuses on the 
role of the church referring to the main events described above.  
 
2.2.1 Main church figures 
Bishop Patrick Buckley 
Patrick Buckley (born 1952) is one of the most controversial clerics who was in constant 
conflict with other members of the Roman Catholic church. He is a former priest of the 
Catholic church in Ireland who was excommunicated, due to his bishop ordination to an 
independent church. Bishop Buckley is often called Maverick because of his unusual and 
liberal thinking towards celibacy and mixed marriages. Beside this he often criticized the role 
of the Church during the Troubles. Referring to Buckley, the church often regarded the 
violence on the streets as a “cruel business” but at the same time they were very contained. 
Buckley was one of the few clerics in Northern Ireland which had the courage to be active in 
order to stop the violence. The active role of Bishop Buckley leads to several violent attacks 
against him. Buckley’s criticism is not just about his own church but also against all churches 
in Northern Ireland. He believed that the churches are cynical, manipulative, preoccupied with 
power and controlling their respective communities. The role of Bishop Patrick Buckley 
during the Troubles shows the modern, liberal and active side of the church, trying to solve 
the conflict thourgh cleric authority (Dillon 1998: 136ff.). 
 
Father Patrick Ryan 
Regarding the Troubles, the catholic priest Patrick Ryan (born 1930) was a Christian 
missionary and on the other hand he was one of the main financial supporters of the IRA. 
Father Ryan travelled throughout Europe and collected money for the IRA to provide arms 
and explosives. This way, Patrick Ryan became one of the leading figures of the Provisional 
IRA. Furthermore, he was obliquely involved in many IRA bombings, such as the Hyde Park 
bombing on two Horse Guards in 1982. Therefore in the media he was often named as the 
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“bombing priest”. Father Ryan was operating through an international terrorist system with a 
network of secret bank accounts in order to find new financial supply lines for the IRA. Since 
Scotland Yard realised his important role, Father Ryan sought refuged in alternating places all 
around Europe. He was arrested and released several times in different countries and finally 
he was convicted in 1993 in Ireland’s Special Criminal Court. The case of Father Patrick 
Ryan shows that even religious figures can play a key role in terrorism (Davies 1988 and 
Clutterbuck 1992: 67ff.). 
 
Kenny McClinton 
Kenny McClinton (born 1947) is a protestant pastor and former member of the Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA). Due to his military background, he was an active member of the Ulster 
Freedom Fighters elite squad and was involved in many terrorist attacks. One of his most 
famous attacks during the Troubles in 1977 was the assassination of Harry Bradshaw, a 
Protestant bus driver. McClinton had thought that Bradshaw was a Catholic. The whole UDA 
felt sorry about this terrible mistake and a letter with money was sent to Bradshaw’s the 
widow. On 27 August 1977 MacClinton was convicted of two killings (including the 
Bradshaw case) and finally sent to the Maze Prison. During his imprisonment McClinton 
converted to Baptism and becoming a “born-again Christian”. He was released from prison in 
1993 and became a Baptist pastor in Texas where he preached a fundamentalist Protestantism. 
The case of Kenny McClinton shows, that not only catholic but also some of the Protestant 
clerics were involved in terrorist attacks during the Troubles (Dillon 1998: 23ff.). 
 
2.2.2 The position of churches in the framework of the main events 
The Good Friday Agreement 
The Protestant and the Catholic churches welcomed the Good Friday Agreement and for them 
it was an important step towards peace between Catholics and Protestants. The most 
important regulation for the church in the Good Friday Agreement was that the government 
would become “post sectarian” in order to build up a more secular system. This regulation 
was seen as a part of the peace process by keeping the religion out of political issues. The 
religious dimension in political debates between Catholics and Protestants was often seen as 
an obstacle for a peaceful solution. The problem with secularisation of politics was that the 
Northern Irish community and all parts of social life were closely linked to their faith. The 
place of birth, schools, sport teams and the district in which people live are strongly linked to 
religion and church (McVeigh and Rolston 2007: 16ff.). On the one hand, the regulation of 
the Good Friday Agreement would imply that the churches would lose political and social 
influence and thereby also power. On the other hand, there would be a lack in people’s daily 
life, causing a vacuum. One good indicator to evaluate the process of the regulation is the 
school system of Northern Ireland which is mainly controlled by the churches and the 
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government. The only schools that had been secularised were the state schools. Besides, in the 
year 2000 only four per cent of the pupils went to so-called integrated or mixed schools which 
also shows the limited influence of the regulation (Kienzle 2003: 6ff.). The idea of 
constructing a “post-sectarian” system in Northern Ireland was well-intentioned. The 
difficulty is that the religious roots and the relation between church, state and community is 
still an important factor for the whole consciousness of Northern Ireland people. 
 
The Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison 
The hunger strike in Maze prison lead to the death of several persons. This fact caused civil 
commotions, especially the families of the dead hunger strikers were angry about the official 
definition of “suicide by starvation”, attributed by the government. From the families’ and 
paramilitaries’ perspective, the ten deaths were considered as murder committed by Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher or as killings caused by British intransigence. Focusing on the 
philosophical point of view the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison can be seen from two 
perspectives. The humanist thesis describes the case of a hunger strike as a right of self-
determination ones own life. From the humanist perspective the Hunger Strikes in the Maze 
prison can be seen as rational choices by the prisoners to commit suicide in order to express 
their political motives. The religious perspective, in contrast, considers suicide as an evil act. 
Life is seen more as a gift from God and therefore only God has the right to decide over life 
and death. In general, from the Christian standpoint the intended suicide through starvation is 
unmoral and unacceptable. The problematic situation of the Hunger Strike in the Maze prison 
is that the aim of the prisoners was not primarily to commit suicide but they just wanted to put 
the British government under pressure for the sake of their community. Furthermore, the 
religious dimension of the Northern Ireland conflict also had an influence on the perspective 
of the church referring to the hunger strikes. The Catholic church knew about the beneficial 
political effect of the hunger strikes on the British government. The hunger strikes were 
politically exploited from the Catholics and they are still a symbolic act for many in Northern 
Ireland. Considering this political sensitivity of the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison, there 
was never a justification from the religious perspective given by the Catholic church 
(O'Keeffe 2011: 349ff.). 
 
The Bloody Sunday 
It is a very impressing and famous picture of Father Edward Daly waving a bloodstained 
piece of cloth, while escorting a group with a wounded demonstrator through the batch. But it 
was more than just this action of Father Edward Daly: For the Catholic Church, the Bloody 
Sunday has a symbolic character, because it shows the evil brutality of British politics. Later 
on, the event was often metaphorically used by the church and the Northern Ireland civilian 
rights organisations to describe the violent political attitude of the British government. The 
more obvious behaviour of the Catholic and the Protestant churches was to disavow and 
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disidentify with the violent side of the Bloody Sunday event. Through this fact, there is not 
much information about the role of the church referring to the Bloody Sunday. But current 
movements show that the Protestant and Catholic churches have begun a peaceful dialogue in 
order to cope with the conflicts of the past (Conway 2010: 4). 
 
2.3 The role of the government 
Besides the churches, the British government played a decisive role in the Northern Ireland 
Conflict. Firstly, we will analyse the main governmental figures (Margaret Thatcher, John 
Hume and Tony Blair), who have influenced the conflict and then explores the government´s 
attitude and role in the three decisive events (Bloody Sunday, the Good Friday Agreement and 
the Hunger Strike) in the Northern Ireland Conflict.  
 
2.3.1 Main government figures 
 
Margaret Thatcher 
When the new conservative government, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was 
elected in 1979 its plan adopt a particularly harsh policy course against terrorism and 
separatism in Northern (Otto 2010: 113). Especially in times of the big hunger strike, 
Margaret Thatcher was adamantine, leading to the death of the prisoner Bobby Sands in 1981 
after 66 days without food. Thatcher’s strict attitude was highly controversial and after the 
funeral, which was attended by more than 100.000 people, many riots occured (Wolfrum, 
Arendes 2007: 193). 
On 12 October 1984 the IRA committed an attack on Mrs Thatcher. Members of the 
paramilitary organisation detonated a bomb in the Grand Hotel in Brighton, where the 
conservatives held their yearly party convention. This bomb attack caused five casualties. The 
IRA assumed responsibility and only regretted that they missed their primary target: Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. Mrs Thatcher seemed not to be intimidated continuing to meet 
with Garret FitzGerald only one month later. On 15 November 1985 they both signed the 
Anglo-Irish-Agreement in Hillsborough. This included the investiture of a permanent 
conference of both governments, guided by the British Northern Ireland minister and the Irish 
foreign minister. This Agreement constituted a schedule for the way to Northern Irish self-
administration (Otto 2010: 119f). 
 
John Hume 
John Hume, cofounder of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and later also its 
chairman, for the time played a role in the Northern Ireland Conflict in 1972 when he tried to 
make contact between the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), which wanted to call for 
armed truce, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). At that time, PIRA also 
182 
 
wanted to declare armed truce but William Whitelaw, the Northern Ireland minister, didn´t 
want to negotiate with terrorists (Otto 2010: 105). 
In 1993, John Hume and Gerry Adams, the president of the Irish-Republican party Sinn Féin, 
met on excitation of representatives of the Catholic Church several times for talks about the 
ending of Sinn Fein’s political isolation. Both politicians stressed their will to end the conflict 
and made clear that an agreement only had a chance if all parties on the island accepted it. On 
24 April they declared in the so-called Hume-Adams Document that the IRA was ready to 
give up the armed fight if the British government conceded the right of self-determination. 
Later, on 16 September, the Prime Minister John Major welcomed John Hume in his official 
seat Downing Street No. 10 where they formulated the Downing Street Declaration, a 
common peace declaration, binding both the Republicans and the Unionists (Allendörfer, 
Haase 2004: 109f). 
In 1998 the Danish member of the European Parliament, Jens-Peter Bonde, proposed John 
Hume and David Trimble for the Nobel Peace Prize. In his commemorative speech, the 
chairman of the Nobel Prize Committee appreciated the efforts of Hume and Trimble for a 
peaceful solution of the national, religious and social conflict in Ireland. He said that Hume 
was the one, who always worked most clearly and most emphatically for a peaceful 
termination among all political leaders. His principles were based on the Good-Friday-
Agreement of 1998 (Allendörfer, Haase 2004: 126f). 
 
Tony Blair 
For Tony Blair the Northern Ireland conflict wasn´t a central or even a personal concern but 
rather one of many major challenges (Knoll 2002: 132). Tony Blair was the first, who took 
the negotiations about peace in Northern Ireland one step further. He brought the Irish-
Republican Party Sinn Féin, known as the political extremist arm of the IRA, to the 
negotiation table in order to convince them of the necessity of non-violence. He offered the 
immediate involvement of Sinn Féin into the talks which came along with an armed truce of 
the IRA (Otto 2010: 132f). 
Tony Blair himself called the conflict in Northern Ireland senselessly, complicated and direful 
time-consuming. Blair’s assignment in Northern Ireland was relatively altruistic, as the 
conflict dominated politics there, but had turned unimportant in British politics. This means 
that he could have lost, but would not much in the case of success (Blair 2010: 161ff). During 
further peace talks Tony Blair used a feint to gain time for the election of the Northern Ireland 
minister: He suspended the Northern Irish autonomy for one day and thereby got another six 
weeks to fulfil the code of procedure (Otto 2010: 138f). Thus, Tony Blair was significantly 
involved in the peace negotiations and played a major role in resolving the Northern Ireland 
conflict.  
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2.3.2 The government positions in the framework of the main events 
The Bloody Sunday 
The violence that happened during the Bloody Sunday is always reported differently. In the 
English media, the violence against the state dominates the narrative. Violence executed by 
governmental groups in Northern Ireland was always denied or the responsibility was given to 
the other side. Assasinations, like the ones committed on Bloody Sunday were linguistically 
trivialized. Torture was often reinterpreted as physical maltreatment, disguising its cruelty 
(Beermann 2004: 70). 
As already described above, on 30 of January 1972, 14 Catholics were killed by the British 
Army. The Commander of the land forces in Northern Ireland, major general Robert Ford 
wanted to teach those - as he said – hooligans a lesson. He delegated, that the paratroopers 
were set at the end of the demonstration march in order to demonstrate that the British 
government was the primary target of the violence on Bloody Sunday (Otto 2010: 101). An 
investigation followed which found the British military not guilty and blamed agent 
provocateurs blameworthy for the 14 casualties (Moltmann 2008: 261). Only 38 years later, in 
2010, the families of the victims received an apology from the current Prime Minister of 
Great Britain, David Cameron. He admitted that the government was responsible for the 
violent behaviour of the military. The reason for this excuse was the so-called Saville Inquiry 
which was the longest and costliest investigation in British history. The report is based on 
2500 witness accounts and took twelve years. The Saville Inquiry declares that the 14 victims 
were totally innocent whereas the soldiers were completely guilty. Few of them lost their self-
control and acted without legal cause and in an unjustifiable way (Scarff 2010). After the 
occurrences in 1972 the British and the Irish government declared in the Sunningdale 
Agreement a tighter cooperation (Beck 2006: 405). 
 
The Good Friday Agreement 
The Good Friday Agreement emerged from peace talks between the government of Great 
Britain, the government of the Republic Ireland and the political parties in Northern Ireland, 
so it can be said that the state was definitively involved. Tony Blair brought the Irish-
Republican party Sinn Féin into the negotiations to convince them of the necessity to stop 
violence. The talks started halting and this is why the US-Senator George Mitchell, who 
chaired these conversations, declared that all parties had to agree on one document on 
Thursday before Easter in 1998. Under this time pressure he wanted to raise the awareness of 
all involved parties that a give-and-take was necessary to be successful. Finally, in the early 
morning of 10 April 1998, Mitchell submitted a proposal, which was signed on the same day 
(Otto 2010: 132ff). 
The Good Friday Agreement contains three major sections: It regulates the decentralised 
government in Northern Ireland and it defines the relationship between the Republic Ireland 
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and Northern Ireland as well as between Great Britain and Ireland. Thereby, this contract has 
set a foundation stone for a political realignment in Northern Ireland (Beck 2006: 405). 
Obviously, the Good Friday Agreement was more than a contract: It was the first reliable sign 
for lasting peace in Northern Ireland and has a strong symbolic meaning.  
 
The Republican Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison 
As described above, the hunger strike happened in two steps. Especially in the second part the 
British government was involved and discredited in the eyes of many observers by its way of 
handling it. When the prisoner Bobby Sands appealed for a hunger strike for improved prison 
conditions again, his intention had received the plentiful encouragement by the population on 
the streets. After Bobby Sands, every week another prisoner began to get on hunger strike. 
After the death of Frank McGuire for Fermanagh/South Tyrone, re-elections started, where 
Sands offered himself as a candidate to follow-up. He won a seat, but the House of Commons 
enacted a law allowing no prisoner to candidate for elections. Bobby Sands died on 5 May 
1981 after 66 days without food, leading to worldwide protests against the British government 
(Liftenegger 2013: 167f). This anger was in particular addressed to Margaret Thatcher, 
because of her unyielding attitude towards the inmates and the IRA in general (Multhaupt 
1988: 298). Referring to the hunger strikes Thatcher stated that this “is a matter for those who 
go on hunger strike and those who are encouraging them to do so. I am urging them not to 
die…It is they [the IRA] who are sentencing their own people to death, not me” (Campbell 
2008: 425) and about the death of Bobby Sands: “Mr Sands was a criminal. He chose to take 
his own life” (Fischer 2012: 14). 
The hunger strikes played an important symbolic role in the Northern Ireland conflict: The 
relationships between the state, the population and actors as the IRA became seriously 
degraded. Thus, the hunger strike was an important move within a process of strategic 
interactions between the IRA and the British state (Pettenkofer 2008: 75). 
 
 
3. Multi-dimensional impacts of the case studies 
Reviewing different case studies of ethno-socio-religious conflicts, there are specific 
dimensions that are often present during the whole strife (see figure 2).  
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Fig. 2: Dimensions of ethno-socio-religious conflict  
Source: own figure 
In general, a conflict is often linked to actions that determine terms of violence and peace. 
Focusing on these, the emotional and symbolic character within conflicts plays an important 
role and is often responsible for tightening or easing the whole situation. Analysing an ethno-
socio-religious conflict, the political and religious dimensions can be defined as counterparts 
or as an entity. Therefore, the religion and policy can be seen as frame conditions, which are 
essential to valid further influences, such as violence, peace, emotionality or symbolism. In 
the following the events of the Bloody Sunday, the Good Friday Agreement and the Hunger 
Strikes in the Maze prison will be analysed in terms of the dimensions highlighted in fig. 2. 
The results will be summarised below in table 1. 
 
The Bloody Sunday 
On the one hand, the Bloody Sunday can be analysed from the perspective of violence 
because of the violence that has been utilised by the British government against the 
demonstrators. On the other hand, it has also an intense emotional meaning for the whole 
community of Northern Ireland through the anger caused by the death of ten unarmed 
Catholic civilians. The political impact can be seen as a major long-lasting political aftermath. 
Especially Tony Blair and David Cameron were involved in the subsequent peace process, 
finally leading to the Good Friday Agreement. The most important impact is the symbolic 
character of this violent event which was the catalyst and starting point of the Troubles. The 
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Bloody Sunday often served as a symbol and justification for Catholic paramilitary groups in 
order to stimulate them for further violent actions. The religious dimension is given by the 
fact, that Protestant Paratroopers killed Catholics for belonging to the opposed group. 
 
The Good Friday Agreement 
The Good Friday Agreement was essential for the peace process in the Northern Ireland 
conflict. The fact that this peace agreement was made on a high political level shows the 
strong political dimension of the Good Friday Agreement. Furthermore, the agreement was a 
very important political milestone for the following peace negotiations between the UK, the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement is not only important 
for the political dimension but it also has a symbolic meaning: The serious efforts in solving 
the Northern Ireland conflict in a non-violent way. 
 
The Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison 
From the political perspective, the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison can be seen as a difficult 
and violent event. The British government was strongly under pressure because of the critical 
situation and public opinion during the hunger strikes. Many citizens felt solidarity with the 
striking prisoners and were emotionally touched by the suffering prisoners who fought and 
died for their goals. This emotional impact was the reason for many citizens to sympathize 
with the Catholic parliamentarians and become radical. The Hunger Strikes in the Maze 
prison have also a symbolic dimension for the whole conflict. Particularly the famous “H-
Block” is often used as a symbol for many Catholic paramilitaries in order to show that they 
would go to the extreme to enforce their political and ideological beliefs. Referring to the 
dimension of violence it can be stated that violence was indirectly triggered by the death of 
the hunger strikers. 
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Table 1: Multidimensional impacts on the case studies  
Source: own table 
 
4. Conclusion and outlook  
The work in this paper shows, that the two main actors, state and church, had a very strong 
influence on the whole process of the conflict in Northern Ireland. It has become apparent that 
for a deeper understanding of the conflict it is important to analyse the church and the state in 
context. Furthermore, the analysis of the three main incidents suggests that the impact of the 
state was more significantly, compared to the influence of the church. Most of the impacts 
that have been investigated in this paper were mostly political or symbolic and the religious 
dimension played a major role just by determining the belonging to one or the other faith 
group.  
The conflict of Northern Ireland is still an important issue for the present consciousness and 
politics of the UK, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Sporadic incidents can easily 
unravel the “old” conflict between Republicans and Unionist. For this, the flag issue in 
Northern Ireland is an illustrative example. In December 2012, the city council of Belfast 
decided not to fly the Union Jack flag which stands for the belonging to the United Kingdom. 
Many Unionists felt offended through this act and started to proclaim their dislike on the 
streets (Zaschke 2013). This demonstration escalated into a five days riot with Molotov 
cocktails, stones, burning cars and heavy police interference. This occurrence around a mere 
symbolic issue like the flag shows that the conflict is still deeply anchored in the awareness of 
the Northern Irish community (Kielinger 2013). Such disputes may well happen also in the 
future and therefore a better understanding of the roots of the conflicts is necessary to define 
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measures that can lead to long-lasting peace through emotional healing between the opposing 
groups. 
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The Growing Security “Threat” in European Cities 
Marcel Mondel 
 
Abstract 
This article deals with the issue of growing threats for European cities. The “threat” will be 
discussed from two points of view. On the one side there are the actual terrorist assaults in 
important urban centres of Europe and on the other side we find the consequences of these 
attacks in terms of intensifying surveillance policies. Firstly, the increasing amount of 
terrorist attacks in Europe in the last decade as well as the background of modern terrorism 
and its main aims will be examined. Often terrorists have been religiously radicalised and 
resort to violence to express their dissent with the prevailing social and political system in 
Europe. Secondly, the role of cities as preferred targets for terrorist-assaults will be exposed. 
After surveying this issue the consequences of the terrorist attacks, and therein especially the 
political measures, such as growing Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), militarisation of 
cities, restrictions and architecture, will be discussed. There Terrorism is a threat to the 
actual Lives of people I will follow the thoughts of the urbanist Stephen Graham by arguing 
that the increasing security-measures and the restriction of public space in cities can be a 
dangerous threat to modern urban life, too, but in a different way. 
 
1. Increasing terrorism in European cities 
Terrorism in Europe is a threat since the late seventies, when organisations such as the ETA 
or the RAF tried to enforce their political aims with bombings and through kidnapping. The 
goal of these, and mainly all other terrorist groups was to spread fear and terror among a 
group of people as large as possible and to urge the government to follow their political 
demands. To achieve these aims urban regions with a high density of people were preferred 
places for terrorist actions. After the turn of the Millennium, European cities faced a growing 
number of terrorist assassinations again which were increasingly religiously motivated. Even 
the rampage in Norway committed by Anders Breivik in July 2011 who pretended to protest 
against the perceived Islamisation of his home country was to some extent religiously 
motivated. But two of the most drastic assassinations had a fundamentalist Islamist 
background. One was the bombing in Madrid in March 2004, the assault with the most killed 
people since WWII. The declared assassins stated that their attacks were coordinated by Al-
Qaeda, although no direct linkage could be proven, and that their goal was to fight the western 
way of life (Sciolino 2004: n.p.). About one year later the Underground in London was hit by 
another dramatic terrorist attack. Here again the suspected assassins stated that their actions 
were motivated by the Jihad against the western world (Cowell 2005: n.p.). The importance of 
the religious background of these terrorists and the specific urban space they attacked will be 
discussed later in this article. As a consequence of this and other terrorist threats in urban 
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European centres, many national governments adjusted their security-law by extending the 
measures of surveillance, saving of data or restricting public space, e.g. with the PATRIOT 
Act in the USA or the “Anti-Terror Gesetze” (Anti-Terrorism Laws) in Germany, which were 
recently extended until 2015 (Zeit Online 2013: n.p.). In the following chapters I will briefly 
define what the term terrorism comprises and what its main aims are. The main part of the 
paper focuses on the development of the role of urban space in (terrorist) warfare, on cities as 
symbols for the Western way of modern life, and therein the concept of urbicide. Finally, the 
political consequences of the terrorist attacks and the threat for modern urban life by 
intensifying surveillance policies will be debated in the second part of the article.  
 
2. The role of the city in terrorist attacks 
Cities have always been primary targets in wars. In former time where nations fought against 
nations, cities have been important strategical sites which had to be conquered to gain victory 
over the enemy. But the way conflicts were carried out has changed drastically in the last 
decades. With globalisation, modern wars become more complex involving also unknown 
enemies who do not represent territorial nation states. Terrorist organisations like Al-Quaeda 
are no longer bound to a certain place, making it difficult to counter these groups. On the 
other hand, many terrorists don’t fight against single nations but against a specific way of life.  
This could be specified as the “Western way of life”. It represents values such as democracy, 
liberalism, capitalism and human rights which are declined by some radical religious leaders. 
 
2.1. Definition of modern global terrorism 
The content of this part comprises terrorist activities and their motivation. At first, terrorism 
itself has to be defined. The “European Forum for Urban Safety” (2007: 19) declares inter alia 
following characteristics: 
• The common norms and rules how disputes and protests are handled are harmed 
• It is designed to create a “climate of extreme fear” 
• The victims weren’t the actual target, but rather a wider political or religious goal. 
As already mentioned, terrorist attacks have been carried out in the 60s and 70s by radical 
political organisations in Europe. Anti-terror-strategies were introduced for the first time by 
different nations, gaining more attention through the events of 9/11. Since then the fear of 
religiously motivated terrorism has been kept high in the Western world, especially in the 
USA. But also European capitals became targets for terrorist assaults. But why do terrorists 
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prefer the Western capitals as favourable targets and not the less protected periphery? This 
has several reasons, which are discussed in the following chapter.35 
 
2.2. The city as a symbol of the Western way of life 
This part of the article will analyse the role of the urban centres in Europe as targets for 
terrorists. First of all, the high density of residents makes the urban space a preferred target. In 
addition, the concentration of media plays an important role. Terrorists want to maximise the 
impact of their assaults. To gain this impact media coverage is very important. The two planes 
that hit the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York for example were timed in a way that 
the journalists had enough time to focus the WTC until the second plane crashed into the 
second tower. To kill as many people as possible and to achieve an enormous media impact 
are two, so to say, “practical” reasons for attacking specifically cities. However, there is a 
symbolic motivation, too. 
The fundamentalist Islamist way of life is in stark contrast to the Western way of life. It is 
shaped by conservatism, traditionalism and the denial of modern Western norms and 
behaviour. Capitalism in the West is seen as an enemy or conqueror of their own culture. And 
the Western way of life corresponds most closely to the urban way of life, which stands for 
heterogeneity, capitalism and economic progress. Thus places that represent these 
antagonistic ideals are preferred targets. The destruction of these places is a symbolic 
demonstration of the rejection of the way of life their citizens practise (Coward 2006. 165 f.). 
An important concept in the perception of cities in wars or terrorist attacks is “urbicide”. As 
Shaw states urbicide can be seen as a component of genocide. The definition of genocide is 
the destruction of a certain “it”. In this sense “it” refers to a member of a specific ethnical, 
religious or political group. But genocide also implies the destruction of symbolic urban 
fabric, referred to as “urbicide”. Buildings with an important meaning for the antagonistic side 
are ruined to weaken the coherence of the enemy.36 As a conclusion Shaw argues that 
genocide cannot be separated from “urbicide” and vice versa (Shaw 2006: 149). This concept 
should help us understand why certain places with a symbolic meaning are favoured targets. 
European and American cities represent the “western way of life”. By attacking this space 
terrorists attack the whole system with its particular values represented by them. This explains 
why terrorist attacks mainly take place in urban centres and not in rural regions. 
Consequently, measures of counter-terrorism were mainly carried out in cities, too. These 
measures and their outcomes will be discussed in the following part of the article. 
 
                                                 
35 More information about the goals of terrorism and other aspects can be found in the article by Sascha 
Geissler. 
36 This is just a very brief overview over the concept “urbicide”. It will be reviewed with more detail in the 
chapter by Henning Günter. 
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3. Consequences of terrorism in cities in terms of surveillance 
After 9/11 an intense discussion about the security of the Western nations arose. Politicians 
focused on methods which should facilitate preventing terrorist assaults and detecting 
terrorists. Some of these measures and their outcomes for today’s life will be discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
3.1 The role of the discourse 
An important issue is the developing discourse about the threat emanating from the “Muslim 
world”. Often discrimination is not only about the religious or political ideas of a person but 
also about their culture and the related way of the people’s appearance. There is a great 
danger in the “othering” and subsequent exclusion of people with other cultural background 
than the Western one. Especially the Arab-Muslim population was affected by the political 
discourse and consequences from 9/11 in America (Body-Gendrot 2012: 53). The discourse in 
politics and the media influences the whole population of a country. Body-Gendrot states that 
after 9/11 approx. 1.200 men with Muslim background were arrested, most of them just 
because of the violation of immigration laws, what wouldn’t be the cause for an arrest without 
the terrorist attacks (Body-Gendrot 2012: 54). Another example that can be found in the daily 
media abundantly is that foreign looking people are checked more often than Westerners (see, 
for example, Isenberg 2012: n.p.). Later on, I will illustrate this claim taking the example of 
London. Exclusionary and discriminatory trends can be accelerated by the political discourse 
about the “enemy” or the “Islamic threat”. This should illustrate how politics and public 
discourses can spread a climate of exclusion, mainly based on the cultural and religious 
background of people or their appearance. In Europe this debate wasn’t as extensive as in the 
US, nevertheless the increasing number of anti-European, anti-Islamic, nationalist parties also 
shows the growing fear of “the stranger” in Europe. But modern societies and therein 
especially urban places in Europe often benefit from the inclusion of other cultures, the 
mixing of different ways of living and the tolerance between each group. Without tolerance in 
turn intercultural tension can weaken a city or even make it uninhabitable. Subsequently, the 
exclusion of foreign citizens in a former tolerant city can divide or weaken a society. 
 
3.2 Growing security-measures in European cities 
The main counter-terrorism measures which have been taken were to extend the employment 
of diverse surveillance technologies with different functions. There are those ones that 
monitor behaviour and others which identify people (Lyon 2006: 299). Of course both are 
linked very often and work together. In the following part I will introduce four surveillance 
technologies and their consequences for the urban life. 
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3.2.1 Biometrics and ID-cards 
The first measure is the recording of biometric data of to identify individuals. This includes 
fingerprints, irises or hand geometry. The Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, for instance, 
introduced eye scanners after 9/11. In connection with a smart card, travellers can be 
identified swiftly and precisely (Lyon 2006: 299 f.). This measure of identification is strongly 
linked to another surveillance technology, the ID cards. They are a way to be sure if a person 
is actually the one he pretends to be and if he’s got the right to be in this place. This contains 
several problems if one bears in mind that it always needs to be decided first who has access 
to certain spaces, e.g. in the case of crossing borders. This can cause an exclusion of people 
with inadequate documentation. The identifying methods, such as the new fingerprint on ID-
cards in Germany, will be extended until the population refuses to allocate their data. At the 
moment many people just accept these measures as a price of security. But the danger that the 
gigantic databases could end up in the wrong hands is commonly overseen. Another problem 
is that, regardless of all surveillance measures, most terrorists will find their way onto certain 
blacklists not before they have actually committed a crime (Lyon 2006: 301 ff.). 
3.2.2 CCTV and monitoring communication 
Besides these technologies aiming to identify people, the second category includes 
technologies of monitoring. The most famous is the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). After 
9/11 many technologies of CCTV were adjusted with the possibility to recognise faces. They 
are especially used in airports in the USA to scan travellers and crew members. But also in 
Europe, e.g. in the Newham district in London with about 300 installed cameras, face 
recognition technologies were adopted (Lyon 2006: 303). Lyon argues that face recognition is 
mainly used to detect petty criminals, because there isn’t any reliable data or photographs of 
every possible terrorist. Moreover, the chance of a false alarm is very high, where 9,999 false 
alarms stack up to one accurate identification (Lyon 2006: 304). This refers to the former 
point that people are classified and suspected just by their appearance, and this classification 
could possibly cause restrictions to access a space. Certain groups with similar attributes, e.g. 
long beards, could be excluded or discriminated by using these technologies. 
Another current issue is the surveillance of communication. Interception of conversations via 
mobiles or telephones or the observation of activities in the World-Wide Web by governments 
are common these days in the USA as well as in Europe. In the guise of anti-terrorism 
measures politicians gather plenty of personal data of every person. This data can be used to 
classify people with similar interests or to search for criminals of all kind. The current 
discussion on the National Security Agency (NSA) using their program PRISM to monitor the 
usage of millions of internet-users also in Europe shows how anti-terror laws can lead to a 
restriction of actions. Checking for key-words in emails, for example, can lead to the 
inclusion of an innocent person into a terrorism blacklist. This doesn’t mean any limitations at 
first, but one could be checked ever again if the government reckons it as necessary. It could 
even reject access to particular nations (Lyon 2006: 305 ff.).  
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3.2.3 London as a case study for increasing CCTV 
To conclude this chapter I will highlight London as a place with the highest density of 
surveillance technologies in Europe and the occurred consequences by these measures. 
London was a target of terrorists’ activities in the last decades, starting in the early 1990s with 
attacks by the IRA. Consequently, London developed very early different measures to protect 
the city from terrorism. The London Police has four important goals named “high visibility 
policing, directed intelligence, technology, partnership” (Coaffee 2006: 293). The modern 
“ring of steel” (ibid: 278) was built to protect the central business district. It consists of armed 
road checkpoints, parking restrictions, highly developed CCTV (over 15,000 surveillance 
cameras) and the defending architecture of buildings such as the American embassy or the 
London’s House of Parliament (Body-Gendrot 2001: 95). This helped the City of London to 
safeguard its inclusion into the economic global market, while excluding itself from the 
fragmented rest of the urban area. Coaffee calls the present condition as a “global connection 
and local disconnection” (Coaffee 2006: 294). Furthermore, he remarks that no terrorists were 
caught by the surveillance systems but mainly petty criminals. As a conclusion the City of 
London can be seen as a secure place for business life. However, the restriction of social life 
and the requirement of a certain kind of behaviour exclude specific people from urban life in 
central London. 
Another aspect that was mentioned before is the building of a community of suspects in 
London, mainly consisting of Muslims. It has been discovered that the number of controlled 
Muslims rose from over 10,000 in 2002 to nearly a quarter million in 2009 (Body-Gendrot 
2011: 94). The controlled people are differentiated by communities and not by ideologies and 
are discriminated this way. Another example is that CCTV with the task to collect license 
plates automatically were about to be installed in Birmingham, where predominantly Muslims 
lived (Body-Gendrot 2011: 94). With the example given I wanted to visualize the problems 
which can occur if security measures are intensified too much. In the last chapter this issue 
will be tackled again and will lead to the conclusion of this article. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The threat of terrorist assaults in European cities is still considered to be relatively high. As 
already mentioned in the introduction nearly every year some kind of terrorist attack occurs in 
the urban regions of Europe. This keeps the fear alive of being a potential victim of such an 
attack, even if one’s own spatial actuation habits were not affected. This causes a high 
wariness, e.g. towards things like left-alone suitcases at places like airports which may be 
helpful in a few cases. But it can also create diffuse fears of people with a different cultural 
background or appearance. Prejudices and reservation towards these can slow down or block 
the integration and inclusion of foreign people into our modern society. Urban space has 
always been the fertile soil to practice a peaceful co-existence and the fear of terror means a 
cessation of this process. 
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Furthermore, the technological solutions to fight or prevent terrorism in urban spaces are 
often inadequate to deal with the threat of terrorism and, simultaneously, dangerous for our 
democracies. Lyon mentions three central points where anti-terror measures can be dangerous 
for our modern society: 
1. The growing influence of surveillance, police and supervision can be seen as a 
recentralisation of state power. The state decides which behaviour or appearance is 
accepted and which is suspicious. Who will be scrutinised specifically after having 
been filmed? This question leads directly to the second statement. 
2. Certain algorithmic surveillance programs detect suspects by specific attributes. These 
can lead to an exclusion of a certain group of people, just by their physical appearance. 
3. Finally the lack of accountability for these measures has to be seen critical. Most of 
the people accept that their fingerprints are taken or their faces are filmed as a “price 
of security” (Lyon 2006: 310) 
To conclude this article I will quote Swanstrom (after Jon Coaffee 2006: 296) with his 
statement on the growing surveillance measures in cities:  
“The main threat to cities comes not from terrorism but from the policy responses to terrorism that 
could undermine the freedom of thought and movement that are the lifeblood of cities.”  
 
 
References 
Body-Gendrot, S. 2012. Globalization, Fear and Insecurity. Challenges for Cities North and 
South. London. 
Coaffee, J. 2006: Recasting the “Ring of Steel”: Designing out Terrorism in the City of 
London? In Graham, S. (ed.): Cities, War and Terrorism. Malden, 276-297 
Coward, M. 2006. Urbicide in Bosnia. In Graham, S. (ed.): Cities, War and Terrorism. 
Malden, 154-172 
European Forum for Urban Safety. 2007. Secucities – Cities Against Terrorism. Training 
local Representatives in facing Terrorism. Paris. 
Graham, S. 2011. Cities under Siege. The New Military Urbanism. London/ New York. 
Lyon, D. 2006. Technology vs. “Terrorism”: Circuits of City Surveillance Since September 
11, 2001. In Graham, S. (ed.): Cities, War and Terrorism. Malden, 297-312 
Shaw, M. 2006. New Wars of the City: Relationships of “Urbicide” and “Genocide”. In 
Graham, S. (ed.): Cities, War and Terrorism. Malden, 141-154 
 
 
197 
 
Other sources 
Sciolino, E. 2004. Spain Struggles to Absorb Worst Terrorist Attacks in Its History. New 
York Times, 11.03.2004. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/11/international/europe/11CND-TRAI.html 
(accessed: 15.07.2013).  
Cowell, A. 2005. Subway and Bus Blast Kill at Least 37. New York Times, 08.072005. 
[Online] Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/08/international/europe/08bombings.html?pagewante
d=all&_r=0 (accessed: 15.07.2013). 
Isenberg, M. 2012. Stehen Ausländer bei Polizei unter Generalverdacht? Stuttgarter 
Nachrichten. 09.05.2012. [Online] Available at: http://www.stuttgarter-
nachrichten.de/inhalt.polizeikontrollen-stehen-auslaender-bei-polizei-unter-
generalverdacht.de5869a0-b7ec-49ff-b03d-cac4c742ce55.html (accessed: 20.07.2013). 
Zeit Online 2013. Anti-Terror-Gesetze bis 2015 verlängert. Zeit Online, 28.10.2011. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-10/anti-terror-gesetz-
verlaengerung (accessed: 15.07.2013). 
 
